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The first two essays in this thesis discuss stock return forecast (prediction), a 
thrilling endeavor of both practitioners and academics of finance with a long history. 
The practitioners forecast the stock return in real-time to optimize asset allocation and 
seek an alpha return. In the meantime, recognizing the underlying reason of return 
predictability may help academic researchers identify what variables explain/drive the 
stock returns, and thus help them produce improved asset pricing theory. 
Most of the existing literature on stock return prediction focus on the 
macroeconomic variables, including the dividend-price ratio, inflation rate, interest rate, 
volatility, et cetera (e.g., Campbell & Thompson 2008; Welch & Goyal 2008). However, 
little attention has been paid to the technical indicator (technical analysis) which is 
extensively used by practitioners (Burghardt & Walls 2011; Covel 2009; Lo & 
Hasanhodzic 2010, 2011; Menkhoff 2010; Park & Irwin 2007; Schwager 2012). 
Meanwhile, most of the literature on technical indicator exclusively investigate the 
profitability but do not investigate the ability of technical indicator in directly predicting 
the equity risk premium, while predicting equity premium is the focus of vast literature 
on macroeconomic variables. The only exception is Neely et al. (2014) and they find 
that technical indicator provides vast complementary information to macroeconomic 
variables in predicting equity risk premium in the U.S. 
The first essay extends the playground to China, and investigates the predictability 
of technical indicator together with macroeconomic variables in China. We choose 
China for several reasons. Firstly, the Chinese stock market hase become increasingly 
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relevant to not only the academics but also the investment industry. Since 2015, 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange together has become the second largest stock 
market by market capitalization (the largest is NYSE). Secondly, a high level of 
information friction due to non-transparency and short-sell restriction, and the 
prevalence of individual investors causing more server behaviour biases (underreaction 
and overreaction) can boost the predictive power of technical indicators. Lastly, no 
study has examined the predictability of technical analysis in China, so my first essay 
filled the gap. We find that technical indicators outperform macroeconomic variables 
in China and capture ample complementary information. We also find that weekly-level 
technical indicators outperform monthly-level ones, implying a short-term trending 
feature of the Chinese stock market. 
The second essay shifts the focus to the U.S. and other international markets, and 
is the first study to investigate the predictability of technical indicator in a cross-
sectional view. We find that the predictive power of intermediate-term technical 
indicator identified by Neely et al. (2014) is only useful in predicting the top 10% U.S. 
companies by market cap, it appears to be a calendar effect, and it does not work well 
in many other countries. In contrast, the short-term technical indicator can well predict 
much more U.S. companies, it is not a calendar phenomenon, and it can well predict 
Japan and other Asia-pacific markets. Finally, contradict to the vast literature on the 
profitability of technical analysis, we find no positive correlation between volatility and 
the performance of technical indicators. 
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On the foundation of the Fama and French (2015) five-factor asset pricing model, 
the third essay proposes three additional risk factors in China based on: 1.) substantial 
daily-level short-term reversal; 2.) state ownership; 3.) institutional ownership, all of 
which are unique features of the Chinese stock market. We identify vast useful 
information provided by our proposed factors and we suggest that the five-factor asset 
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We examine how technical indicator can help predict the Chinese equity premium. 
In-sample tests show that technical indicators provide complementary information to 
macroeconomic variables in predicting the Chinese equity risk premium. Out-of-
sample tests suggest that technical indicators perform more consistently in the weekly 
frequency than in the monthly frequency. The weekly-level predictive power of 
technical indicators also presents on the firm-level, exist in the cross-section and 
generates robust certainty equivalent return. Overall, the Chinese stock market return 
seems to have a shorter-term price trend than the US. The predictive power of technical 





1. Introduction  
Numerous studies report evidence regarding the power of macroeconomic 
variables to predict the U.S. equity risk premium (e.g., Breen, Glosten & Jagannathan 
1989; Campbell 1987; Cochrane 2007; Fama & French 1988, 1989; Fama & Schwert 
1977; Ferson & Harvey 1991; Lettau & Ludvigson 2001; Pástor & Stambaugh 2009; 
Pettenuzzo, Timmermann & Valkanov 2014), while others report findings for 
international markets (e.g., Ang & Bekaert 2006; Bekaert & Hodrick 1992; Cutler, 
Poterba & Summers 1991; Ferson & Harvey 1993; Harvey 1991; Henkel, Martin & 
Nardari 2011; Hjalmarsson 2010; Solnik 1993), including China (e.g., Chen, J et al. 
2016; Chen, X et al. 2010; Goh et al. 2013; Jiang, F et al. 2011). Contrary to 
macroeconomic variables, technical indicators have received less attention despite their 
extensive use among practitioners (Covel 2009; Lo & Hasanhodzic 2010, 2011; 
Menkhoff 2010; Menkhoff & Taylor 2007; Park & Irwin 2007; Schwager 2012).  
Our study examines the ability of technical indicators to predict the Chinese equity 
premium. We add to the existing literature on equity premium predictability by 
investigating the power of technical indicators in conjunction with macroeconomic 
variables to predict the U.S. equity risk premium (for a recent example, see Neely et al. 
2014). While a lot of the existing literature on technical analysis is focused for the most 
part on the profitability of technical indicators (e.g., Brock, Lakonishok & LeBaron 
1992; Lo, Mamaysky & Wang 2000a), we examine the predictive power of technical 
indicator directly over the equity risk premium. 
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Theoretically, macroeconomic variables can predict the equity risk premium 
because they measure changing macroeconomic conditions which are the fundamental 
drivers of time-varying expected returns. This predictive ability is consistent with 
rational asset pricing and reflects fluctuations in aggregate risk exposure which 
produces time-varying discount rates (see, for example, Cochrane 2011; Rapach, D & 
Zhou 2013). In contrast, the predictive ability of trend-following technical indicators is 
still controversial and requires more discussion. Cespa and Vives (2012) show that, in 
the presence of heterogeneous information, asset prices can systematically diverge 
away from fundamental values and generate rational trends in the market. Alternatively, 
behavioral biases can lead to deviation from fundamental values. For example, Hong 
and Stein (1999) show that investors tend to underreact to new information at first and 
then overreact in the long run, pushing the price higher. Daniel, K, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) suggest that investors are overconfident about their private 
information and overreact to confirming news, therefore causing the price trend. 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) posit that investors underweight new information 
and therefore cause price continuation. Finally, investor sentiment seems to be related 
to technical indicator’s predictive power. Neely et al. (2014) find that technical 
indicator can significantly predict the investor sentiment index, while measures of 
investor sentiment are found to help explain U.S. and international equity returns (Baker 
& Wurgler 2006, 2007; Baker, Wurgler & Yuan 2012) 
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Investigating technical indicators in China is interesting for three reasons. Firstly, 
individual investors dominate the Chinese stock market. By March 2018, 99.73% of the 
total security accounts belong to individual investors (China Securities Depository and 
Clearing Co. Ltd, http://www.chinaclear.cn). The Chinese retail investors are not well-
educated financially, gambling oriented, and prone to behavioral biases. Therefore, as 
discussed above, the prevalence of behavioral biases (e.g., underreaction and 
overreaction) in China may result in price trend and would boost the predictive power 
of technical indicators.  
Secondly, short-sell is highly restricted in the Chinese stock market and is only 
open to the high-net-worth Chinese investor. As of December 5, 2016, there are 950 A-
shares allowed to be borrowed and short, a number that is less than one-third of the total 
number of A-shares. Short-sell restriction can slow price discovery process (Bai, Y, 
Chang & Wang 2007; Chang, Cheng & Yu 2007; Miller 1977). Jiang, GJ, Lu and Zhu 
(2014) posit that short-sale restriction causes negative information not instantaneously 
incorporated into stock prices. As a result, a gradual market reaction to news indicates 
a price continuation and the predictive power of the trend-following technical indicators.  
Thirdly, initiated in December 1990, the Chinese stock market has a short history. 
Its regulatory system is under development, and asymmetric information problem is 
still severe. Chinese listed companies have weaker corporate governance and weaker 
shareholder protection compared with the developed markets (Bai, C-E et al. 2004; Sun 
& Tong 2003; Wei, Xie & Zhang 2005). Overall, the Chinese market embeds 
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considerable amount of uncertainty due to unstable policy and non-transparent 
information. Zhang (2006) show that investors tend to underreact more to new 
information under greater information uncertainty. Taylor (2014) finds that the excess 
return of technical analyses is higher when there are higher market illiquidity and 
macroeconomic uncertainty. Along this line, we believe the uncertainty within the 
Chinese stock market would benefit the performance of technical indicator. 
We perform both in-sample and out-of-sample tests and use data spanning 1997:07 
to 2016:12. Our methodology is similar to that of Neely et al. (2014). However, unlike 
their US result, we find that monthly-level technical indicators do not provide 
comparable predictive power to the macroeconomic variables. In contrast, we find that 
technical indicators perform more consistently in the weekly frequency in China. We 
highlight our contributions in the following: 
 Monthly-level in sample tests show that technical indicators provide 
complementary information to the macroeconomic variables in predicting the 
Chinese equity premium and the R2 are much higher than the US result reported 
in Neely et al. (2014). Weekly-level technical indicators also exhibit tremendous 
predictive power. However, traditional asset pricing models leave no room for 
technical analysis despite growing evidence of its predictive power. 
 In the out-of-sample tests, macroeconomic variables outperform the benchmark 
while monthly-level technical indicators underperform. In contrast, weekly-level 
technical indicators can deliver more powerful and consistent predictive power 
both in-sample and out-of-sample, and generate considerable certainty equivalent 
return gain after transaction cost. Moreover, the predictive ability of the weekly-
level technical indicators presents on the firm-level while monthly-level ones do 
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not. We argue the weekly-level predictive power is of great economic value given 
the scarcity of weekly-level predictor. 
 The superior performance of weekly-level trend-following technical indicators 
reveals that the price trend mainly exists in the weekly frequency in the Chinese 
stock market. This finding suggests a short-term price trend in China, consistent 
with Pan, Tang and Xu (2013) who find that momentum only exists in the weekly 
frequency in China, as well as Han et al. (2014) who show that a short-term 
moving average delivers a substantial alpha return in this market. Moreover, our 
finding sheds light on why the previous studies fail to find momentum in China 
(e.g. Cakici, Chatterjee & Topyan 2015; Chui, Titman & Wei 2010; Griffin, Ji & 
Martin 2003; Li et al. 2017; Wang & Chin 2004). The reason is that they only 
exclusively examine the monthly-level data following the standard literature 
regarding momentum, while the price trend presents mainly in the weekly 
frequency. 
 Compared to the US, the Chinese stock market seems to have a higher-frequency 
price trend. Our result poses a theoretical implication that any asset pricing theory 
addressing price trend (rational or behavioral) should be able to explain the 
difference in price trend across countries. The underlying reason for this 
international difference can be an interesting research topic. 
 Finally, cross-sectional tests suggest that the predictive ability of technical 
indicators is sensitive to market cap but not to volatility, different from the existing 
literature of technical indicators which usually find volatility is a strongly 
correlated with the profitability of the technical indicators (e.g., Glabadanidis 
2015b; Han, Yang & Zhou 2013). This puzzling discrepancy among the two 




2. Predictive regression and the predictors 
A conventional way to analyze the in-sample predictability is through the following 
model: 
 𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑗𝑥𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 , (1) 
where the equity risk premium, 𝑟𝑡+1, is the return on the market portfolio in excess of 
the risk-free rate from period 𝑡  to 𝑡 + 1; 𝑥𝑗,𝑡  is the predictor at time 𝑡 ; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1  is the 
disturbance term with zero mean. 𝑥𝑗,𝑡  can take the value of the level of a 
macroeconomic variable, or a trading signal 𝑆𝑖,𝑡  generated by a technical indicator. 
Under the null hypothesis 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 = 0 , 𝑥𝑗,𝑡  cannot predict the equity risk premium of 
portfolio 𝑖. In this case, the model breaks down into a constant expected equity risk 
premium model. We test 𝐻0: 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 = 0 against 𝐻1: 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 > 0 using the heteroskedasticity-
consistent t-statistic1, based on an ordinary least square (OLS) procedure.  
When the independent variable is highly persistent, the Stambaugh (1999) bias may 
inflate the t-statistic and distorts test size. Many of the conventional indicators are 
highly persistent. We address this issue by calculating p-value using a bootstrap 
procedure, and we base the statistical interpretation on the wild bootstrapping p-value.  
The current study performs predictive regression (1) on both monthly return and 
weekly return of a value-weighted market portfolio2, which is constructed using all A-
shares’ log return and rebalances at the end of every month (week). A-shares include 
                                                 
1 We use the Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistic with 5 lags. 
2 Our results are qualitatively similar when use the Shanghai Composite index 
return as a proxy for the market portfolio return.  
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all stocks traded in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange open to domestic investors 
and trade in RMB (Chinese yuan). The Chinese A-shares data is obtained from 
Datastream. Chinese risk-free rate is retrieved from the China Stock Market & 
Accounting Research database (CSMAR). 
2.1. Macroeconomic variables 
For the monthly-level analysis, we study 15 monthly macroeconomic predictors 
which are representative of the existing literature (Jiang, F et al. 2011; Neely et al. 2014; 
Welch & Goyal 2008), as well as considering data availability in China. They are book-
to-market ratio (BM), cash-flow to price ratio (CFP), dividend-earnings ratio (DE), 
dividend-price ratio (DP), dividend yield (DY), earning-price ratio (EP), inflation 
(INFL), stock variance (SVAR), trading volume scaled by market value (VO/MV), 
volatility index (VIX), 7-days repo rate (R007), overnight interbank lending rate 
(IBO001), M0 growth (M0G), M1 growth shock (M1G), and M2 growth (M2G). A 
detailed description of the data construction and data source is in Table 1.1. 
Our sample period starts in December 2002 and continues until November 20163 
due to data availability. Money supply data (M0, M1 and M2) is available starting at 
the end of 1999 and the short-term interest rates (R007 and IBO001) are available from 
the end of 2002. Both short-term interest rate and money supply data are gauges of the 
monetary policy pursued by the People’s Bank of China (the central bank). Monetary 
policy can affect the equity market return is through the credit channel of monetary 
                                                 
3 Section 3.4 also reports the results based on an extended sample from July 1997. 
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policy described in Bernanke and Gertler (1995). Looser monetary policy leads to 
cheaper bank credit loan which is a major financing channel for the listed Chinese firms, 
and thus may affect the equity market return (Jiang et al. 2011). In Table 1.2 we report 
the descriptive statistics for the market portfolio monthly (weekly) excess return and 
the fifteen macroeconomic variables. The valuation ratios (BM, CFP, DE, DP, DY, and 
EP), INFL, VO/MV and SVAR are highly persistent with a high autocorrelation 
coefficient at lag 1.  
2.2. Technical indicators 
Following Neely et al. (2014), we compare the macroeconomic variables to three 
types of trend-following technical indicators. They are the Moving Average (MA), 
Momentum (MOM), and Volume-based indicator (VOL).  
A MA indicator generates a trading signal by comparing two moving averages at 
the end of 𝑡: 
 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡 ≥ 𝑀𝐴𝑙,𝑡








𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 0 and 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 1  suggests a sell and buy signal, respectively; 𝑗 denotes the 
maximum lag of the MA length and can be either 𝑠 or 𝑙 (short or long); 𝑃𝑡 is the level 
of a portfolio index at time 𝑡. Therefore, an MA indicator will generate a signal based 
on a comparison between the value of 𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡 and 𝑀𝐴𝑙,𝑡 . When 𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡  exceeds (falls 
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short of) 𝑀𝐴𝑙,𝑡 , indicating an upward (downward) trend, a buy (sell) signal will be 
generated. We denote the cross-over MA indicator as 𝑀𝐴(𝑠, 𝑙) . We use a 
comprehensive range of cross-over MA indicators with 𝑠 = 1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ(𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘) and 𝑙 =
3, 5, 7, 9, 11 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠(𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠).4  
Our second technical indicator is based on the well-known momentum effect, and 
it generates a trading signal in the following way: 
 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑡−𝑚
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑡 < 𝑃𝑡−𝑚
 (4) 
For a 𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑚) indicator, when the level of the portfolio index exceeds (falls short 
of) its past level 𝑚 periods ago, a buy (sell) signal will be generated by this indicator. 
Again, we examine a comprehensive range of 𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑚)  indictors, with 𝑚 =
3, 5, 7, 9, 11 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠(𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠). 
Another technical indicator is the volume-based (VOL) indicator, following Neely 
et al. (2014). This indicator incorporates information in both past prices and trading 
volume. It generates a trading signal based on the “on-balance” trading volume (OBV): 
 
𝑂𝐵𝑉𝑡 = ∑ 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑘𝐷𝑘
𝑡
𝑘=1
, 𝐷𝑘 = {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑡−1
−1 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑡 < 𝑃𝑡−1
 (5) 
where 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑘 is the total trading volume of the portfolio (stock) during period 𝑘. 𝐷𝑘 is a 
binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the current price is equal or higher than the 
price of the last timestep and equals ─1 if the price is lower than that of the last timestep.  
                                                 
4 We examine a more comprehensive set of technical indicators than Neely et al. 
(2014) who only focus on indicators with 𝑙 = 9, 12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠.  
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Based on the moving average of the on-balance trading volume (𝑂𝐵𝑉𝑡), a 𝑉𝑂𝐿 
indicator generates trading signal in the following way: 
 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = {













A 𝑉𝑂𝐿(𝑠, 𝑙) indicator generates a buy (sell) signal when the movement in trading 
volume accompanies a continuation of recent price increases (decreases). Similarly to 
𝑀𝐴(𝑠, 𝑙) and 𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑚) , we examine 𝑉𝑂𝐿(𝑠, 𝑙)  with 𝑠 = 1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ(𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘)  and 𝑙 =
3, 5, 7, 9, 11 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠(𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠). 
Finally, to differentiate the weekly-level technical indicators from the monthly-
level indicators, we denoted the weekly-level indicators as 
𝑀𝐴(𝑠, 𝑙)𝑤 , 𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑚)𝑤 and 𝑉𝑂𝐿(𝑠, 𝑙)𝑤 . Note that our choice of parameters suggest 
that the weekly technical indicators employ the prior price information of up to 11 
weeks (approximate 2.53 months). This is complementary to the monthly-level 
technical indicators that captures price information between past 3 months to past 11 
months. Thus, the weekly technical indicators we have examined use non-overlapping 




3. Empirical results 
3.1. In-sample tests 
We first investigate the monthly equity premium before we focus on our weekly-
level results. Table 1.3 reports estimates of the slope coefficients for the predictive 
regression (1) and the left-hand-side variable is the market portfolio monthly excess 
return from December 2002 until November 2016. Panel A of Table 1.3 shows that 10 
of the 15 Macroeconomic variables have significant predictive power. A monthly R2 
near 0.5% can represent an economically significant degree of equity risk premium 
predictability (Campbell & Thompson 2008; Kandel & Stambaugh 1996; Xu 2004). 
The macroeconomic variables with significant predictive power have R2 statistics 
ranging from 1.29% to 8.17% and are well above the 0.5% threshold. INFL, VO/MV, 
and DY deliver the highest R2 of 8.17%, 4.45%, and 4.38%, respectively. Our newly 
proposed short-term interest rates gauges, R007 and IBO001 can significantly predict 
the Chinese stock market risk premium, revealing a significant effect of monetary 
policy on Chinese equity premium. Overall, most of the R2 statistics are larger than the 
US result reported in Neely et al. (2014).  
Turning to the monthly-level technical indicators, the right-hand-side of Table 1.3 
shows that 12 of the 15 monthly technical indicators have significant predictive power. 
The R2 statistics hover around 2% for MA and a bit less than that for MOM and VOL, 
most of which are well above the 0.5 % threshold for economic significance. Overall, 
monthly-level technical indicators in China also provide higher in-sample R2 than the 
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US technical indicators reported in Neely et al. (2014). The slope estimates imply that 
a buy signal suggests the equity risk premium next month will be 84 basis points to 330 
basis points higher when compared to a sell signal.  
As a next step, we examine the sensitivity of predictive power under different 
market conditions. Similar to Neely et al. (2014), to compare the predictability under 
different market condition, we compute the following sub-sample R2 statistic: 
 
𝑅𝑐







𝑡=1 (𝑟𝑡 − ?̅?)
2
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐 = 𝑆𝑇𝐴, 𝑉𝑂𝐿; (8) 
where 𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑇𝐴 (𝐼𝑡
𝑉𝑂𝐿) is an indicator variable that equals 1 when month (week) 𝑡 is in the 
stable (volatile) periods and equals 0 otherwise. Since there is no business cycle data 
available for the Chinese stock market, we define two volatile periods, from January 
2007 until December 2009 and September 2014 until December 2016, during which the 
market are volatile and experienced two major market crashes. The rest of the sample 
period are defined as stable periods. 𝜀?̂?,𝑡
2  is the fitted residual based on the full-sample 
estimates of the original predictive regression model; ?̅? is the full-sample mean of 𝑟𝑡; 
and 𝑇 is the number of usable observations for the full sample. Therefore, the 𝑅𝑉𝑂𝐿
2  
statistic measures the total variation explained in the volatile periods and the 𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐴
2  
statistic do the same for the stable periods.  
𝑅𝑉𝑂𝐿
2  and 𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐴
2  reported in the left-hand-side of Table 1.3 suggest that a few 
macroeconomic variables perform consistently regardless of stock market volatility 
(BM, CFP, DP, DY, INFL, VO/MV), while some are effective exclusively in the 
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volatile periods (SVAR, R007 and IBO001). In contrast, right-hand-side the of Table 
1.3 shows that most of the technical indicators perform well only in the volatile periods 
given consistently high 𝑅𝑉𝑂𝐿
2  and low 𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐴
2 , similar to the US result in Neely et al. 
(2014). 
Now we turn to the weekly-level predictive regression results. To line up with the 
monthly sample, we based our weekly-level analysis on the weekly excess return of the 
market portfolio of the same period, 27 December 2002 until 2 December 2016. We do 
not report any results for macroeconomic variables for weekly-level analysis because 
very few macroeconomic variables are available on a weekly basis.  
The weekly-level predictive regression result is in Table 1.4. Panel A shows that 
every single weekly-level technical indicator exhibits significant predictive power. 14 
out of the 15 weekly technical indicators generate R2 statistics exceeding the monthly 
threshold of 0.5%, ranging from 0.64% to 1.51%. A similar level of R2 statistic in the 
weekly-level predictive regression to the monthly-level one should indicate a stronger 
predictive power since the weekly returns are noisier by definition. However, since 
there is little guidance in the literature regarding a threshold of R2 statistics for a weekly 
predictive regression, we leave the inference to the reader. The slope estimates imply 
that buy signals predict the equity risk premium next week to be 46 basis points to 89 
basis points higher compared to the sell signals. 
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3.2. In-sample tests based on principal component analysis 
To simultaneously incorporate the information from multiple predictors, we use a 
principal component analysis following the literature (Ludvigson & Ng 2007, 2009; 
Neely et al. 2014). The advantage of using the principal component analysis is to 
capture the key co-movements in multiple variables, filter out the noise in individual 
predictors, and mitigate the in-sample overfitting problem. The principal component 
predictive regression model (PC-ECON, PC-TECH and PC-ALL model) is defined as: 
 




+ 𝜀𝑡+1    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 = 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁, 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻, 𝐴𝐿𝐿 (9) 
where ?̂?𝑡
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁 = (?̂?1,𝑡
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁, … , ?̂?𝐾,𝑡
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁)′ denotes the vector containing the first K principal 
components estimated from the N-vector (𝑁 = 15) of all macroeconomic variables; 
?̂?𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 = (?̂?1,𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻, … , ?̂?𝐾,𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻)′ denotes for the vector containing the first K principal 
components estimated from the N-vector (𝑁 = 15) of all technical indicators; ?̂?𝑡
𝐴𝐿𝐿 =
(?̂?1,𝑡
𝐴𝐿𝐿 , … , ?̂?𝐾,𝑡
𝐴𝐿𝐿)′  denotes the vector containing the first K principal components 
extracted from the N-vector (𝑁 = 30) of all predictors taken together. The value of K 
is determined by the adjusted R2 and we restrict K to be no larger than 3. We use OLS 
to estimate model (9) and base our inferences on the wild bootstrapped p-values. 
To compare the technical indicators with different time horizon, we also consider 
?̂?𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻(3,5)
 which is first K principal component extracted from the N-vector (𝑁 = 6) 
of short-term technical indicators 𝑀𝐴(1, 𝑙), 𝑀𝑂𝑀(1, 𝑙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝐿(1, 𝑙) with 𝑙 = 3, 5, 
and ?̂?𝑡
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻(9,11)
which is the first K principal component extracted from the N-
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vector (𝑁 = 6) of relatively long-term technical indicators with 𝑙 = 9, 11. Similarly, 
we examine these principal components based on model (9) and the corresponding 
models are denoted as PC-TECH[3,5] and PC-TECH[9,11]. 
Panel B of Table 1.3 shows that the PC-ECON model has a K=1 (chosen by 
adjusted R2). The first principal component of macroeconomic variables (?̂?1
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁) has a 
slope coefficient that is significant at 1% significance level and the R2 is 5.95%. 
Moreover, 𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐴
2  is 4.42% and 𝑅𝑉𝑂𝐿
2  is 6.68%, suggesting that macroeconomic variables 
overall perform consistently under different market volatility and do slightly better in 
volatile periods.  
Right-hand-side of Panel B shows that the PC-TECH model has a K=1 (chosen by 
adjusted R2) and the first principal component of the technical indicators (?̂?1
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻) has 
significant predictive power with an R2 of 2.60%, lower than that of the macroeconomic 
variables. Meanwhile, the first principal component of the technical indicators with 
relative short-term horizon ( ?̂?1
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻(3,5)







 together provide a similar R2 of 3.39%, indicating that 
short-term and long-term horizon technical indicators have similar predictive power to 
the monthly equity premium. Finally, the high 𝑅𝑉𝑂𝐿
2  and poor 𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐴
2  on the principal 
component models of technical indicators verify that the technical indicators’ predictive 
power concentrate on the volatile periods, similar to the findings documented in the 




Do technical indicators provide complementary information to the macroeconomic 
variables in predicting Chinese equity premium? In Panel C of Table 1.3 we report our 
findings for the PC-ALL model utilizing information from all the predictors. Both ?̂?1
𝐴𝐿𝐿 
and ?̂?2
𝐴𝐿𝐿 show significant predictive power and the PC-ALL model delivers a R2 of 
9.29%, higher than that of PC-ECON model and PC-TECH model combined, also much 
higher than the US result reported by Neely et al. (2014). Therefore, in-sample tests 
suggest that macroeconomic variables and technical indicators seem to provide non-
overlapping information and complement each other in predicting the equity risk 
premium.  
Turning to the weekly-level principal component result reported in Table 1.4. In 
Panel B we show that the first principal component based on all weekly technical 
indicators (?̂?1
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑤) has significant predictive power with an R2 of 1.45%. The principal 
component based on short-term horizon weekly indicators ( ?̂?1
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻[3,5]𝑤
) delivers 





) together also provide significant predictive power and an R2 
of 1.81%. Finally, if we compare 𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐴
2  to 𝑅𝑉𝑂𝐿
2 , all the principal component models 
perform better in the volatile periods. Overall, in-sample test suggests that technical 
indicator do well in both monthly and weekly frequency. 
3.3. Out-of-sample tests 
Welch and Goyal (2008) show that many popular predictors fail to outperform a 
simple benchmark in the out-of-sample tests. Thus, to further verify the in-sample result, 
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we perform an out-of-sample test on the predictors. Interestingly, we find that weekly-
level technical indicators perform more consistently in the out-of-sample tests.  
Consider the out-of-sample forecasting model: 
 ?̂?𝑡+1 = ?̂?𝑡,𝑖 + ?̂?𝑡,𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑡 , (10) 
For each time step t, we obtain ?̂?𝑡,𝑖 and ?̂?𝑡,𝑖 by regressing the realized return series 
{𝑟𝑠}𝑠=2
𝑡  on a constant and the lagged predictor {𝑥𝑖,𝑠}𝑠=1
𝑡−1
 , where 𝑥𝑖,𝑠 can be the level of 
a macroeconomic variable, as well as the trading signal 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 generated by a technical 









 for 𝑗 = 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁, 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻, 𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝐿𝐿; (11) 
For each timestep t, ?̂?1:𝑡,𝑘,𝑡
𝑗
 is the kth principal component extracted from the 15 
macroeconomic variables (𝑗 = 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁), 15 technical indicators (𝑗 = 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻), or all 30 
predictors taken together (𝑗 = 𝐴𝐿𝐿) estimated using the data through t; the value of K 
is selected by the adjusted R2 and we restrict K to be no larger than 3; and ?̂?𝑡  and 
?̂?𝑡,𝑘 (𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾) are the OLS estimates from continuously regressing the realized 
return {𝑟𝑠}𝑠=2






1, … , 𝐾).  
We use the historical average (HA) forecast as the benchmark forecast, following 
the existing studies (e.g., Campbell & Thompson 2008; Ferreira & Santa-Clara 2011; 
Jiang, F et al. 2011; Neely et al. 2014; Welch & Goyal 2008). This benchmark assumes 
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a constant expected equity risk premium, 𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑡+1. Therefore, we compare the 








We analyze the forecasts based on Campbell and Thompson (2008) out-of-sample 
R2 ( 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 ) and Clark and West (2007) MSFE-adjusted statistics. The 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  statistic 
measures the proportional reduction in mean squared forecast error (MSFE) for the 
predictive regression forecast compared with the historical average forecast. The null 
hypothesis is that the historical average MSFE is less than or equal to the predictive 
regression MSFE, and the alternative hypothesis is historical average MSFE is higher 
than the predictive regression MSFE.  
For monthly-level analysis, December 2002 until December 2007 is the initial 
estimation period (60 months), and January 2008 until November 2016 is the forecast 
evaluation period (107 months). The length of the initial estimation period is close to 
Jiang, F et al. (2011) and Rapach, DE, Strauss and Zhou (2013). We obtain the initial 
estimates of ?̂? and ?̂? using the initial estimation period. We then continuously update 
?̂?  and ?̂?  using an expanding window and evaluate the performance in the forecast 
evaluation period. 
In Table 1.5 we report the out-of-sample forecasting results. Panel A shows that 7 
of the 15 macroeconomic variables outperform the HA benchmark as they have 
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significant MSFE-adjusted statistics with positive 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  ranges from 1.11% to 8.10%. 
Panel B reports that the PC-ECON model outperform the benchmark (𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 = 4.31%). 
In contrast, right-hand-side reports that only two short-term horizon monthly-level 
technical indicators, MA(1,3) and MOM(3), outperform the benchmark. Most technical 
indicators have negative 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 , including the PC-TECH model ( 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 = −2.89%) , 
casting doubt on the reliability of monthly-level technical indicators in predicting the 
Chinese equity risk premium. In contrast, the US result reported in Neely et al. (2014) 
shows that ALL their monthly-level technical indicators have positive 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  and 
outperform the benchmark.  
It is noteworthy that PC-TECH[3,5] model perform far better than PC-TECH[9,11] 
as in Table 1.5, suggesting technical indicator utilizing short-term horizon information 
can more consistently predict Chinese equity premium. The question arises whether our 
week-level technical indicators utilizing shorter-term past price information will 
perform better. 
Out-of-sample performance of the weekly technical indicators reported in Table 
1.6 supports this hypothesis. We use 200 weeks starting from 26 December 2002 until 
20 October 2006 as the initial estimation period (200 weeks), leaving us with 27 
October 2006 until 3 December 2016 as the forecast evaluation period (528 weeks). In 
contrast to the poor out-of-sample performance of the monthly-level technical indicators, 
we identify tremendous predictive power in the weekly-level out-of-sample tests. Panel 
A of Table 1.6 shows that 13 out of 15 weekly-level technical indicators outperform the 
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benchmark historical average forecasting and most MSFE-adjusted statistics are 
significant, showing positive 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 . In Panel B we find that the week-level versions of 
the principal component models significantly outperform the benchmark. The PC-
TECHw model, the PC-TECH[3,5]w model, and the PC-TECH[9,11]w model all 
significantly outperform the HA benchmark.  
 
3.4. Extended sample  
To further verify the difference between monthly-level and weekly-level technical 
indicators, we then examine them on an extended sample beginning at July 1997. This 
extended sample includes 4.5 years of additional data compared to our previous analysis. 
We align the forecast evaluation periods: 2003:01 until 2016:11 for the monthly-level 
analysis and 2003:01:03 until 2016:12:02 for the weekly-level one. The corresponding 
initial estimation periods are the same for both analyses, from July 1997 until the end 
of 2012.  
In Table 1.7 we report the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of the 
monthly-level technical indicators on the extended sample. Although the left-hand-side 
of Table 1.7 shows that the 11 of 15 monthly-level technical indicators have significant 
in-sample predictive power, the right-hand-side indicates only two of them outperform 
the benchmark in the out-of-sample test with marginal significance. The significant 
indicators are still the short-term horizon indicator MA(1,3) and MOM(3). Moreover, 
Panel B of Table 1.7 suggests that short-term model (PC-TECH(3,5)) significant 
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outperform HA benchmark while PC-TECH[9,11] does not, verifying our finding in 
the original sample that short-term past price information seems to help better predict 
Chinese equity premium.  
Table 1.8 reveals that weekly-level technical indicators which utilize shorter-term 
past price information (within 11 weeks, or 2.53 months, complementary to our month-
level indicators) generate substantial predictive power both in-sample and out-of-
sample. Left-hand-side reports that ALL weekly-level technical indicators and their 
principal component models show significant in-sample predictive power. More 
importantly, right-hand-side of Table 1.8 suggests that every single weekly-level 
technical indicator significantly outperform the benchmark forecast in the out-of-
sample tests. Overall, the test on the extended sample verified that technical indicator 
can predict the Chinese equity premium more consistently in the weekly frequency than 
in the monthly frequency.  
In summary, macroeconomic variables can consistently predict monthly equity 
premium in-sample and out-of-sample. Although most monthly-level technical 
underperform the benchmark in the out-of-sample tests, weekly-level technical 
indicators have substantial predictive power in-sample and out-of-sample. This 
difference reveals that weekly-level technical indicators are better predictors of the 
Chinese equity risk premium. If these trend-following strategies are an indication of 
price trend, our results suggest that such price trend exists in China and concentrates on 
the weekly frequency but much weaker in the monthly frequency. Moreover, we argue 
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that the predictive power at the weekly frequency is of great value given the scarcity of 
weekly-level predictors.  
 
4. Robustness  
4.1. Firm-level analysis 
To see whether the predictors can predict individual firm excess return, we perform 
the predictive regression (1) for the individual listed company. We filter and choose the 
Chinese A-shares that have at least 36 months of prior stock return and 12 months of 
accounting data subsequent to December 2002, obtaining a sample size of 2506 firms. 
We then generate monthly (weekly) technical indicators based on the monthly (weekly) 
prices and trading volume of the individual stock and examine predictive regression (1) 
separately on each company’s monthly (weekly) excess return. 
In Table 1.9 we present the results of monthly and weekly bivariate predictive 
regression based on individual firm excess return. As shown in columns 4 and 5, there 
is no distinguishable difference between the number of companies with positive 
significance and negative significance when using monthly-level technical indicators. 
Thus, we corroborate our previous findings regarding the inability of monthly technical 
indicators to predict monthly stock returns in the case of individual stocks.  
In the right-hand-side of Table 1.9, we present our findings for the firm-level 
weekly returns. For a non-trivial proportion of companies, we can positively identify 
their future stock returns while only very few companies future stock returns are 
wrongly predicted. This implies that there is a distinct pattern and further supports our 
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prior evidence of the predictive power of weekly-level technical indicators. In Panel B 
of Table 1.9 we present evidence showing that the principal components of the weekly 
technical indicators have modest predictive power as well. PC-TECHW model can 
positive significantly predict 6.30% of the companies while negative significantly 
predict only 0.66% of the companies. In summary, we find evidence that weekly 
technical indicators have significant predictive on the individual firm-level while the 
monthly technical indicators do not.   
4.2. Asset allocation 
How much economic value will these predictors provide in an asset allocation 
perspective? As in Campbell and Thompson (2008), Ferreira and Santa-Clara (2011) 
and Neely et al. (2014), we examine the certainty equivalent return (CER) gain for a 
mean-variance investor who allocates a fraction of her wealth to equities and the 
remainder to a risk-free asset based on forecasts of our predictors against the benchmark 
historical average forecast. 
The expected utility of a mean-variance investor is the following: 
 
𝑈(𝑅𝑝) = 𝐸(𝑅𝑝) −
1
2
𝛾𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑝) , (13) 
where 𝑅𝑝 is the return on the investor’s portfolio, 𝐸(𝑅𝑝) is the expected portfolio return, 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑝) is the variance of the portfolio return, and 𝛾  is the relative risk aversion 
coefficient for the investor. At the end of month (week) t, the investor allocates the 










2 ) , (14) 
where ?̂?𝑡+1 is a forecast of the equity risk premium and ?̂?𝑡+1
2  is a forecast of its variance. 
Then we assume that the investor uses a 60-month (200-week) moving window of past 
monthly (weekly) returns to estimate the variance of the equity risk premium. We 
constrain 𝑤𝑡  to stay between 0 and 1.5, allowing for leveraging up to 50%. The 
proportion 1 − 𝑤𝑡 is invested to risk-free assets. Therefore, the portfolio return at 𝑡 +
1 is: 
 𝑅𝑝,𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑡𝑟𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝑤𝑡)𝑅𝑓,𝑡+1 , (15) 
where 𝑅𝑓,𝑡+1 is the risk-free return.  
Finally, the certainty equivalent return (CER) for the investor is given by: 
 




2 , (16) 
where ?̂?𝑝 and ?̂?𝑝
2 are the portfolio mean and variance during the forecast evaluation 
period when the investor optimally allocates the equities and risk-free asset in the way 
described above. The relative risk aversion coefficient 𝛾  takes a value of 5 in the 
calculation of CER5. Then we compare the CER based on forecasts generated by 
technical indicators to the CER based on the historical average forecast by computing 
the incremental CER. This gain in CER is given by the difference between the CER for 
an investor who uses forecasts based on technical indicators and the CER for the same 
                                                 




investor if she uses the historical average forecast instead. We multiply this difference 
by 1200 for monthly analysis, and by 5200 for weekly analysis, representing the 
annualized percentage management fee an investor would be willing to pay to have 
access to the forecasts from the predictive regressions over the historical average 
forecast.   
In Table 1.10 and 1.11 we present the CER values (Δ) for an investor who uses the 
historical average forecast and CER gains (Δ) arising from predictive regressions. We 
also report Sharpe ratios of the optimal portfolio calculated as the portfolio excess 
return divided by the standard deviation of the portfolio excess return. Relative average 
turnover for the portfolio using historical average (HA) forecast is the average 
percentage of wealth traded each month (week). For other portfolios, relative average 
turnover is the average turnover divided by the average turnover of the portfolio using 
the historical average forecast. We also report CER gains for the stable periods and 
volatile periods separately (Δ, Stable; Δ, Volatile). CER gains after transaction costs of 
50 basis points are also presented (Δ, 50 bps cost). The transaction costs are calculated 
based on the turnover measure. The initial estimation period and forecast evaluation 
period are identical to the previous out-of-sample analysis since the CER calculation is 
based on the out-of-sample forecasts.  
Table 1.10 reports the monthly-level results. The annualized CER for the portfolio 
using historical average (HA) forecast is 2.20%. Panel A shows that the annualized 
CER gains are positive for 8 of the 15 portfolios using macroeconomic variable 
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forecasts, indicating that these portfolios provide higher CER than the portfolio of the 
HA forecast. Among them, BM, DP, DY, IBO001 and M0G provide annualized CER 
gains exceeding 100 basis points (bps). 7 of the 15 macroeconomic variables generate 
a positive CER gain after a transaction cost of 50 bps. Finally, Panel B of Table 1.10 
shows that the PC-ECON model provides a decent CER gain of 414 bps after 
transaction cost. Turning to the results using the monthly technical indicators, right-
hand side of Table 1.10 shows that 14 of the 15 portfolios have negative CER gains, 
indicating a CER loss when using monthly technical indicator forecasts. This confirms 
our prior out-of-sample findings regarding the failure of monthly technical indicators 
to beat the historical average forecast.  
Weekly-level CER gains are reported in Table 1.11. We verify that weekly-level 
technical indicators perform much better than their monthly counterparts as far as CER 
gains are concerned. The CER of the benchmark portfolio using the historical average 
forecast is 3.93%, which is considerably higher than the monthly result. Although this 
benchmark CER is now tougher to beat, 14 of the 15 portfolios using forecasts based 
on weekly-level technical indicators generate positive annualized CER gains, spanning 
from 86 bps to 497 bps. Since the weekly technical indicators trigger more frequent 
trading than their monthly counterparts, the CER gains decrease considerably after 
imposing a transaction cost of 50 bps. Nevertheless, 7 of the 15 technical indicators 
have positive CER gains after the transaction costs, still far better than the negative 
CER gain for the entire set of the monthly-level technical indicator. In Panel B of Table 
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1.11 we show that PC-TECHw model can generate 610 bps CER gain before transaction 
cost and 113bps after transaction cost and PC-TECH[9,11]w model performed even 
better, providing 291 bps CER gain after transaction cost. 
In summary, at the monthly frequency, macroeconomic variables can generate 
CER gain after transaction cost, while the monthly-level technical indicators do not. In 
contrast, weekly-level technical indicators offer considerable CER gains even after the 
imposition of a substantial transaction cost, verifying that technical indicator can 
predict Chinese equity premium more consistently in weekly frequency. 
4.3. Cross-sectional tests 
In this section, we report the performance of weekly technical indicators in the 
cross-section. Our cross-sectional analysis is different from existing literature on 
technical indicator. Firstly, recent literature investigating technical indicators focus on 
the profitability while we use predictive ability as a measure of performance. Secondly, 
the existing literature usually uses single variable sorted portfolios to examine the cross-
sectional performance (e.g., Glabadanidis 2015b; Han et al. 2014; Han, Yang & Zhou 
2013). They found that the profitability of technical analysis is related to both volatility 
and market-value (size). However, we argue that single variable sorting cannot 
distinguish the impact of one variable from the impact of the other. For example, small 
firms tend to have higher volatility, and large firms generally have lower volatility. This 




To address this issue, we examine the predictability on 25 size-volatility double-
sorted portfolios. We define volatility as the standard deviation of the weekly return in 
the prior 51 weeks. Market capitalization (Size) is the last week-end closing price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding for each company. The 25 double-sorted 
size-volatility portfolios are constructed using the weekly return data of all Chinese A-
shares and the data comes from Datastream. From 1997:07 to 2016:12, we rebalance 
the portfolios at the end of every June using sorting data available and are held until the 
following June6. All portfolios are value-weighted. We end up with 25 portfolios that 
have a similar number of firms in every year7. 
For clarity, we only report the result for three type of principal component models. 
The first one is the principal component model using all the weekly technical indicators 
which we refer to as the PC-TECHw model. The second one is PC-TECH[3,5]w model 
which is based on  𝑀𝐴(1, 𝑙), 𝑀𝑂𝑀(1, 𝑙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝐿(1, 𝑙) with l =  3, 5 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘. The last 
one is PC-TECH[9,11]w model based on longer-horizon weekly technical indicators 
with l =  9, 11 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠. In line with the previous principal component model, the up-
limit for the number of principal components is K=3 and the number of K is determined 
by the adjusted R2. A full set of technical indicators and their principal components 
models are generated separately for each double-sorted portfolio.  
                                                 
6 For 2016 only, the portfolios are held to December 2016 due to data availability. 
7 The average number of firms in the 25 VW double-sorted portfolios is evenly 
distributed, ranging from 52.38 to 84.62.  
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Overall, Table 1.12 suggest the weekly technical indicators have substantial 
predictive power for all double-sorted portfolios in the in-sample tests (R2 are reported 
in the left-hand-side) and can outperform the benchmark forecast for most portfolios in 
the out-of-sample tests (𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  are reported in the right-hand-side). 
We find that there is little cross-sectional variation present by the PC-TECHw 
model. In contrast, PC-TECH[3,5]w and the PC-TECH[9,11]w models exhibit apparent 
cross-sectional variation in both in-sample and out-of-sample results. Firstly, Table 
1.12 shows that, in both in-sample (left-hand-side) and out-of-sample tests (right-hand-
side), PC-TECH[3,5]w model can better predict the smallest quintile (first column) than 
the largest quintile (fifth column), obtaining consistently high R2 (𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 ). If trend-
following strategies we examined are an indication of price trend, the small firms show 
stronger short-term price trend when compared to large firms, because PC-TECH[3,5]w 
model which uses past price information in a shorter time horizon can better explain 
the smallest quintile. In contrast, PC-TECH[9,11]w model seems to better predict the 
smallest and largest size quintile at the same time while do worse for the medium-size 
firms. Our result indicates smallest and largest firms show distinct price dynamics in 
the short-term time horizon which requires further investigation. 
Secondly, the performance of technical indicators seems not to be sensitive to the 
volatility of the underlying asset, as we fail to identify any clear pattern along the rows 
of Table 1.12. However, Han et al. (2014) found that the excess returns generated by 
technical indicators are significantly higher for high volatility quintiles in the Chinese 
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stock market. A similar association between technical indicator’ profitability and 
underlying asset’s volatility has been reported for the U.S. (e.g., Glabadanidis 2015b; 
Han, Yang & Zhou 2013). Therefore, an interesting discrepancy between the 
profitability and predictability of the technical indicators arises here. It seems that the 
increasing profitability of the technical indicator across volatility deciles is not 
necessarily associated with an increasing predictive power as suggested by our 
findings8.  
5. Conclusion 
We find that monthly-level technical indicators provide complementary 
information to macroeconomic variables in predicting Chinese monthly equity 
premium. The proportion of variation explained is higher than that of the US result 
reported in Neely et al. (2014). Macroeconomic variables outperform the HA 
benchmark in the out-of-sample tests while most monthly-level technical indicators 
underperform the benchmark. In contrast, our newly proposed weekly-level technical 
indicator utilizing non-overlapping price information to the monthly counterparts show 
substantial predictive ability in-sample and out-of-sample, generating considerable 
certainty equivalent gain after 50 bps transaction cost. Moreover, weekly-level 
technical indicators significantly predict firm-level excess return while monthly-level 
one does not. Overall, the different performance between monthly-level and weekly-
level trend-following technical indicator suggests that a short-term price trend exists in 
                                                 
8 We find a similar result when examining the monthly-level technical indicators 
on double-sorted portfolio monthly returns. 
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China and concentrate on the weekly frequency rather than the monthly frequency. Our 
finding, if compared with the US result in Neely et al. (2014), suggests that the Chinese 
stock market has a different price dynamic to the US where the monthly-level technical 
indicators worked very well. Finally, we find that the predictive power of technical 
indicator is associated with market capitalization but not volatility in the cross-section. 
The implication is threefold. Firstly, weekly-level technical indicators well predict 
Chinese equity premium and the predictive ability is of great economic value given the 
scarcity of weekly-level predictor. However, traditional asset pricing models leave no 
room for technical analysis despite growing evidence of its predictive power. Thus, it 
is important to bridge the gap between traditional asset pricing model and theoretical 
models of technical analysis.  
Secondly, we find that technical indicator’ predictive ability is not sensitive to 
volatility, contradicting to Han, Yang and Zhou (2013) who argue information 
uncertainty (proxied by volatility) is a major explanatory factor to technical indicators. 
Thus, the driving force of the technical indicator’s predictive ability is still controversial 
and require further investigation.  
Thirdly, the distinct price trend between China and US identified by the current 
study poses a challenge to the theoretical model of technical analysis and price trend. 
They should be able to explain the difference in the time horizon (i.e., length) of price 
trend across countries. Possible explanations may arise through the perspective of the 
market efficiency, the presence of behavioral biases, investor sentiment, information 
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friction, and level of heterogeneous information (as reviewed in the introduction). 
Moreover, given the difference across countries, an extensive focus on US equity 
premium might be problematic, and it is critical to examine technical indicators’ 
predictive ability on other international markets before we can obtain a more 
comprehensive picture about what drives international equity premium and cross-






Table 1.1  Macroeconomic Variable Construction 




For the months of July of year t to June of year t+1, BM is 
computed by dividing the sum of “common shareholders’ equity” 
(WC035019) of all A shares for fiscal year-end in year t-1 by the 






For the months of July of year t to June of year t+1, CFP is the 
ratio of the sum of “funds from operations” (WC04201) of all A 
shares at the fiscal year-end of year t-1, to the sum of the total 






For the months of July of year t to June of year t+1, DE is the 
difference between the log of the sum of the “cash dividends paid” 
(WC04551) of all A shares at the fiscal year-end of year t-1, and 
the log of the sum of the “net income” (WC01706) of all A shares 





For the months of July of year t to June of year t+1, DP is the 
difference between the log of the sum of the “cash dividends paid” 
(WC04551) of all A shares at the fiscal year-end of year t-1, and 
the log of the sum of the market value (MV) of all A shares at the 





For the months of July of year t to June of year t+1, DY is the 
difference between the log of the sum of the “cash dividends paid” 
(WC04551) of all A shares at the fiscal year-end of year t-1, and 
the log of the sum of the market value (MV) of all A shares at the 





For the months of July of year t to June of year t+1, EP is the 
difference between the log of the sum of the “net income” 
(WC01706) of all A shares at the fiscal year-end of year t-1, and 
the log of the sum of the market value (MV) of all A shares at the 




It is a monthly annual inflation rate using monthly CPI data from 
the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of 
China10. We lagged the CPI for one month since there is a one-
month delay for the announcement of CPI data. 
National Bureau of 
Statistics of the 
People’s Republic 
of China 
                                                 
9 The symbols in the parentheses are Datastream codes if applicable. 
10 The CPI data is constructed by comparing the current price level with the price level of same 
month last year. Thus, the inflation used in this paper is the annual inflation compared with the same 






It is the sum of squared daily returns of the Shanghai Composite 
index of the current month. 









It is the ratio of the total trading volume of Shanghai A and 
Shenzhen A market divided by the total market value of all A 
shares of the current month. 





It is the percentage change in the VIX index at the end of every 
month, which is downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis. 
Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis. 
7-days Repo, 
R007 
It is the percentage change in the 7-days Repo rate at the current 
month end compared with that of the last month end. 







It is the percentage change of the Overnight interbank lending rate 
at the current month end compared with that of the last month end. 





It is the percentage change of the currency in circulation (M0) of 
every month. 
National Bureau of 





It is the difference between the percentage change of the money 
(M1) of the current month and the last month. 
National Bureau of 





It is the percentage change of the money and quasi-money (M2) 
of every month. 
National Bureau of 










Minimum Maximum Autocorrelation Skewness Kurtosis 
MKT -0.237 8.519 -29.439 19.355 0.113 -0.766 4.375 
MKTw -0.069 3.606 -16.079 13.378 0.095 -0.471 5.288 
BM 0.470 0.153 0.147 0.822 0.955 0.149 2.530 
CFP 0.129 0.060 0.040 0.315 0.971 1.237 4.256 
DE -1.283 0.405 -1.795 -0.556 0.952 0.517 1.823 
DP -4.183 0.499 -5.412 -3.208 0.962 -0.037 2.481 
DY -4.169 0.503 -5.412 -3.142 0.954 -0.020 2.511 
EP -2.900 0.430 -3.953 -2.026 0.958 -0.196 2.373 
INFL 2.685 2.054 -1.800 8.700 0.947 0.606 3.483 
SVAR 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.031 0.650 2.142 7.508 
VO/MV 0.036 0.024 0.010 0.124 0.825 1.521 4.876 
VIX 0.017 0.226 -0.385 1.346 -0.170 1.824 10.184 
R007 0.030 0.243 -0.631 0.907 -0.170 0.822 4.513 
IBO001 0.036 0.277 -0.574 1.111 -0.297 0.898 4.454 
M0G 0.011 0.072 -0.186 0.306 -0.169 0.888 7.041 
M1G 0.000 0.034 -0.105 0.099 -0.549 -0.170 3.461 
M2G 0.013 0.011 -0.015 0.047 -0.062 0.370 3.587 
Notes: MKT is log equity risk premium (in percent) of the monthly market portfolio. MKTw is log equity risk premium 
(in percent) of the weekly market portfolio. BM is book-to-market ratio. CFP is cash flow-to-price ratio. DE is log 
dividend-to-price ratio. DY is log dividend yield. EP is log earning-to-price ratio. Inflation is lagged monthly inflation 
rate. SVAR is stock variance. VO/MV is trading volume scaled by market value. VIX is the percentage change in the 
VIX index. R007 is the percentage change in the 7-days Repo rate. IBO001 is the percentage change in the overnight 
interbank lending rate. M0G is the percentage change of the currency in circulation. M1G is the money (M1) growth 




Table 1.3  Predictive Regression Estimation Results (monthly-level), 2002:12 to 2016:11 












Panel A: Bivariate Predictive Regressions 
BM 9.68 [2.16]* 3.03% 3.57% 2.77%  MA(1,3) 2.55 [1.96]** 2.25% -2.81% 4.65% 
CFP 17.41 [1.77] 1.51% 1.28% 1.62%  MA(1,5) 2.44 [1.85]** 2.04% -1.51% 3.73% 
DE 1.17 [0.77] 0.30% 0.58% 0.17%  MA(1,7) 2.05 [1.52]* 1.43% -0.38% 2.29% 
DP 3.24 [2.38]** 3.57% 4.67% 3.05%  MA(1,9) 2.88 [2.12]** 2.75% -1.94% 4.98% 
DY 3.56 [2.69]*** 4.38% 5.37% 3.91%  MA(1,11) 2.68 [1.94]** 2.35% -2.16% 4.49% 
EP 3.31 [2.10]* 2.80% 0.99% 3.65%  MOM(3) 3.30 [2.52]*** 3.73% 2.25% 4.43% 
INFL 1.17 [3.18]*** 8.17% 5.90% 9.24%  MOM(5) 2.47 [1.88]** 2.09% -2.59% 4.32% 
SVAR 241.12 [1.92]** 2.82% -1.35% 4.80%  MOM(7) 1.89 [1.40]* 1.21% -2.00% 2.74% 
VO/MV 74.38 [2.97]*** 4.45% 2.41% 5.42%  MOM(9) 2.36 [1.61]* 1.76% 0.22% 2.50% 
R007 4.80 [1.95]** 1.88% -2.00% 3.72%  MOM(11) 0.84 [0.54] 0.22% 0.91% -0.10% 
IBO001 5.06 [2.50]*** 2.71% -3.08% 5.46%  VOL(1,3) 1.81 [1.39]* 1.13% 0.49% 1.43% 
M0G 13.42 [1.76]** 1.29% 5.92% -0.90%  VOL(1,5) 2.31 [1.79]** 1.83% 0.76% 2.33% 
M1G 5.63 [0.33] 0.05% 0.75% -0.28%  VOL(1,7) 2.34 [1.81]** 1.89% -1.65% 3.58% 
M2G 54.59 [1.24] 0.46% -0.39% 0.87%  VOL(1,9) 1.19 [0.92] 0.49% 0.07% 0.69% 
VIX 4.33 [1.25] 1.31% 1.83% 1.06%  VOL(1,11) 0.98 [0.75] 0.33% 0.16% 0.41% 
Panel B: Principal Component Predictive Regressions 
?̂?1
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁 1.00 [3.04]*** 5.95% 4.42% 6.68%  ?̂?1
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 0.46 [1.94]** 2.60% -0.67% 4.16% 
       ?̂?1
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻[3,5]
 0.77 [2.23]** 3.21% -0.69% 5.06% 
       ?̂?1
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻[9,11]
 0.54 [1.54]* 3.39% 0.07% 2.36% 
       ?̂?2
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻[9,11]
 -0.74 [-1.10]    
       ?̂?3
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻[9,11]
 -1.23 [-1.45]*    
Panel C: Principal Component Predictive Regression, All Predictors Taken Together 
?̂?1
𝐴𝐿𝐿 0.44 [1.97]* 9.29% 3.04% 12.26%        
?̂?2
𝐴𝐿𝐿 1.06 [3.23]***           
Notes: Panel A reports estimation results for the in-sample predictive regression model (1) and the dependent variable is the market 
portfolio monthly excess return. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, based on the one-side wild 
bootstrapped p-value. 𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐴
2  (𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐴
2 ) is a sub-sample R2 statistic for the stable (volatile) periods, as given by (8) in the text. 
Panel B and C report estimation results for the principal component predictive regression model (9) and the dependent variable is 
also the market portfolio monthly excess return. ?̂?𝑘
𝑗
 is the kth principal component extracted from the 15 macroeconomic variables 
(𝑗 = 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁), 15 monthly-level technical indicators (𝑗 = 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻), or all 30 predictors taken together (𝑗 = 𝐴𝐿𝐿). ?̂?𝑘
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻[3,5]
 is the kth 
principal component extracted from six short-term monthly-level technical indicators 𝑀𝐴(1, 𝑙), 𝑀𝑂𝑀(1, 𝑙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝐿(1, 𝑙) given 
𝑙 = 3, 5 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎs. Similarly, ?̂?𝑘
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻[9,11]
 is the kth principal component extracted from six longer-term technical indicators given 
𝑙 = 9, 11 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠. 
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Table 1.4 Predictive Regression Estimation Results (weekly-level), 2002:12:27 to 2016:12:02 







Panel A: Bivariate Predictive Regressions 
MA(1,3)w 0.66 [2.47]*** 0.84% 0.98% 0.77% 
MA(1,5)w 0.64 [2.41]** 0.80% 0.59% 0.91% 
MA(1,7)w 0.83 [3.12]*** 1.32% 0.94% 1.53% 
MA(1,9)w 0.87 [3.30]*** 1.46% 0.42% 2.02% 
MA(1,11)w 0.89 [3.34]*** 1.51% -0.29% 2.47% 
MOM(3)w 0.71 [2.64]*** 0.96% 0.65% 1.12% 
MOM(5)w 0.58 [2.17]** 0.64% 0.34% 0.81% 
MOM(7)w 0.74 [2.77]*** 1.05% -0.70% 1.98% 
MOM(9)w 0.83 [3.14]*** 1.33% -0.70% 2.41% 
MOM(11)w 0.88 [3.30]*** 1.47% -0.18% 2.35% 
VOL(1,3)w 0.48 [1.79]** 0.44% -0.41% 0.90% 
VOL(1,5)w 0.64 [2.38]*** 0.78% 0.73% 0.80% 
VOL(1,7)w 0.68 [2.53]*** 0.88% 1.52% 0.54% 
VOL(1,9)w 0.63 [2.35]*** 0.76% 1.12% 0.57% 
VOL(1,11)w 0.46 [1.70]** 0.39% 1.17% -0.02% 
Panel B: Principal Component Predictive Regressions 
?̂?1
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑤 0.14 [3.33]*** 1.45% 0.80% 1.80% 
?̂?1
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻[3,5]𝑤
 0.18 [2.84]*** 1.05% 0.65% 1.27% 
?̂?1
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻[9,11]𝑤
 0.21 [3.31]*** 1.81% 0.64% 1.92% 
?̂?2
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻[9,11]𝑤
 0.25 [1.60]*    
Notes: Panel A reports estimation results for the in-sample predictive regression model (1) and 
the dependent variable is the market portfolio weekly excess return. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, based on the one-side wild bootstrapped p-value. 
𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐴
2  (𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐴
2 ) is a sub-sample R2 statistic for the stable (volatile) periods, as given by (8) in the 
text. 
Panel B and C report estimation results for the principal component predictive regression 
model (9) and the dependent variable is the market portfolio weekly excess return. ?̂?1
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑤 is 
the 1st principal component extracted from the 15 weekly technical indicators. ?̂?1
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻[3,5]𝑤
 is 
the first principal component extracted from six short-term weekly technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(1, 𝑙), 𝑀𝑂𝑀(1, 𝑙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝐿(1, 𝑙)  given 𝑙 = 3, 5 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 . ?̂?k
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻[9,11]𝑤
is the 𝑘th  principal 
component of six longer-term weekly technical indicators given 𝑙 = 9, 11 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠.  
39 
 
Table 1.5  Out-of-Sample Forecasting Results (monthly-level), 2002:12 to 2016:11 






















HA 82.41     0.39 82.02          
Panel A: Bivariate Predictive Regression Forecasts 
BM 80.03 2.88% 2.12** 2.67% 2.91% 0.48 79.56  MA(1,3) 81.28 1.37% 1.33* -15.09% 5.84% 0.54 80.74 
CFP 81.55 1.04% 1.16 3.22% 0.49% 0.15 81.40  MA(1,5) 82.40 0.01% 1.02 -15.35% 4.17% 0.34 82.06 
DE 83.12 -0.86% -0.17 -0.62% -1.00% 0.99 82.13  MA(1,7) 84.96 -3.09% 0.28 -22.59% 2.23% 0.32 84.64 
DP 79.92 3.02% 2.42*** -3.48% 4.68% 2.40 77.52  MA(1,9) 82.83 -0.51% 0.87 -19.64% 4.68% 0.25 82.58 
DY 79.34 3.72% 2.62*** -5.63% 6.16% 2.26 77.09  MA(1,11) 84.03 -1.96% 0.53 -24.08% 4.05% 0.23 83.79 
EP 80.12 2.78% 2.06** -0.45% 3.71% 0.79 79.33  MOM(3) 81.08 1.61% 1.53* -8.14% 4.18% 0.45 80.63 
INFL 75.73 8.10% 2.38*** 2.24% 9.66% 0.62 75.12  MOM(5) 82.49 -0.10% 0.95 -13.02% 3.38% 0.35 82.14 
SVAR 82.87 -0.56% 0.62 -3.92% 0.27% 0.67 82.20  MOM(7) 83.97 -1.89% 0.27 -18.45% 2.61% 0.30 83.67 
VO/MV 81.21 1.45% 1.68** -9.00% 4.56% 0.84 80.37  MOM(9) 83.49 -1.31% 0.46 -10.45% 1.11% 0.36 83.13 
R007 82.32 0.11% 1.26 -7.92% 2.42% 0.35 81.97  MOM(11) 86.58 -5.06% -1.18 -5.88% -4.81% 0.53 86.05 
IBO001* 81.50 1.11% 1.89** -13.87% 5.25% 0.28 81.22  VOL(1,3) 82.65 -0.29% 0.48 -4.07% 0.68% 0.44 82.21 
M0G 82.69 -0.35% 0.78 6.71% -2.28% 0.42 82.27  VOL(1,5) 82.80 -0.47% 0.93 -10.20% 2.14% 0.29 82.51 
M1G 83.52 -1.35% -0.39 -12.64% 1.80% 0.44 83.08  VOL(1,7) 82.29 0.15% 1.01 -13.15% 3.75% 0.41 81.88 
M2G 83.65 -1.51% 1.07 -12.21% 1.53% 0.33 83.32  VOL(1,9) 84.16 -2.13% 0.07 -11.07% 0.30% 0.47 83.69 
VIX 86.91 -5.46% -0.46 1.42% -7.25% 0.59 86.32  VOL(1,11) 84.63 -2.69% -0.21 -11.38% -0.22% 0.46 84.17 
Panel B: Principal Component Predictive Forecasts 
PC-ECON 78.85 4.31% 2.83*** -17.90% 10.39% 0.86 78.00  PC-TECH 84.79 -2.89% 0.50 -20.14% 1.78% 0.26 84.53 
         PC-TECH[3,5] 82.09 0.39% 1.20 -15.36% 4.62% 0.29 81.80 
         PC-TECH[9,11] 86.74 -5.25% -0.07 -23.30% -0.43% 0.29 86.45 
Panel C: Principal Component Predictive Forecasts, All Predictors Taken Together 
PC-ALL 79.16 3.95% 2.87*** -32.50% 13.91% 0.62 78.53          
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Notes: This table reports the monthly-level out-of-sample forecasting result as given by (10) and (11) in the text. The dependent variable is the market portfolio monthly excess return. MSFE is the 
mean squared forecast error. 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  measures the reduction in MSFE for the predictive regression forecast relative to the benchmark historical average (HA) forecast. MSFE-adjusted is the Clark and 
West (2007) statistic, testing a null hypothesis that the MSFE of HA forecast is smaller than the MSFE of the predictive regression forecasts. 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  for the stable and volatile periods are reported 
separately. (?̅̂?)2 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?) are the squared forecast bias and forecast error variance, respectively. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. PC-ECON denotes the principal 
component forecasting model (11) based on the 15 macroeconomic variables. PC-TECH denotes the principal component forecasting model (11) based on the 15 monthly-level technical indicators. 
PC-TECH[3,5] is the principal component model (11) based on six short-term monthly-level technical indicators 𝑀𝐴(1, 𝑙), 𝑀𝑂𝑀(1, 𝑙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝐿(1, 𝑙) given 𝑙 = 3, 5 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠. PC-TECH[9,11] is 
the principal component model (11) based on six longer-term monthly-level technical indicators 𝑀𝐴(1, 𝑙), 𝑀𝑂𝑀(1, 𝑙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝐿(1, 𝑙) given 𝑙 = 9, 11 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠. PC-ALL is the principal component 
model (11) based on all the 30 predictors taken together. December 2002 until December 2007 is the initial estimation period (60 months), and January 2008 until November 2016 is the forecast 
evaluation period (107 months). 
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Table 1.6  Out-of-Sample Forecasting Results (weekly-level), 2002:12:27 to 2016:12:02 












HA 15.15     0.00 15.15 
Panel A: Bivariate Predictive Regression Forecasts 
MA(1,3)w 15.08 0.52% 1.59* -0.48% 0.77% 0.00 15.08 
MA(1,5)w 15.07 0.58% 1.72** -1.05% 0.98% 0.00 15.07 
MA(1,7)w 14.99 1.07% 2.28** -1.33% 1.67% 0.00 14.99 
MA(1,9)w 14.96 1.25% 2.60*** -3.10% 2.33% 0.00 14.96 
MA(1,11)w 14.95 1.34% 2.69*** -4.42% 2.77% 0.00 14.95 
MOM(3)w 15.03 0.82% 1.95** 0.05% 1.02% 0.00 15.03 
MOM(5)w 15.08 0.47% 1.60* -0.98% 0.83% 0.00 15.08 
MOM(7)w 15.03 0.84% 2.07** -4.24% 2.10% 0.00 15.03 
MOM(9)w 14.97 1.25% 2.56*** -3.37% 2.39% 0.00 14.96 
MOM(11)w 14.96 1.28% 2.63*** -4.83% 2.80% 0.00 14.96 
VOL(1,3)w 15.12 0.23% 1.18 -1.61% 0.69% 0.00 15.12 
VOL(1,5)w 15.07 0.57% 1.66** -0.42% 0.82% 0.00 15.07 
VOL(1,7)w 15.06 0.60% 1.73** 0.81% 0.55% 0.00 15.06 
VOL(1,9)w 15.10 0.38% 1.53* -0.70% 0.65% 0.00 15.10 
VOL(1,11)w 15.17 -0.12% 1.20 -1.19% 0.14% 0.00 15.17 
Panel B: Principal Component Predictive Forecasts 
PC-TECHw 15.03 0.83% 2.24** -2.94% 1.76% 0.00 15.03 
PC-TECH[9,11]w 15.02 0.89% 2.13** -0.88% 1.33% 0.00 15.02 
PC-TECH[9,11]w 14.99 1.10% 2.49*** -3.93% 2.35% 0.00 14.99 
Notes: This table reports the weekly-level out-of-sample forecasting result as given by (10) and (11) in the text. The 
dependent variable is the market portfolio weekly excess return. MSFE is the mean squared forecast error. 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  measures 
the reduction in MSFE for the predictive regression forecast relative to the benchmark historical average (HA) forecast. 
MSFE-adjusted is the Clark and West (2007) statistic, testing a null hypothesis that the MSFE of HA forecast is smaller 
than the MSFE of the predictive regression forecasts. 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  for the stable and volatile periods are reported separately. (?̅̂?)2 
and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?) are the squared forecast bias and forecast error variance, respectively. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. PC-TECHw denotes the principal component forecasting model (11) based on the weekly-
level 15 technical indicators. PC-TECH[3,5]w is the principal component model (11) based on six short-term weekly-level 
technical indicators 𝑀𝐴(1, 𝑙), 𝑀𝑂𝑀(1, 𝑙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝐿(1, 𝑙)  given 𝑙 = 3, 5 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠.  PC-TECH[9,11]w is the principal 
component model (11) based on six longer-term weekly-level technical indicators 𝑀𝐴(1, 𝑙), 𝑀𝑂𝑀(1, 𝑙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝐿(1, 𝑙) 
given 𝑙 = 9, 11 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠. 26 December 2002 until 20 October 2006 is the initial estimation period (200 weeks), and 27 
October 2006 until 3 December 2016 is the forecast evaluation period (528 weeks). 
42 
 
Table 1.7  Technical indicator performance on the extended sample (monthly-level), 1997:07 to 2016:11 
In-sample results,  
technical indicators (monthly-level) 
 
Out-of-sample results,  









     HA 72.97   0.05 72.91 
Panel A: Bivariate Predictive Model 
MA(1,3) 2.03 [1.92]** 1.56%  MA(1,3) 72.06 1.24% 1.34* 0.01 72.05 
MA(1,5) 1.75 [1.62]* 1.15%  MA(1,5) 72.41 0.76% 1.03 0.02 72.39 
MA(1,7) 1.55 [1.43]* 0.90%  MA(1,7) 72.66 0.43% 0.85 0.02 72.64 
MA(1,9) 1.92 [1.75]** 1.35%  MA(1,9) 72.24 0.99% 1.16 0.03 72.22 
MA(1,11) 1.79 [1.61]* 1.17%  MA(1,11) 72.42 0.76% 0.99 0.03 72.39 
MOM(3) 2.29 [2.12]** 1.95%  MOM(3) 71.68 1.77% 1.57* 0.01 71.67 
MOM(5) 1.47 [1.37]* 0.81%  MOM(5) 72.85 0.16% 0.69 0.02 72.83 
MOM(7) 0.25 [0.23] 0.02%  MOM(7) 74.96 -2.74% -1.30 0.01 74.95 
MOM(9) 1.91 [1.65]** 1.30%  MOM(9) 72.41 0.77% 0.99 0.04 72.37 
MOM(11) 0.11 [0.10] 0.00%  MOM(11) 73.75 -1.07% -0.96 0.00 73.75 
VOL(1,3) 1.46 [1.37]* 0.80%  VOL(1,3) 72.75 0.29% 0.68 0.01 72.74 
VOL(1,5) 1.82 [1.73]** 1.25%  VOL(1,5) 72.32 0.88% 1.18 0.01 72.31 
VOL(1,7) 1.50 [1.42]* 0.85%  VOL(1,7) 72.73 0.33% 0.81 0.02 72.71 
VOL(1,9) 0.64 [0.61] 0.16%  VOL(1,9) 73.39 -0.58% -0.05 0.01 73.38 
VOL(1,11) 0.54 [0.51] 0.11%  VOL(1,11) 73.40 -0.60% -0.09 0.01 73.39 
Panel B: Principal Component Predictive Model 
PC-TECH 0.31 [1.60]** 1.69%  PC-TECH 72.99 -0.03 0.73 0.00 72.99 
 0.40 [1.00]         
PC-TECH[3,5] 0.56 [1.98]** 1.88%  PC-TECH[3,5] 72.01 1.32 1.31* 0.01 72.00 
PC-TECH[9,11] 0.35 [1.26] 2.14%  PC-TECH[9,11] 72.90 0.08 0.76 0.01 72.89 
 -0.45 [-0.86]         
 -1.18 [-1.54]*         
Notes: Left-hand side reports the estimation results based on weekly-level predictive regression model (1) and principal component 
model (9). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, based on the one-side wild bootstrapped p-value. Right-
hand side reports the out-of-sample forecasting results as given by (10) and (11) in the text. MSFE is the mean squared forecast error. 
𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  measures the reduction in MSFE for the predictive regression forecasts relative to the benchmark historical average (HA) 
forecast. MSFE-adjusted is the Clark and West (2007) statistic that tests a null hypothesis that the MSFE of HA forecast is smaller 
than the MSFE of the predictive regression forecasts. 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  for the stable and volatile periods are reported separately. (?̅̂?)2 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?) 
are the squared forecast bias and forecast error variance, respectively. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. 0.00 represents less than 0.005 in absolute value. Initial estimation period is 1997:07 until 2012:12 and forecast evaluation 
period is 2003:01 until 2016:11. 
PC-TECH denotes the principal component model of the 15 monthly-level technical indicators, as given by (9) and (11) in the text. 
PC-TECH[3,5] is the principal component model of the six short-term monthly-level technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(1, 𝑙), 𝑀𝑂𝑀(1, 𝑙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝐿(1, 𝑙) given 𝑙 = 3, 5 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠. PC-TECH[9,11] is the principal component model of the six longer-
term monthly-level technical indicators 𝑀𝐴(1, 𝑙), 𝑀𝑂𝑀(1, 𝑙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝐿(1, 𝑙) given 𝑙 = 9, 11 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠. 
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Table 1.8  Technical indicator performance on the extended sample (weekly-level), 1997.07.04 to 2016:12:02 
In-sample results,  
technical indicators (weekly-level) 
 
Out-of-sample results,  









     HA 13.08   0.00 13.08 
Panel A: Bivariate Predictive Model 
MA(1,3)w 0.61 [2.83]*** 0.79%  MA(1,3)w 12.99 0.67%
% 
2.07** 0.00 12.99 
MA(1,5)w 0.63 [2.91]*** 0.83%  MA(1,5)w 13.00 0.64%
% 
2.06** 0.00 12.99 
MA(1,7)w 0.80 [3.72]*** 1.35%  MA(1,7)w 12.93 1.17%
% 
2.75*** 0.00 12.93 
MA(1,9)w 0.77 [3.56]*** 1.23%  MA(1,9)w 12.92 1.23%
% 
2.90*** 0.00 12.92 
MA(1,11)w 0.72 [3.34]*** 1.08%  MA(1,11)w 12.93 1.16%
% 
2.85*** 0.00 12.93 
MOM(3)w 0.75 [3.47]*** 1.17%  MOM(3)w 12.98 0.79%
% 
2.32** 0.00 12.98 
MOM(5)w 0.52 [2.39]*** 0.56%  MOM(5)w 13.02 0.46%
% 
1.73** 0.00 13.02 
MOM(7)w 0.59 [2.74]*** 0.73%  MOM(7)w 12.98 0.74%
% 
2.22** 0.00 12.98 
MOM(9)w 0.65 [3.02]*** 0.88%  MOM(9)w 12.96 0.94%
% 
2.56*** 0.00 12.96 
MOM(11)w 0.59 [2.73]*** 0.72%  MOM(11)w 12.98 0.75%
% 
2.23** 0.00 12.98 
VOL(1,3)w 0.55 [2.52]*** 0.63%  VOL(1,3)w 13.05 0.26%
% 
1.50* 0.00 13.05 
VOL(1,5)w 0.66 [3.05]*** 0.92%  VOL(1,5)w 13.00 0.62%
% 
2.06** 0.00 13.00 
VOL(1,7)w 0.62 [2.86]*** 0.81%  VOL(1,7)w 12.99 0.71%
% 
2.14** 0.00 12.99 
VOL(1,9)w 0.50 [2.29]** 0.52%  VOL(1,9)w 13.02 0.49%
% 
1.71** 0.00 13.02 
VOL(1,11)w 0.42 [1.90]** 0.36%  VOL(1,11)w 13.05 0.23%
% 
1.40* 0.00 13.05 
Panel B: Principal Component Predictive Model 
PC-TECHw 0.13 [3.66]*** 1.27%  PC-TECHw 12.96 0.94% 2.61*** 0.00 12.96 
PC-TECH[3,5]w 0.18 [3.53]*** 1.17%  PC-TECH[3,5]w 12.96 0.89% 2.51*** 0.00 12.96 
PC-TECH[9,11]w 0.17 [3.24]*** 1.28%  PC-TECH[9,11]w 12.95 1.01% 2.63*** 0.00 12.95 
 -0.13 [-1.10]         
 0.19 [1.19]         
Notes: Left-hand side reports the estimation results based on weekly-level predictive regression model (1) and principal component 
model (9). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, based on the one-side wild bootstrapped p-value. Right-
hand side reports the out-of-sample forecasting results as given by (10) and (11) in the text. MSFE is the mean squared forecast error. 
𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  measures the reduction in MSFE for the predictive regression forecasts relative to the benchmark historical average (HA) 
forecast. MSFE-adjusted is the Clark and West (2007) statistic that tests a null hypothesis that the MSFE of HA forecast is smaller 
than the MSFE of the predictive regression forecasts. 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  for the stable and volatile periods are reported separately. (?̅̂?)2 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?) 
are the squared forecast bias and forecast error variance, respectively. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. 0.00 represents less than 0.005 in absolute value. Initial estimation period is 1997:07:04 until 2012:12:28 and forecast 
evaluation period is 2003:01:03 until 2016:12:02. 
PC-TECHw denotes the principal component model of the 15 weekly-level technical indicators, as given by (9) and (11) in the text. 
PC-TECH[3,5]w is the principal component model of the six short-term weekly-level technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(1, 𝑙), 𝑀𝑂𝑀(1, 𝑙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝐿(1, 𝑙) given 𝑙 = 3, 5 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠. PC-TECH[9,11]w is the principal component model of the six longer-
term weekly-level technical indicators 𝑀𝐴(1, 𝑙), 𝑀𝑂𝑀(1, 𝑙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝐿(1, 𝑙) given 𝑙 = 9, 11 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠. 
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Table 1.9  Firm-level predictive regression estimation results, 2002:12 to 2016:11 


















Sig. (+) Sig. (-) 
R2 
(Mean) 
Panel A: Bivariate Predictive Regressions 
MA(1,3) 0.16 54.91% 45.09% 2.04% 0.92% 0.82%  MA(1,3)w 0.25 69.24% 30.76% 6.03% 0.45% 0.32% 
MA(1,5) -0.35 48.48% 51.52% 2.08% 2.00% 1.00%  MA(1,5)w 0.34 76.91% 23.09% 8.39% 0.07% 0.34% 
MA(1,7) -0.63 47.05% 52.95% 1.92% 3.27% 1.23%  MA(1,7)w 0.26 74.02% 25.98% 5.61% 0.17% 0.31% 
MA(1,9) -0.36 52.19% 47.77% 2.39% 3.07% 1.16%  MA(1,9)w 0.24 72.31% 27.69% 6.48% 0.31% 0.31% 
MA(1,11) -0.24 53.07% 46.85% 1.80% 2.47% 1.03%  MA(1,11)w 0.22 72.94% 27.06% 6.44% 0.42% 0.31% 
MOM(3) -0.66 44.89% 55.11% 1.60% 3.03% 1.09%  MOM(3)w 0.36 77.92% 22.08% 10.62% 0.24% 0.37% 
MOM(5) -0.38 54.35% 45.65% 2.67% 4.39% 1.39%  MOM(5)w 0.16 69.31% 30.69% 3.76% 0.21% 0.28% 
MOM(7) 0.52 61.77% 38.23% 1.92% 1.12% 0.87%  MOM(7)w -0.07 57.68% 42.32% 3.03% 1.01% 0.32% 
MOM(9) 0.64 65.84% 34.00% 1.80% 1.12% 0.79%  MOM(9)w -0.02 62.94% 37.06% 4.28% 0.94% 0.34% 
MOM(11) 0.33 60.10% 39.55% 0.84% 1.04% 0.77%  MOM(11)w -0.19 54.79% 45.21% 2.33% 1.53% 0.36% 
VOL(1,3) 0.33 54.07% 45.93% 1.92% 1.40% 0.91%  VOL(1,3)w -0.06 52.28% 47.72% 1.74% 1.39% 0.28% 
VOL(1,5) -0.75 40.34% 59.66% 1.32% 3.23% 0.99%  VOL(1,5)w 0.15 66.56% 33.44% 6.58% 0.56% 0.35% 
VOL(1,7) -0.38 45.01% 54.99% 1.96% 2.59% 0.97%  VOL(1,7)w -0.05 57.96% 42.04% 3.87% 1.18% 0.35% 
VOL(1,9) -0.56 43.66% 56.30% 2.19% 3.31% 1.04%  VOL(1,9)w -0.16 55.17% 44.83% 3.20% 2.12% 0.38% 
VOL(1,11 -0.43 46.37% 53.59% 1.56% 3.15% 0.97%  VOL(1,11)w -0.15 56.08% 43.85% 3.24% 1.92% 0.40% 
Panel B: Principal Component Predictive Regressions 
PC-TECH 0.00 52.91% 47.09% 1.88% 2.08% 2.27%  PC-TECHW 0.03 72.20% 27.80% 6.30% 0.66% 0.78% 








0.01 54.23% 45.77% 1.52% 1.52% 2.32%  PC-TECH[9,11]W 0.01 67.19% 32.81% 4.91% 0.98% 0.82% 
Notes: The table reports the in-sample predictive regression estimation results on the firm-level, based on individual firm monthly(weekly) excess return. Left-hand-side is the monthly-level 
result the right-hand-side is the weekly-level result. Loading (Mean) is the average slope coefficients of the predictive regressions for all firm-level regressions. Loading(+) and loading (–) are 
the proportion of companies that have positive slope coefficient and negative slope coefficient. Sig.(+) and Sig.(–) are the proportion of companies that have significant positive and negative 
slope coefficients on the predictors. R2 (Mean) is the average R2 statistics for a given predictor for all firm-level regressions. The principal component models are defined in Table 7 and 8. 
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Table 1.10  Portfolio Performance Measures (monthly), 2002:12 to 2016:11 







Δ, Stable  Δ, Volatile  
Δ, 
50bps cost  






Δ, Stable Δ, Volatile  
Δ, 
50bps cost 
HA 2.20% -0.13 0.36%   2.18%         
Panel A: Bivariate Predictive Regression Forecasts 
BM 1.50% 0.02 9.33 0.74% 2.34% 1.32%  MA(1,3) 0.29% 0.06 33.21 -3.75% 4.58% -0.48% 
CFP -0.36% -0.09 2.54 0.13% -0.91% -0.40%  MA(1,5) -1.88% 0.03 27.69 -3.82% -0.01% -2.53% 
DE -4.35% -0.05 9.23 -0.20% -9.20% -4.54%  MA(1,7) -6.36% -0.04 35.30 -5.47% -7.75% -7.21% 
DP 1.23% 0.11 17.75 0.72% 1.34% 0.88%  MA(1,9) -3.13% 0.02 24.35 -5.16% -1.25% -3.73% 
DY 2.71% 0.14 19.20 0.35% 4.96% 2.31%  MA(1,11) -4.47% 0.00 25.52 -5.95% -3.23% -5.10% 
EP 0.95% -0.03 6.05 -0.71% 2.80% 0.85%  MOM(3) -2.73% 0.06 34.82 -1.57% -4.48% -3.58% 
INFL -3.44% 0.07 25.88 -0.37% -7.10% -3.97%  MOM(5) -2.68% 0.00 22.69 -3.74% -1.86% -3.21% 
SVAR -5.49% -0.10 20.54 -1.24% -10.55% -5.93%  MOM(7) -3.84% -0.03 18.19 -4.75% -3.15% -4.24% 
VO/MV 0.90% 0.02 17.36 0.01% 1.88% 0.56%  MOM(9) -5.29% 0.00 22.72 -3.17% -8.13% -5.80% 
R007* -1.51% -0.06 47.37 -1.49% -1.60% -2.51%  MOM(11) -10.76% -0.12 12.21 -1.83% -20.83% -11.07% 
IBO001* 1.54% 0.06 69.92 -3.11% 6.78% 0.06%  VOL(1,3) -1.62% -0.06 27.07 -1.44% -2.05% -2.22% 
M0G 1.67% 0.06 39.95 1.50% 1.86% 0.89%  VOL(1,5) -3.45% -0.02 31.08 -2.51% -4.82% -4.16% 
M1G -1.08% -0.15 16.28 -2.53% 0.51% -1.40%  VOL(1,7) -2.47% 0.00 23.99 -3.21% -1.96% -3.00% 
M2G 0.88% 0.02 60.97 -2.87% 5.06% -0.37%  VOL(1,9) -5.05% -0.07 17.09 -2.85% -7.71% -5.42% 
VIX -9.77% -0.09 43.21 -0.60% -20.10% -10.73%  VOL(1,11) -5.59% -0.09 16.06 -2.89% -8.74% -5.95% 
Panel B: Principal Component Predictive Forecasts 
PC-ECON 5.53% 0.18 66.75 -2.94% 15.04% 4.14%  PC-TECH -7.79% 0.00 39.77 -5.68% -10.61% -8.75% 
        PC-TECH[3,5] -4.68% 0.03 43.54 -3.41% -6.62% -5.71% 
        PC-TECH[9,11] -6.23% -0.01 33.20 -5.96% -7.36% -7.00% 
Panel C: Principal Component Predictive Forecasts, All Predictors Taken Together 
PC-ALL 1.44% 0.14 69.80 -6.42% 10.34% -0.14%         
Notes: The table presents portfolio performance measures for a mean-variance investor with relative risk aversion coefficient of five who use an historical average (HA) forecast or predictive 
regression forecast to allocate monthly between equities and risk-free asset. Δ is the annualized certainty equivalent return (CER) gain for an investor who use the monthly-level predictive 
regression forecast instead of the HA forecast; we report the absolute level of CER for the HA forecast only. Δ are also reported for the stable and volatile periods separately. The definition of 
certainty equivalent return is given in (16). Relative average turnover is the average monthly turnover divided by the average monthly turnover for the portfolio based on the HA forecast; for 
HA forecast only, we report the average turnover level. Δ, 50bps cost is the CER gain after a transaction cost of 50 basis points per trade. The principal component models are defined in Table 
7 and 8. 
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Table 1.11  Portfolio Performance Measures (weekly), 2002:12:27 to 2016:12:02 
Technical indicators (weekly-level) 




Δ, Stable Δ, Volatile 
Δ,  
50bps cost 
HA 3.93% -0.01 0.35%   3.84% 
Panel A: Bivariate Predictive Regression Forecasts 
MA(1,3)w 2.93% 0.07 48.79 -2.42% 7.59% -1.66% 
MA(1,5)w 2.90% 0.07 40.24 -2.61% 7.70% -0.92% 
MA(1,7)w 4.97% 0.10 43.42 -3.49% 12.43% 0.77% 
MA(1,9)w 4.48% 0.10 41.03 -5.57% 13.34% 0.50% 
MA(1,11)w 4.15% 0.09 35.40 -6.78% 13.80% 0.72% 
MOM(3)w 3.51% 0.08 34.23 -1.23% 7.63% 0.30% 
MOM(5)w 1.63% 0.06 31.01 -2.64% 5.35% -1.26% 
MOM(7)w 2.55% 0.07 26.22 -5.64% 9.75% 0.10% 
MOM(9)w 4.25% 0.09 25.10 -5.07% 12.46% 1.89% 
MOM(11)w 3.64% 0.10 30.18 -7.10% 13.17% 0.78% 
VOL(1,3)w 0.86% 0.04 45.05 -2.36% 3.65% -3.27% 
VOL(1,5)w 2.45% 0.07 42.36 -0.70% 5.20% -1.48% 
VOL(1,7)w 2.19% 0.07 34.58 0.04% 4.07% -1.03% 
VOL(1,9)w 1.91% 0.07 31.55 -1.83% 5.20% -1.03% 
VOL(1,11)w -0.80% 0.05 29.37 -2.47% 0.68% -3.54% 
Panel B: Principal Component Predictive Forecasts 
PC-TECHW 6.10% 0.11 52.43 -2.97% 14.10% 1.13% 
PC-TECH[3,5]W 4.61% 0.09 61.25 -0.01% 8.64% -1.16% 
PC-TECH[9,11]W 6.50% 0.11 37.79 -2.68% 14.63% 2.91% 
Notes: The table presents portfolio performance measures for a mean-variance investor with relative risk aversion 
coefficient of five who use an historical average (HA) forecast or weekly-level predictive regression forecast to allocate 
weekly between equities and risk-free asset. Δ is the annualized certainty equivalent return (CER) gain for an investor 
who use the predictive regression forecast instead of the HA forecast; we report the absolute level of CER for the HA 
forecast only. Δ are also reported for the stable and volatile periods separately. The definition of certainty equivalent return 
is given in (16). Relative average turnover is the average weekly turnover divided by the average monthly turnover for the 
portfolio based on the HA forecast; for HA forecast only, we report the average turnover level. Δ, 50bps cost is the CER 
gain after a transaction cost of 50 basis points per trade. The principal component models are defined in Table 7 and 8. 
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Table 1.12  Cross-Sectional Performance of the Weekly-level Technical Indicators, 1997.07.04 to 2016:12:02 
    SIZE 
VOL 
Small 2 3 4 Big  Small 2 3 4 Big 
 In-sample R2  Out-of-sample 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  
Panel A:  PC-TECHw model 
Low 1.70%*** 1.48%*** 1.67%*** 1.99%*** 1.36%***  1.01%*** 1.35%*** 0.96%*** 1.52%*** 0.85%*** 
2 1.85%*** 1.57%*** 1.29%*** 1.38%*** 1.46%***  1.49%*** 0.83%*** 0.42%** 0.33%** 0.83%*** 
3 1.75%*** 1.70%*** 1.53%*** 1.60%*** 1.24%***  1.23%*** 0.34%** 0.65%** 1.13%*** 0.84%*** 
4 1.97%*** 1.26%*** 1.56%*** 1.46%*** 1.28%***  1.22%*** 0.59%** 0.57%** 0.68%** 0.91%*** 
High 2.07%*** 1.64%*** 1.29%*** 1.70%*** 0.88%***  1.21%*** 1.05%*** 0.34%** 0.99%*** 0.66%** 
Panel B:  PC-TECH[3,5]w model 
Low 2.01%*** 1.54%*** 1.38%*** 1.79%*** 1.20%***  1.26%*** 1.02%*** 1.25%*** 1.47%*** 0.99%*** 
2 1.92%*** 1.57%*** 1.21%*** 1.35%*** 0.80%**  1.83%*** 1.04%*** 1.03%*** 0.87%*** 0.30%* 
3 1.84%*** 1.62%*** 1.72%*** 1.56%*** 0.83%***  1.59%*** 0.76%*** 1.03%*** 1.51%*** 0.79%** 
4 1.98%*** 1.38%*** 1.58%*** 1.34%*** 1.10%***  1.59%*** 1.11%*** 1.18%*** 0.76%*** 0.66%** 
High 2.34%*** 1.49%*** 1.48%*** 1.76%*** 0.76%***  1.35%*** 0.70%*** 0.65%*** 0.98%*** 0.57%** 
Panel C:  PC-TECH[9,11]w model 
Low 0.89%*** 1.15%*** 1.41%*** 1.45%*** 1.16%***  0.55%** 0.81%*** 0.60%** 1.10%*** 0.95%*** 
2 1.07%*** 0.83%*** 0.46%** 0.66%*** 1.73%***  0.83%*** 0.59%** 0.13% 0.18%* 1.21%*** 
3 1.24%*** 0.96%*** 0.72%*** 0.50%** 1.53%***  0.87%*** -0.09% 0.46%** 0.00% 1.13%*** 
4 1.29%*** 0.87%*** 0.44%** 0.74%** 1.42%***  0.28%** 0.35%** 0.19%* 0.28%* 0.99%*** 
High 0.97%*** 0.46%** 0.71%** 1.18%*** 0.79%***  0.34%** 0.27%* 0.36%* 0.61%*** 0.42%** 
Notes: This table reports the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of the principal component models based on weekly-level 
technical indicators for the 25 size-volatility double-sorted portfolios. In-sample R2 statistic and out-of-sample 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  statistic are 
reported in the left-hand-side and right-hand-side, respectively. For in-sample R2, *, ** and *** indicate the slope coefficient is 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, based on the one-side wild bootstrapped p-value. For out-of-sample 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 , *, ** and *** 
represent the MSFE-adjusted statistic is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Initial estimation period is 1997:07:04 until 
2012:12:28 and forecast evaluation period is 2003:01:03 until 2016:12:02 for the out-of-sample tests. 
PC-TECHw denotes the principal component model (as given by (9) and (11) in the text) based on the 15 weekly-level technical 
indicators. PC-TECH[3,5]w is the principal component model of the six short-term weekly-level technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(1, 𝑙), 𝑀𝑂𝑀(1, 𝑙) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑂𝐿(1, 𝑙) given 𝑙 = 3, 5 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠. PC-TECH[9,11]w is the principal component model of the six longer-








 TWO DISTINCT PHENOMENA? ─ THE 
PREDICTIVE POWER OF THE SHORT-TERM AND 
INTERMEDIATE-TERM MOVING AVERAGES 
 
Abstract 
We find that moving average indicators over intermediate-horizons (roughly 7 to 
15 months) generate strong predictive power for US market indices, which is solely 
driven by the top 10% companies by market capitalization. The significant predictive 
power of intermediate-horizon technical indicator in Neely et al. (2014) appears to be 
a unique phenomenon for the largest companies as they examined only the S&P 500 
index. In contrast, companies with small-to-medium market capitalization exhibit 
future price predictability using short-horizon moving average indicators. A weekly-
level analysis reveals that moving average indicators provide strong and long-lasting 
short-horizon predictive power for over 50% of the cross-section. This short-horizon 
predictive power is strongly correlated with market capitalization but not with other 
sorting criteria including volatility. A qualitatively similar result holds in out-of-sample 
test. Sub-period tests show that the intermediate-horizon predictive power is likely due 
to a calendar effect. Overall, the intermediate-horizon and short-horizon predictive 
power of technical indicators appear to capture two distinct phenomena of US stock 
returns. The former resembles the “echo” effect described in Novy-Marx (2012) and 
Goyal and Wahal (2015). The use of momentum indicators yields a similar result and 
suggests momentum indicators capture similar information as moving average 
indicators. Nevertheless, momentum indicators exhibit weaker and shorter-lasting 
predictive power compared to moving average indicators. International evidence 
suggests that the predictive power of moving average indicators at intermediate 
horizons is strong only in the US market. In contrast, that predictive power of short-
horizon moving average indicators is very strong in stock markets in Japan as well as 






Technical analysis attempts to forecast future prices by relying on past price and 
volume information. Examples of the most commonly used technical indicators include 
momentum and moving averages, both of which are trend-following trading strategies. 
The profitability of technical indicators has been investigated and documented in 
numerous studies (e.g., Brock, Lakonishok & LeBaron 1992; Chan, Jegadeesh & 
Lakonishok 1996; Lo, Mamaysky & Wang 2000b). More recently, several researchers 
have shown that applying technical analysis to the cross-section can generate 
substantial excess returns which are greater for small capitalization stocks and more 
volatile stocks (e.g., Glabadanidis 2015a, 2015b, 2016; Han et al. 2014; Han, Yang & 
Zhou 2013; Shynkevich 2012). Technical analysis has also been used to predict future 
values of the equity risk premium. Neely et al. (2014) show that technical indicators 
can predict the monthly excess return of the S&P 500 index and that they provide 
complementary information to that supplied by conventional macroeconomic 
predictors. We intend to fill the gap in this literature by examining the predictive power 
of technical indicators (moving average and momentum indicators) in multiple indices, 
in the cross-section, as well as using higher frequency data, i.e., weekly in addition to 
monthly stock returns. 
Neely et al.(2014) find that trend-following technical indicators with the horizon 
of 9-to-12 months can significantly predict the excess return of the S&P 500 index. We 
replicate their approach using both the S&P 500 index and CSRP value-weighted index. 
Our first finding is that the predictive power of moving averages is strong exclusively 
at intermediate horizons (around 7 to 15 months). Our second major finding is that the 
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predictive power is much weaker for the CRSP value-weighted return, which contains 
a much larger number of companies with small-to-medium market capitalization 
compared to the S&P 500 index. Therefore, it is possible that the finding in Neely et al. 
(2014) is driven by the concentration of extra-large companies in the S&P 500 index. 
This possibility motivates us to examine the power of predictive regressions in the 
cross-section. Our third finding is that the predictive power of moving average (and 
momentum) indicators at intermediate horizons is significant only for the top/bottom 
size decile portfolios. Therefore, since Neely et al. (2014) examine only the largest 500 
companies in the U.S. stock market, their result is mainly driven by the superior 
predictive power of intermediate-horizon moving averages for the companies with the 
largest market capitalization. In contrast, the predictive power of intermediate-horizon 
moving averages in the rest of the cross-section is much lower.  
Our fourth finding is that short-horizon moving averages have substantial 
predictive power over future stock returns of firms with small market capitalization. 
Short-horizon (3-7 months) moving average indicators can significantly predict the 
returns of the smallest size decile. For all other size sorted deciles (except the largest 
decile), we also observe a greater predictive power at very short horizons. As a result, 
small-to-medium size companies seem to have very “sluggish” returns in the short-term, 
while the largest decile exclusively exhibits intermediate-term predictive power. This 
cross-sectional difference implies that short-horizon and intermediate-horizon moving 
averages may be capturing two distinct phenomena.  
We repeat our analysis using weekly returns. We find that the predictive power of 
short-horizon moving average indicators is quite prominent. Based on the weekly return, 
we find that there is a persistent and substantial predictive power of short-horizon 
moving average for most of the cross-section which is also relatively long-lasting for 
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more than 30 weeks. The absence of this predictability in monthly level returns suggests 
that there is a prominent short-term trend at the weekly frequency, indicating that a 
price trend may last for a week but not necessarily for a month. We show that the 
predictive power of short-term technical indicators is strongly and monotonically 
correlated with market capitalization, suggesting that smaller firms have stronger and 
more “sluggish” returns while larger firms have weaker and shorter-lasting price trends. 
The largest firms even exhibit negative predictive power. We do not find the same 
cross-sectional result when using other sorting characteristics. Our result is consistent 
with Gutierrez and Kelley (2008), who report a long-lasting weekly momentum return 
after a short-lasting reversal effect. 
Subperiod analysis shows that the predictive power of the intermediate-horizon 
moving average appears to be due to a calendar effect. We examined the sub-sample 
R2 statistic regarding calendar months and business cycles. We find that the monthly-
level predictability at intermediate horizons is due to the June and October monthly 
returns while the predictive power of short-horizon moving average indicators is not 
sensitive to any calendar month. Thus, the predictive power of the intermediate-horizon 
moving average indicators appears to be a distinct phenomenon to that captured by 
short-term moving average indicators. In terms of the effect of business cycles, the 
predictive power of both short-horizon and intermediate-horizon moving averages is 
greater during recessions, which is consistent with the predictability literature.  
The implications of our findings are fourfold. First, we provide an alternative way 
to examine and compare the performance of technical indicators, while the existing 
empirical literature exclusively uses profitability as the measurement of performance. 
For example, Han, Yang and Zhou (2013) examine the excess return generated by 
moving average in the cross-section of the US stock market. They found that high stock 
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volatility, small market capitalization and other “information uncertainty” proxies are 
related to the profitability of short-horizon technical indicators in the cross-section. 
However, due to large cross-sectional differences in volatility, comparing average 
return may not help us get much insight into predictability mechanism of technical 
indicators. Glabadanidis (2015b, 2016) suggest that the timing ability of technical 
indicators creates a payoff resembling an at-the-money put option combined with 
regards to a buy-and-hold position in the underlying risky asset. Technical indicators 
may capture some of the upside volatility while avoiding some of the downside 
volatility and, hence, the average historical return may be highly correlated with past 
volatility. Therefore, technical indicators will generate a greater average excess return 
for an underlying asset with high volatility due to the convexity of the payoff. This 
could mean that it is possible that the excess return may be due to the influence of 
volatility differences rather than a genuinely greater predictive power. Rather than 
focus on comparing average return we focus on studying the predictive power of the 
moving average technical indicators. This provides an alternative angle to investigate 
the performance of technical indicators. 
Second, the differences in the predictive power of intermediate-horizon and short-
horizon moving average indicators may be capturing two distinct phenomena. The high 
predictive power of intermediate-horizon moving averages with monthly stock returns 
coincides with that in Novy-Marx (2012), who find that momentum profits are 
concentrated on portfolios sorted by the past performance at intermediate-horizons (7 
to 12 months) rather than short-horizons. If the predictive power of trend-following 
technical indicators is indeed driven by a strong price trend11, this greater predictive 
                                                 
11 There is not an ideal way to measure price continuation. Momentum strategies which 
sort stocks by past winners/losers provides only indirect evidence of a price trend as well. 
Similarly, simulating trend-following technical trading strategies and measuring their average 
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power that is concentrated at intermediate horizons is in conflict with the intuition about 
price trends that “price increases are followed by further price increases and price 
declines are followed by further price declines.” Goyal and Wahal (2015) call this an 
“echo” effect rather than price continuation. We contribute to the literature by showing 
that this monthly level “echo” effect is a distinct phenomenon present only in the largest 
10% companies. In sharp contrast, our weekly analysis shows that the short-horizon 
predictive power is strong at first and decays at greater lags, which is consistent with 
the notion of a price trend. Moreover, this short-term predictive power of trend-
following technical indicators is found to be monotonic in market capitalization, where 
the companies with the smallest market capitalization exhibit the strongest and longest-
lasting price trends. Yao (2012) argues that the January effect has been the driver of the 
“echo” effect found in Novy-Marx (2012) and Goyal and Wahal (2015). In contrast, 
our findings suggest that the predictive power of intermediate-horizon moving average 
indicators relies highly on the months of June and October. 
Third, in contrast with the literature measuring the investment performance of 
technical analysis (e.g., Glabadanidis 2015b, 2016; Han et al. 2014; Han, Yang & Zhou 
2013), we find that the predictive power of short-term technical indicators is highly 
associated with market capitalization, not volatility. This finding supports several 
theoretical explanations regarding the links between the investment performance of 
technical analysis and market capitalization. For example, information frictions12 may 
be one of the factors closely related to the market capitalization of the underlying asset. 
Also, if the magnitude of the predictive power of the trend-following technical indicator 
                                                 
return is also an indirect measurement of a price trend. We believe that examining the predictive 
power of trend-following technical indicators provides an alternative angle in examining price 
trends.  
12 Neely et al. (2014) reviewed four types of theoretical model on information friction that 
may explain to the success of the trend-following technical. 
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is representative of the strength of the price trend, then the predictive power of the short-
horizon indicators and, especially with weekly returns, is indicative of a price 
continuation. This predictive power of short-term moving average indicators makes 
intuitive sense especially for firms with smaller market capitalization. Any theory 
attempting to explain price trends will have to address specifically the relationship 
between market capitalization and price trends.  
Lastly, in the cross-section, we can observe high predictive power when using 
weekly returns but not monthly returns. Thus, it seems that the price trend is strong at 
the weekly frequency but is much weaker at the monthly frequency. One possible 
interpretation of this finding is the gradual decay of the price trend. 
2. Methodology and data 
We retrieve S&P 500 return data from Wharton Research Data Services. Value-
weighted, equal-weighted market return and daily variance sorted decile portfolio are 
obtained from Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). All data on other decile 
portfolios is retrieved from Kenneth R. French’s website (http://mba.tuck. 
dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html). Monthly risk-free return is 
retrieved from Amit Goyal’s website (http://www.hec.unil.ch/agoyal/). Lastly, we 
obtain the daily risk-free return from Kenneth R. French’s website. Our sample is from 
July 1963 until December 2016.  
Consider the following predictive regression model: 
 𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 , (1) 
where the equity risk premium, 𝑟𝑡+1, is the return on the market portfolio
 in excess of 
the risk-free rate from period 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1; 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 is the disturbance term with zero mean. 
The signal 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the trading signal generated by technical indicator 𝑖 at time 𝑡. Under 
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the null hypothesis 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 = 0 , 𝑆𝑖,𝑡  cannot predict the equity risk premium of the 
underlying asset. In this case, the model breaks down into a constant expected equity 
risk premium model. Inoue and Kilian (2005) recommend a one-sided attest to increase 
the statistical power of in-sample predictability test. We thus test 𝐻0: 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 = 0 against 
𝐻1: 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 > 0 using the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistic
13, based on an ordinary 
least square (OLS) procedure.  
The moving average of past prices is a widely used technical trading indicator. We 
use the trading signal generated by a cross-over moving average (MA) rule as the 
predictor in the regression in (1) above. The MA rule generates a trading signal by 
comparing two moving averages at the end of 𝑡: 
 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡 ≥ 𝑀𝐴𝑙,𝑡








𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 0  and 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 1  suggests a sell and buy signal, respectively; 𝑗 denotes the 
maximum lag of the MA length and can be either 𝑠 or 𝑙 (short or long); 𝑃𝑡 is the level 
of a portfolio index at time 𝑡. Therefore, an MA indicator will generate a signal based 
on a comparison between the value of 𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡 and 𝑀𝐴𝑙,𝑡 . When 𝑀𝐴𝑠,𝑡  exceeds (falls 
short of) 𝑀𝐴𝑙,𝑡 , indicating an upward (downward) trend, a buy (sell) signal will be 
generated. For our monthly (weekly) analysis, we use 2-year horizon of cross-over MA 
indicators with 𝑠 = 1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ (𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘)  and 𝑙 = 3 𝑡𝑜 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 (3 𝑡𝑜 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠) . 
Since we only use moving average with 𝑠 = 1 with varying 𝑙, we drop 𝑠 and denote a 
                                                 
13 We use the Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistic. 
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MA indicator as 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ for indicator which is based on monthly return, and as 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 for one generated from weekly return.  
3. Predicting market indices 
We use the moving average indicators described in (2) and (3) to estimate the 
predictive regression model in (1). For ease of presentation, we provide a novel way to 
visualize the predictive power of moving average indicators. We plot the t-statistics and 
R2 along the lag horizon (𝑙) of the moving average indicators, as in Figure 2.1. We 
present our findings throughout the paper in figures rather than in tabular format.14 This 
presentation of our findings makes it easier to compare the performance of moving 
average indicators for various values of the lag parameter 𝑙. We can also easily compare 
the performance of technical indicators in the cross-section. 
In Figure 2.1 we plot the in-sample predictive power of the moving average 
indicators 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ  with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 . In Section A of Figure 2.1 we 
present the predictive power of the regression for excess return of the S&P 500 index 
starting in July 1963 until December 2016. The findings indicate that the predictive 
power is weak15 for the moving average indicator 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ with 𝑙 in the short-term 
(3, 4 or 5 month), but increases and reaches a peak at intermediate lags (around 10 
months to 17 months) with a t-statistic of around two16. The R2 statistics reach 0.8% to 
1% around the same lag windows. The predictive power is statistically significant 
around the peak and the in-sample R2 statistic is well above the 0.5% threshold which 
provides substantial economic significance as suggested in Campbell and Thompson 
                                                 
14 All estimation data is available upon request and will be published online.  
15 Note that the t-statistics are negative in the first two months. We do not use bootstrapped 
p-value because the computation cost is too high when examine multiple underlying assets. 
16 For a one-sided test, 𝑡 = 1.645 indicates significant at 5% significance level. We mark 




(2008). This significant predictive power of moving average indicators at intermediate 
horizons is consistent with the findings reported in Neely et al. (2014) for the S&P 500 
index using moving average indicators with 𝑙 = 9 and 12 months.  
We extend our analysis to other market indices. In Section B of Figure 2.1 we 
report our findings for the value-weighted CRSP index during the same sample period. 
The predictive power of moving average indicators over future monthly returns of the 
value-weighted CRSP index is similar though weaker than that reported for S&P 500. 
The predictive power of moving averages is very weak for lags of between 3 and 8 
months, but increases for lags of between 10 and 17 months and reaches a peak at lag 
of 15 months with a t-statistic of over 1.6 and an R-squared of 0.7%. At greater horizons 
the predictive power gradually decays. Overall, the hump-shaped term-structure of the 
predictive power of moving average indicators is similar though weaker than the one 
for the S&P 500 index.  
The hump-shaped curve implies that the moving average indicators using more 
recent past price information does not predict the nearest future month return well. 
However, using a longer history of past price does a better job at explaining well future 
stock index returns. Since the moving average indicator is a typical “trend-following” 
technical indicator the hump-shared predictability pattern indicates that there is a strong 
price trend at intermediate lags which is not present for the first 3 to 6 months of past 
prices. Price continuation, or momentum, is perceived as higher prices following a 
rising price as well as lower future prices following a price drop. It is puzzling why 
price continuation is weak and insignificant at shorter horizons, but is stronger 
afterward, contradicting our intuition about “price continuation.” Our result is similar 
to the finding of Novy-Marx (2012), who report that the momentum strategy based on 
the past returns of between 7 and 12 month outperforms the strategy based on past 
59 
 
returns of between 2 and 6 months. He argues that momentum profitability is mainly 
driven by the past performance in the intermediate term. Goyal and Wahal (2015) 
describe this vividly as an “echo” effect. We observe a similar phenomenon in a 
different experimental setup. 
The difference between the performance of moving average indicators for the S&P 
500 index and the CRSP value-weighted index reveals an important cross-sectional 
pattern of the predictive power of moving averages. The plots in Sections A and B of 
Figure 2.1 we demonstrate that moving average indicator can better predict the S&P 
500 index than the CRSP value-weighted index, especially in the intermediate term. 
The main difference between the CRSP value-weighted index and S&P 500 is their 
composition. S&P 500 includes the largest 500 companies while the CRSP value-
weighted index is a more comprehensive representation of the market. The fact that the 
result is stronger for S&P 500 raises the question whether it is the largest companies 
that drive the predictive power of the intermediate-term moving average indicator. 
To address this possibility, we repeat our analysis using an equal-weighted CRSP 
index, which puts much greater weight on the small-to-medium companies. We report 
our findings in Section C of Figure 2.1. In addition to the significant predictive power 
in the intermediate term, we also observe strong predictive power using the short-term 
moving average (𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ with 𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, 6 ,7) with t-statistics ranging from 2 to 
3.5 and R2 well above 1 percent, which is unobservable in the prior result based on the 
value-weighted index. This difference between the value-weighted and the equal-
weighted findings implies that it is small-to-medium size companies that have different 
short-term price patterns compared to large companies. The predictive power at short-
term horizons is strong and gradually decays at longer lags with a “bump” in the 
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intermediate term. Next, we turn to the examination of the cross-sectional differences 
in the predictive power of moving average indicators.  
4. Cross-sectional Predictability 
Since value-weighted and equal-weighted indices have a distinct pattern of price-
continuation, using portfolios sorted by market capitalization may help us gain some 
insights about the differential predictive power in the cross-section. We perform the 
predictive regression (1) using value-weighted portfolios sorted by market 
capitalization (size) with monthly returns retrieved from Kenneth French’s online Data 
Library. We simulate the moving average trading signal for each of the size decile 
portfolios and use the signals to predict future portfolio monthly returns.  
In Figure 2.2 we present our findings for the power of the predictive regression 
size-sorted decile portfolios. In the cross-section, the predictive power varies 
substantially using the moving averages at different horizons. Firstly, Figure 2.2 
suggests that the largest-cap decile indeed has the greatest and most significant 
predictive power (black curve) at intermediate horizons (around 10 to 17 months), while 
most of the other size deciles have much weaker results. This cross-sectional difference 
explains why we find significant intermediate-term predictive power in S&P 500 but 
weaker result in CRSP value-weighted return since the predictive power in the 
intermediate term is mostly an effect mostly due to the largest companies. It is 
worthwhile noting that the rest of the size-sorted portfolio do exhibit an increasing 
though insignificant predictive power at intermediate horizons. We show that the 
largest-cap companies play a substantial role in driving the greater predictive power at 
intermediate horizons. Overall, this unique behavior of the stock returns of the largest 
companies reveals that the predictive power of technical indicators described in Neely 
et al. (2014) appears to be driven by the companies with the largest market 
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capitalizations which constitutes the majority of the composition of the S&P 500. Also, 
the evidence we present is consistent with the view that the largest companies may 
contribute exclusively to the “echo” effect documented in Novy-Marx (2012) Goyal 
and Wahal (2015).  
Secondly, Figure 2.2 shows that the decile with the smallest market capitalization 
(micro caps) exhibits the greatest predictive power over and above that of all the other 
deciles and it is slowly decreasing at larger horizons. The predictive power for the 
smallest decile is very strong initially, indicating a very “sluggish” return in the short-
term. Except for the largest decile, all the other deciles appear to have relatively high 
predictive power in the short-term (using 𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ and 𝑀𝐴(4) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ), indicating 
that there is a price-continuation in the very short-term (higher frequency), which is not 
covered by our monthly analysis. Thus, it would be interesting to investigate the 
predictive power at a higher frequency, which we address in the next session. 
So far, market capitalization seems to be an important cross-sectional factor 
associated with the predictive power of moving average indicators. As a comparison, 
we repeat our analysis using five additional sets of decile portfolios retrieved from 
French Kenneth’s website, namely, portfolios sorted by variance, beta, book-to-market, 
industry, and momentum. We present our findings for these portfolio in Sections A 
through E of Figure 2.3. For comparison purpose, we hold the scale of the graphs as 
same as in Figure 2.2. Regarding the t-statistics and R2 statistics, none of these 
portfolios show the same cross-sectional variation as the one with portfolios sorted by 
market capitalization in Figure 2.2. For example, Section A of Figure 2.3 shows that 
short-term moving average indicators can predict the future monthly return of the high 
variance decile while longer horizon indicators predict the future returns of the low 
variance decile. Nevertheless, the cross-sectional difference in predictive power is not 
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of nearly as large as the one reported for size sorted decile portfolios. In other words, 
portfolios sorted by market capitalization have the largest cross-sectional variation in 
predictive power, especially for the largest and smallest decile. As a result, this finding 
indicates that market capitalization may better explain the differential predictive power 
of the moving average indicator than other sorting criteria or characteristics. 
Nevertheless, short-term moving average indicators,  𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ and 𝑀𝐴(4) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ, 
can still predict well future returns of the highest variance decile, the highest beta decile, 
and the highest B/M decile. For momentum-sorted portfolios, future returns of past 
winners (8th, 9th and 10th deciles) can be significantly predicted by moving averages at 
intermediate horizons. Overall, we can document greater predictive power using short-
term and intermediate-term moving averages, with a “dip” in between these two 
horizons. 
5. Weekly-level cross-section 
The existing literature pays little attention to weekly returns, except Gutierrez and 
Kelley (2008), among others, who have documented a long-lasting weekly momentum 
of up to 52 weeks in US stock returns. In the previous section, we show that monthly 
technical indicators with the shortest horizon (𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ and 𝑀𝐴(4) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) have 
relatively high predictive power compared with the longer horizons in most decile 
portfolios. This suggests the possible existence of price continuation at a higher 
frequency, within the minimum formation period of 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ, 𝑙 = 3 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠.  
We explore this possibility by running the predictive regression with weekly 
returns17. Using daily decile portfolio return data retrieved from Kenneth French’s 
online Data Library website, we compute Wednesday to Wednesday weekly return 
                                                 




series18. In case of a missing Wednesday return, we replace it with the Thursday data 
of the same week. For the week starting on 10th September 2001, there is no Wednesday 
or Thursday data due to the 9/11 terrorist attack. We use Monday data for that week. 
We generate the moving average indicators on each portfolio and run the predictive 
regression in (1). To be consistent with our monthly level analysis using 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 
with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24, in our weekly level analysis we use 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 with 𝑙 =
 3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104, covering a same 2-year post-formation period.  
There are three differences between the weekly and monthly findings: Firstly, the 
weekly moving average indicator utilizes additional information which is within the 
horizon of 3 to 13 weeks (< 3 months). Secondly, the weekly predictive regression 
predicts future stock returns only one week forward, capturing predictive power at a 
higher frequency. Meanwhile, our monthly level predictive regression predicts future 
stock returns one month forward. Thirdly, weekly price movement contains inherently 
more (noisy) information than the monthly price, which may affect the predictive power. 
Since the monthly return is nosier than the yearly return, the weekly return may also be 
noisier than the monthly return. We believe the threshold for economic significance for 
weekly predictive regression should be lower than 0.5%, the threshold for monthly level 
predictive regression. However, there is no commonly accepted threshold for the R2 
statistic using predictive regression with weekly return data. We leave the inference to 
the reader.  
Our findings for weekly returns are distinct from our findings with monthly returns 
in two ways: Firstly, as shown in Figure 2.4, within horizons of up to 𝑙 =  30 weeks 
the magnitude of t-statistics/R-squared are monotonically lower across deciles as 
                                                 
18 We do this in order to avoid potential contamination of weekly returns arising from 
beginning-of-the-week and end-of-the-week trading issues. 
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market capitalization increases. This indicates that market capitalization is a very strong 
coincidental factor for the predictive power of short-term moving averages in the cross-
section.  
Secondly, Figure 2.4 shows that, apart from the three largest deciles, the other 
seven size deciles have positively significant short-term price predictive power within 
horizons of up to 𝑙 = 30 weeks. This suggest a very “sluggish” stock return for 70% of 
the cross-section in the weekly level. In contrast, our results for monthly returns 
reported in Figure 2.2 shows that only the smallest two size deciles have significant 
short-term predictive power. In Figure 2.4 we see that the smallest decile portfolio 
allows the strongest level of predictive power with R2 of around 5% at horizons of just 
a few weeks. On the contrary, the largest size decile has a negatively significant (at 5% 
significance level for a one-sided test) t-statistic at the shortest horizons, which 
increases at longer lags but remains negative for lags of up to 15 weeks. This negative 
predictive power suggests a “negative trend”, capturing the short-term reversal effect. 
In the bottom panel of Figure 2.4 we see that the six smallest deciles have R-squared 
reaching the 0.5% using  𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 with 𝑙 < 10 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠.  
This regularity of cross-sectional pattern across market capitalization and the 
strong predictive power using weekly returns is not observable at the monthly 
frequency with size-sorted deciles plotted in Figure 2.2. Considering the difference in 
findings between weekly and monthly predictive regressions, we provide the following 
interpretations:  
The predictive power of the moving average indicator is stronger for next week 
stock returns than for next month stock returns. Alternatively, this may indicate that the 
rising (falling) price keeps rising (falling) for one extra week but does not last long 
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enough for one additional month. Therefore, using weekly return may be better in 
capturing short-term price dynamics than using monthly returns. 
The downward sloping of predictive power as a function of the weekly horizon is 
consistent with our understanding of the price trend getting weaker over time. In 
contrast, with monthly stock returns, the concentration of predictive power in the 
intermediate term driven by the largest capitalization companies is not consistent with 
the usual intuition about a price trend. As a result, the predictive power of short-term 
and intermediate moving average indicators appears to capture two distinct phenomena.  
Market capitalization is negatively correlated with the cross-sectional variation in 
the weekly return predictive power, which is not the case for monthly returns.  
Furthermore, the weekly price trend cannot be subsumed by the conventional 
momentum strategy based on monthly returns, and our result is consistent with the 
finding of Gutierrez and Kelley (2008), who report a long-lasting weekly momentum 
effect following a brief reversal in the nearest weeks. Our findings indicate that the 
initial short-term reversal is stronger for large-caps while most the other companies 
have longer-lasting “sluggish” stock returns in the short-term.   
We find that market capitalization can explain well the “sluggish” cross-sectional 
weekly returns. However, it is also possible that other firm characteristics have a 
bearing on this cross-sectional phenomenon. To address this possibility, we present our 
findings for volatility-sorted, book-to-market, momentum-sorted and industry-sorted 
decile portfolios in Figure 2.5 and 2.6.19 The portfolios sorted by prior variance are 
equally weighted while the other three sets of portfolios are value-weighted.20  
                                                 
19 Our choice of these four sets of decile portfolios is largely driven by data availability. 
20 We use equal-weighted return because value-weighted daily volatility sorted deciles are 




As presented in Figure 2.5, the predictive power of weekly moving average 
indicators volatility-sorted deciles is quite strong at horizons of up to l = 30 weeks 
across all deciles. However, unlike the size-sorted deciles, the volatility-sorted deciles 
largely overlap with each other. The exception is the decile portfolio with the highest 
historical volatility which shows the strongest predictive power with a very high t-
statistic. Compared with our findings for size-sorted deciles, there is not much cross-
sectional variation (except for the highest volatility decile) in the predictive power of 
 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 with 𝑙 <  30 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 , indicating volatility may be not be a good 
characteristic to capture the cross-sectional variation of the predictive power of weekly 
moving average indicators. However, the existing literature shows that the short-term 
trend-following technical trading rules can generate higher excess returns in deciles 
with higher volatility (e.g., Han et al. 2014; Han, Yang & Zhou 2013; Han, Zhou & 
Zhu 2015). If the predictive power of moving averages is similar across volatility-sorted 
deciles, then what is the possible mechanism for this result? Glabadanidis (2015b, 
2016) suggest that the payoffs of moving average rules resemble that of an at-the-
money put option with a long time-varying position in the underlying asset. Therefore, 
even though the predictive power of moving averages is similar across the volatility 
deciles, high volatility itself will lead to higher excess return using the moving average 
trading rule due to its greater convexity in the underlying buy-and-hold return. Because 
of the timing ability of moving averages21, they can successfully capture more upside 
volatility while avoiding some of the downside volatility, resulting in higher excess 
returns even when the predictive power is the same across portfolios. Therefore, it is 
quite plausible that the similar level of predictability and the differences in profitability 
                                                 
21 See Han, Yang and Zhou (2013) and Glabadanidis (2015b, 2016) for the evidence of 
market timing ability of moving averages using methodology described in Treynor and Mazuy 
(1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981) 
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of moving averages indicators across volatility-sorted deciles can manifest at the same 
time. 
Despite the conventional wisdom based on the profitability of moving averages, 
our results indicate that the performance of moving average indicators is more closely 
related to market capitalization than historical volatility. Except for the decile with the 
highest volatility, volatility does not appear to be positively associated with the 
predictive power of short-term moving average indicators. Moreover, we know from 
our previous findings that the predictive power of moving average indicators over 
small-cap stock returns is greater. As a result, using the equal-weighted volatility 
deciles amplified the significance of predictive power in Figure 2.5. If value-weighted 
volatility-sorted deciles were available, we would expect lower statistical significance 
making the slope in Figure 2.5 much flatter. Overall, it appears that market 
capitalization is more strongly associated with the cross-sectional differences in the 
predictive power of moving average indicators compared to historical volatility. 
In Figure 2.6 we plot the predictive regression findings for book-to-market, 
momentum, and industry sorted portfolios. We hold the same scale along the vertical 
axis as in Figure 2.4. In Figure 2.6 we show that the cross-sectional variation is much 
smaller for book-to-market, momentum and industry sorted portfolios relative to that 
of size-sorted portfolios. This finding is consistent with the view that the predictive 
power of moving average indicators is better associated with differences in market 
capitalization.  
Overall, we report very strong predictive power of moving average indicators using 
weekly returns in the cross-section, which is strong at short horizons and declines with 
lag length. This predictive power of short-term moving average indicators is consistent 
with the view that there is a strong price trend. We also show that market capitalization 
68 
 
is monotonically associated with the predictive power of the weekly moving average 
indicator in the cross-section. Weekly stock returns of small-cap companies are more 
easily predicted and, thus, may have more ‘sluggish’ stock returns when compared with 
the weekly stock returns of large-cap companies. The largest 10% companies by market 
capitalization exhibit a “negative trend,” implying that the largest-cap size decile is 
subject to the well-known short-term reversal effect. 
6. Calendar effects and business cycles 
Comparing the predictive power at the weekly frequency which behaves like price 
trend with the predictive power of intermediate-term moving averages at the monthly 
frequency does not appear to behave like price continuation. Yao (2012) argues that the 
January effect drives the intermediate-term "echo" effect discussed in Novy-Marx 
(2012). Indeed, a calendar effect may be behind the monthly return predictability at 
intermediate horizons. Therefore, using predictive regressions, we examine this 
possibility by revisiting our monthly frequency findings. Based on the sub-sample R-
squared statistic in Neely et al. (2014), we calculate the following sub-sample R-
squared statistic:  
 
𝑅𝑐







𝑡=1 (𝑟𝑡 − ?̅?)
2
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐 = 1,2 … 12; (4) 
where 𝐼𝑡
𝑐   is an indicator variable that equals 0 when month 𝑡  is the 𝑐𝑡ℎ  calendar 
month22 and equals 1 otherwise; 𝜀?̂?,𝑡
2  is the fitted residual based on the full-sample 
estimates of the original predictive regression model; ?̅? is the full-sample mean of 𝑟𝑡; 
and 𝑇 is the number of usable observations for the full sample. Note that 𝑅𝑐
2 can be 
negative.  
                                                 
22 𝑐 can also be a subset of 1,2 … 12, in order to exclude multiple month from the sample 




2  is a sub-sample R-squared statistic that measures the goodness of fit by 
excluding a calendar month 𝑐 from the calculation. We first consider monthly returns 
of the CRSP value-weighted index. In Section A of Figure 2.7 we plot the values of 𝑅𝑐
2. 
Note that the subsample goodness-of-fit for most subsamples are equal to or greater 
than that the full sample R2 (black curve). In other word, removing these calendar 
months from the sample does not weaken the predictive regression result. The 
exceptions are February, June and October. Removing them separately from the sample 
causes a sizable reduction in the R-squared statistic. This indicates that the 
predictability of the moving average indicator is highly reliant on these three calendar 
months. To examine their overall effect on the predictive power, we remove the three 
months altogether and compute the sub-sample R2. Section B of Figure 2.7 shows that 
removing them all together completely eliminates the predictive power and leads to 
negative 𝑅𝑐
2 at intermediate horizons. 
We repeat this exercise using monthly returns of the equal-weighted CRSP index 
and report our findings in Sections C and D of Figure 2.7. Similar to the case of the 
value-weighted CRSP index, the predictive power at intermediate horizons relies 
heavily on the index returns in March, June, and October. In Section D we show what 
happens when we remove all three months from the sample. Generally, the predictive 
power of moving average indicators disappears entirely at intermediate-term horizons 
once we remove the March, June and October returns. Note that both the value-
weighted and equal-weighted findings indicate strongly that June and October play a 
crucial role in boosting the predictive power of the moving average technical indicators. 
Furthermore, it is worthwhile noting that the predictive power at short horizons (using 
 𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ , 𝑀𝐴(4) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ ,  𝑀𝐴(5) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ  ) remains largely intact after removing 
these three calendar months, as shown in Section D. This finding indicates that the 
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predictive power at short horizons does not rely entirely on the returns during these 
three calendar months. 
 Next, we investigate whether there is any calendar effect at the weekly return 
frequency. We report our findings using weekly value-weighted CRSP returns in 
Section E. The plots provide additional evidence suggesting that the predictive power 
of short-term technical indicators is not sensitive to any calendar month. In Section E 
we show that the value-weighted CRSP weekly return has a relatively low predictive 
power (< 0.5%) regardless of the sub-sample under consideration. Note that the 
composition of this index is dominated by large-cap companies and, hence, the 
predictive power of short-term moving average indicators over their future stock returns 
at short horizons is very low, if any. In contrast, as presented in Section F, the weekly 
equal-weighted CRSP returns exhibit long-lasting predictive power regardless of which 
calendar month is omitted. Overall, our findings suggest that the predictive power of 
moving average indicators at intermediate horizons appears to be a calendar effect, 
while the predictive power of moving average indicators at short horizons is not due to 
any calendar effects.  
Based on model (4), we also examine the effect of business cycles on the predictive 
power of moving averages. We compute the sub-sample R2 using the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER) dated expansions and recessions. Section A of Figure 
2.8 reports the results for the CRSP value-weighted monthly return. During economic 
recessions (yellow curve), R2 is ranging between 2 and 3 percent at intermediate lags, 
while in economic expansions (orange curve) the R2 is negative for most moving 
averages. This difference implies that the predictive power of intermediate-term 
moving averages over the value-weighted index is mostly due to its predictive power 
during recessionary periods.  
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In Section B of Figure 2.8 we report the sub-sample R2 based on the CRSP equal-
weighted monthly return. Moving averages can predict the equal-weighted index very 
well during recessions (yellow curve) at both short-horizon and intermediate-horizon 
lags, as represented by the large values of the R2 statistics. In contrast, during 
recessionary periods (orange curve), moving averages still show some predictive power 
at short-horizon lags. However, there is no longer any predictive power in the 
intermediate term. This difference suggests that the predictive power over monthly 
returns of the equal-weighted index at intermediate lags is concentrated on recessionary 
periods, while the predictive power of short-term moving averages is less sensitive to 
the general economic conditions.  
For the sake of completeness, we also investigate the differential predictive power 
of moving average indicators across both stages of the business cycle using portfolios 
sorted on market capitalization. In Section C of Figure 2.8 we show that most of the 
deciles have no predictive power during economic expansions, with the exception of 
the smallest three deciles which show economically significant R2 using 𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ, 
while the smallest decile show long-lasting predictive power using 
𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ to  𝑀𝐴(8) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ. This suggests that the “sluggish” monthly return of the 
smallest three deciles do appear to have an effect during economic expansions. In 
Section D we show that, during recessions, most of the size deciles have economically 
significant R-squared (above 0.5%) in the very short-term 
(using 𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ and  𝑀𝐴(4) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) and in the intermediate term. Among those, 
the largest and the smallest decile show the most extreme R-squared which are above 
3% at intermediate lags, with the smallest decile also having a very high R-squared at 
short horizons, a similar pattern to what we reported previously.  
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In Figure 2.9 we report similar results using weekly returns. As the plots indicate, 
most of the predictive ability is concentrated during economic recessionary periods 
(yellow curve). As shown in Section C of Figure 2.9, the smallest two deciles exhibit 
substantial and economically significant predictive power 
using 𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝐴(20) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 even during economic expansionary periods. The 
results we report in Section D of Figure 2.9 suggest that 80% of the cross-sectional 
variation in future returns of size decile portfolios can be well-predicted during 
economic recessions. Both the level of significance and lag of predictive power are 
much stronger than those we reported at the monthly frequency. This suggest further 
that moving averages provide better predictive ability for weekly returns rather than 
monthly returns.  
7. Out-of-sample tests 
To verify the robustness of our findings, we apply an out-of-sample test in this 
session. Consider the following out-of-sample forecasting model: 
 ?̂?𝑡+1 = ?̂?𝑡,𝑖 + ?̂?𝑡,𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡 , (5) 
where ?̂?𝑡,𝑖 and ?̂?𝑡,𝑖 are the estimates from regressing {𝑟𝑠}𝑠=2
𝑡  on a constant and {𝑆𝑖,𝑠}𝑠=1
𝑡−1
 , 
where 𝑆𝑖,𝑠 is the trading signal generated by a technical indicator 𝑖. 
We use the historical average (HA) forecast as the benchmark forecast, following 
the literature (e.g., Campbell & Thompson 2008; Ferreira & Santa-Clara 2011; Jiang, 
F et al. 2011; Neely et al. 2014; Welch & Goyal 2008). This benchmark assumes a 
constant expected equity risk premium, 𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑡+1. Therefore, we compare the 












 , (6) 
We analyze forecasts based on Campbell and Thompson (2008) out-of-sample R2 
(𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 ) and Clark and West (2007) MSFE-adjusted statistics. The 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  statistic measures 
the proportional reduction in mean squared forecast error (MSFE) for the predictive 
regression forecast compared with the historical average forecast. The null hypothesis 
for MSFE-adjusted statistic is that the historical average MSFE is less than or equal to 
the predictive regression MSFE, and the alternative hypothesis is that the historical 
average MSFE is higher than the predictive regression MSFE.  
Figure 2.10 presents the out-of-sample results on the size sorted decile portfolios 
using monthly returns. Both the MSFE-adjusted statistics23 and 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  statistics confirm 
a similar cross-sectional and lag pattern as our in-sample findings. Firstly, for 
intermediate lags the largest decile has the highest predictive power using moving 
average indicators, while all other deciles have negative 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2 , failing to outperform the 
benchmark forecast. The largest decile has a 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  approaching 0.5% at intermediate lags, 
indicating the key role large-cap stocks play in the intermediate term. Secondly, at 
short-term horizons, the smallest two deciles have the strongest out-of-sample 
predictive power using 𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ with 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  exceeding 0.5% and 1.5% respectively, 
suggesting a short-term predictive power for small-cap stocks. 
We repeat the same analysis using weekly decile portfolio returns sorted on market 
capitalization and report our findings in Figure 2.11. Unlike the out-of-sample result 
for monthly returns, Figure 2.11 shows more significant predictive power over future 
weekly returns using 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 with 𝑙 = 3 through 20 weeks. Section A shows that 
                                                 
23 Note that the horizontal line in Section A of Figure 10 represents the MSFE-adjusted 
statistic equal to 1.3, which is around the threshold of significance at a 10% significance level.  
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the MSFE-adjusted statistics are significant for more than 50% of the cross-section, 
with the MSFE-adjusted statistics exceeding 2. Section B of Figure 2.11 shows that the 
smallest three deciles have the highest 𝑅𝑂𝑆
2  using 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘  with 𝑙 =
3 through 20 weeks . Overall, these findings suggest that the predictive power of 
moving averages is stronger for weekly return than monthly returns, revealing that the 
price trend is stronger at the higher frequency. Moreover, it is worthwhile noting that 
MSFE-adjusted statistics are monotonically decreasing across size deciles, confirming 
that market capitalization is an important explanatory factor for the cross-sectional 
variation of the predictive power of short-term moving averages. 
8. Random switching  
The predictive power of short-term moving average indicators exhibits the most 
substantial variation across portfolios sorted on market capitalization. However, since 
small-cap and large-cap companies may contain different level of predictable 
component in their return, it is possible that the cross-sectional pattern is driven by the 
return differences across the size dimension itself rather than the performance of 
predictor. To test out this possibility, we check on and report the predictive power of 
random switching based on randomly generated trading signals in the cross-section. 
The random trading signals generate a 1 or 0 signal randomly with 50%-50% 
probability at each time t. We generate 102 sets of such random signals to match the 
number of weekly moving average indicators. Then we use the random signal to run 
the predictive regression in (1) on each of the weekly size sorted decile portfolio. Figure 
2.12 plots the t-statistics and R2 of all the deciles. The evidence seems to suggest that 
the cross-sectional variation of the predictive power is not due to the different level of 
the predictable component among the weekly return of size-sorted deciles.  
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9. Momentum indicators 
Regarding price continuation, the existing literature focuses more on momentum 
rather than on moving averages, even though they are both trend-following strategies 
based on technical indicators. The momentum strategy should capture similar 
information and, thus, be able to generate a similar result to the one produced by using 
moving averages. To compare the predictive power of moving averages with the 
predictive power of momentum, we test the performance of a momentum indicator 
based on the well-known momentum effect. Following Neely et al. (2014), this strategy 
generates a trading signal as follows: 
 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑡−𝑚
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑡 < 𝑃𝑡−𝑚
 (7) 
When the level of the portfolio index exceeds (falls short of) its past level 𝑚 
periods ago, a buy (sell) signal is generated. We denote this momentum indicator as 
𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑚). Similar to our moving average indicators, we examine a comprehensive 
range of 𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑚)  indictors, with 𝑚 = 3 𝑡𝑜 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑜𝑟 3 𝑡𝑜 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠. 
𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑚)𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ  denotes a momentum indicator generated at the monthly frequency 
while 𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑚)𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 denotes a momentum indicator based on a weekly frequency.  
We simulate trading signals based on each of our return indices and perform the 
predictive regression in (1) in order to predict their excess return. In Section A of Figure 
2.13, we report our findings for the predictive regression results based on the S&P 500 
monthly returns. The hump-shaped term-structure across various lags is similar to that 
found for moving average indicators, where the predictive power is weak at short-term 
lags (using 𝑀𝑂𝑀(3)𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ and 𝑀𝑂𝑀(4)𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) and strong at intermediate-term lags. 
However, the t-statistic and R2 peak at 𝑀𝑂𝑀(5)𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ which is earlier than the case for 
moving average indicators, suggesting that there is perhaps a different dynamic at work 
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for the momentum indicator. It can be easily observed from Section A of Figure 2.12 
that the t-statistics are barely significant at lags between 5 to 12 months with the t-
statistics approaching 2 using 𝑀𝑂𝑀(5)𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ . Only 𝑀𝑂𝑀(5)month  and 
𝑀𝑂𝑀(10)𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ generate in-sample R2 larger than 0.5%. Moreover, the magnitude of 
t-statistic and R2 decays much “faster” starting with 𝑀𝑂𝑀(10)𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ, while the result 
for moving average indicators on S&P 500 suggests a higher level of predictive power 
that persists from 𝑀𝐴(10)𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ until 𝑀𝐴(20)𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ, lasting much longer than the one 
using momentum indicators. Overall, momentum indicators have weaker predictive 
power than moving average indicators in predicting the S&P 500 excess return. 
In Section B of Figure 2.13, we present our findings for how well the momentum 
indicators predict the CRSP value-weighted monthly return. Compared the results on 
S&P 500, momentum indicators exhibit a similar though weaker predictive power over 
the CRSP value-weighted monthly return. The t-statistics are in the range of 1 to 1.5 at 
the peak of the curve. Again, due to the different composition of S&P 500 and CRSP 
value-weighted index, this finding implies there is a major role played by companies 
with very large market capitalization in sustaining the predictive power of intermediate-
term momentum indicator. Moreover, this strong predictive power at intermediate-term 
horizons bears a striking resemblance to the “echo” effect described in Goyal and 
Wahal (2015) and Novy-Marx (2012).  
In Section C of Figure 2.13, we present our findings for the monthly returns of the 
equal-weighted CRSP index. In line with our findings regarding the predictive power 
of moving average technical indicators, the predictive power of short-term momentum 
indicators is much higher for the equal-weighted return than the value-weighted return. 
This indicates that momentum indicators have stronger predictive power at short 
horizons mostly for companies with smaller-to-medium market capitalization. 
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Our cross-sectional findings are based on monthly size sorted decile portfolios is 
presented in Section D of Figure 2.13. The predictive power of momentum indicators 
has a very similar cross-sectional pattern to the one obtained when using moving 
average indicator. First, the largest decile (black curve) exhibits the highest predictive 
power at intermediate-term lags. The largest capitalization companies appear to be the 
driving force behind the predictive power of technical indicators in the intermediate 
term, for both momentum and moving average indicators. Secondly, the smallest decile 
shows distinctly stronger predictive power in the short-term. In contrast, most of the 
other size decile portfolios largely overlap with each other with very similar predictive 
powers when using momentum indicators. 
Next, we turn to our findings for the weekly frequency. Using weekly returns on 
size sorted decile portfolios leads to a much stronger predictive power of the momentum 
indicators as presented in Section E of Figure 2.13. Over 70% of the cross-section can 
be significantly predicted in the short-term, as suggested by the t-statistics in the top 
panel of Section E. Note that the predictive power is weaker and shorter-lasting than 
the moving average result presented in Figure 2.4. Secondly, the predictive power of 
the weekly momentum indicators monotonically increases as size decreases. We can 
summarize that market capitalization plays a critical role in explaining the cross-
sectional variation in the predictive power of both trend-following technical indicators 
– momentum as well as moving averages.  
In summary, momentum indicators appear to capture very similar information to 
moving average indicators. Our findings indicate that momentum indicators have 
weaker and shorter-lasting predictive power when compared to that offered by moving 
average indicators. Both sets of technical indicators suggest predictive power is high at 
short horizons and gradually decays as lags increase. Furthermore, the power to predict 
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future returns with both technical indicators increases with market capitalization. The 
short-term predictive power agrees with the intuition regarding price continuation 
meaning price increases are followed by further price increases and vice versa. 
Furthermore, the predictive power of weekly momentum also decays over longer 
horizons in a manner similar to physical momentum encountering friction. In contrast, 
the monthly level analysis reveals that intermediate-term predictive power is driven by 
the largest decile only, and thus appears to be a distinct phenomenon.   
10. International markets  
Goyal and Wahal (2015) find the “echo” effect is not present outside the US market. 
So far we have only focused our analysis on the US equity market. It would be 
interesting to investigate whether moving average indicators have any predictive power 
over international stock market returns. We use the international value-weighted market 
excess return data obtained from the online Data Library of Kenneth French’s website. 
The value-weighted market excess return data include Global, Global (exclude the US), 
European, North America, Japanese, and the Asia-Pacific (exclude Japan). Both 
monthly and daily returns are available. We use the daily data to construct Wednesday-
to-Wednesday weekly return series. Thus, we can redo our prior analysis at the monthly 
and weekly frequency.  
The sample period is from July 1990 to Dec 2016, which is a much shorter sample 
compared with the US data. As a result, the statistical power may be weaker than our 
previous analysis. Also, note that all the market return are value-weighted, therefore 
mainly representing the large companies.  
In Section A of Figure 2.14, we report our findings for the monthly frequency using 
the global market return. There is a similar concentration of predictive power using the 
intermediate-term moving averages. Our findings at the weekly frequency are reported 
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in Section B and share the same general shape across various lags as the monthly results 
in Section A. Recall that the information within the horizon of 𝑙 < 13 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 (≈
 3 months) is not covered in the monthly analysis, therefore weekly level graph has an 
extended curve in the left relative to the monthly level graph. We observe a “dip” in the 
predictive power using  𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘,  𝑀𝐴(4) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘  and  𝑀𝐴(5) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 with a negative t-
statistic using  𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘. This appears to be an indication of a short-term reversal. 
Excluding the US from the Global market portfolio, our findings are entirely 
different, as reported in Section C of Figure 2.14. Without the US companies, the 
predictive power of moving averages does not concentrate on the intermediate-term 
anymore. Instead, the predictive power is strong at short-term lags using  𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 
and  𝑀𝐴(4) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ. This distinct result after excluding US companies indicates that the 
predictive power of intermediate-term moving averages is solely driven by large-cap 
US companies24, while large-cap non-US companies exhibit strong predictive power 
only in the short-term. Since the intermediate-term predictive power is similar to the 
“echo” effect, our result also implies the absence of “echo” outside the US. This finding 
is consistent with the finding in Goyal and Wahal (2015). In Section D we present our 
results at the weekly frequency. Note that if we exclude the horizon of 𝑙 < 13 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠, 
the weekly graph in Section D will be very similar to the monthly graph in Section C. 
Section D shows that there is also a “dip” in the weekly level predictive power in the 
nearest horizons. The predictive power of moving averages is weak when using 
 𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘  𝑀𝐴(4) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘, and even exhibits a negative t-statistic using  𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘. 
The predictive power of moving averages peaks around 𝑀𝐴(20) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 and decays at 
                                                 
24 Note that most of the world’s largest companies are in the U.S., therefore the global 
value-weighted market return should have a large similarity to the U.S. value-weighted return.  
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longer lags. The low predictive power within horizons with 𝑙 < 13 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 may suggest 
that short-term reversal is a world-wide phenomenon. 
In Section E of Figure 2.14 we report our findings for the predictive power of 
moving averages using monthly European market excess returns. We find that the 
predictive power is relatively strong and mostly concentrated on intermediate-term lags. 
In Section F of Figure 2.14 we report our findings using weekly European excess 
returns. The plot shows a negative t-statistic when using 𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 and 𝑀𝐴(4) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 
and relatively higher predictive power at intermediate-term lags. In Section G and 
Section H we present further evidence that the North American market return exhibits 
a similar pattern of intermedium-term predictive power to the US and global result. 
This is to be expected since this index is mainly composed of large US companies. It is 
worthwhile noting that the significance in this case is weaker than the one for the US 
market only. 
In Section I of Figure 2.14 we plot the predictive power at the monthly frequency 
using the Japanese market. We note the very high predictive power in the short-term 
which decays at longer lags. In Section J we show that the predictive power using 
weekly returns is much weaker with insignificant t-statistics and low R2. The negative 
t-statistics using 𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 and 𝑀𝐴(4) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 suggest that short-term reversal is also 
prevalent in Japan.  
Finally, we report out findings for the Asia-pacific region (excluding Japan) in 
Section K and Section L. We note that the predictive power of short-term moving 
average indicators is very strong. This evidence is present and strong at both monthly 
and weekly frequencies. The predictive power decays over longer horizons, suggesting 
a very “sluggish” return for stocks in the Asia-pacific region. 
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Overall, a comparison between global and global (exclude the US) results reveals 
that the predictive power of intermediate-term moving averages is due mostly to large-
cap US companies. This finding is consistent with the finding in Goyal and Wahal 
(2015) that the “echo” effect only exists in the U.S. European market returns exhibit a 
similar intermediate-term predictive power which shifts somewhat towards longer lags. 
In contrast, Japanese market shows short-term predictive power only using moving 
average indicators. The absence of the predictive power of intermediate-term moving 
averages suggests a possible explanation as to why the existing literature fails to find 
momentum in the Japanese stock market (e.g., Griffin, Ji & Martin 2003) since the price 
trend is concentrated mostly at the short-term horizons. Most interestingly, in the Asia-
pacific (excluding Japan) region we find that the predictive power of short-term moving 
average indicators is strong both at the monthly as well as the weekly frequency. This 
finding implies that stocks in developing markets have the most “sluggish” return and 
the strongest short-term price trend. If the Chinese stock market is taken as an example25, 
our finding may explain why Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003) and Wang and Chin (2004) 
failed to find evidence of momentum using a formation period of 3 to 12 months in the 
Chinese stock market. Moreover, Pan, Tang and Xu (2013) find that only weekly level 
momentum exists in the Chinese stock market. Furthermore, they also report the 
existence of significant weekly momentum in multiple countries in the Asia-pacific 
region.  
It is noteworthy that almost all international weekly level results have negative t-
statistic using  𝑀𝐴(3) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘, capturing the well-known short-term reversal effect in the 
weekly level and suggesting it is a world-wide phenomenon. Since we only have the 
                                                 




value-weighted market return, our understanding to the predictive power of moving 
average indictors using international stock returns is still limited to companies with the 
largest market capitalization since they dominate value-weighted market indices. It 
would be interesting to explore whether and how this result carries over when using 
international equal-weighted portfolios. 
11. Conclusion  
Using US data, we find that the predictive power of the intermediate-term (around 
7 to 15 months) moving average indicators is driven by the largest 10% companies. 
This predictive power is only concentrated on three calendar months and economic 
recessions. Similar to the idea of Novy-Marx (2012), the concentration of predictive 
power on the intermediate term contradicts the intuition about price continuation 
(momentum) which suggests that “rising price keeps rising and falling price keeps 
falling.” Instead, it is more like an “echo” effect as described by Goyal and Wahal 
(2015). In contrast, the predictive power of the short-term moving averages is stronger 
for small-to-medium size companies. Also, at the weekly return frequency, short-term 
moving average indicators have strong predictive power for over 50% of the cross-
section. This predictive power of short-term technical indicators does not rely on any 
particular calendar month. It is strong at short lags and decays with lag length, in line 
with the intuition about price continuation that “rising price keeps rising and falling 
price keeps falling.” Moreover, in the cross-section, market capitalization is negatively 
and monotonically related to the predictive power of the short-term momentum 
indicator. Overall, the predictive power of both short-term and intermediate-term 
indicators seems to capture two distinct phenomena.  
Using international stock returns suggests that the predictive power of 
intermediate-term moving averages appear to be strongest in the U.S., while the stock 
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returns in countries in the Asia-pacific region exhibit greater predictive power using 
short-term moving average indicators. 
We find that momentum indicators capture slightly different information to that of 
the moving average indicator. Replicating the result using momentum indicator yields 
a qualitatively similar result. However, we show that momentum indicators have 
weaker and shorter-lasting predictive power than that offered by moving average 
indicators. 
Our result has several implications: Firstly, the predictive power of short-term 
moving averages is very strong for over 50% of the cross-section and gradually decays 
over time, in line with the intuition regarding price trends. In contrast, the predictive 
power of intermediate-term moving averages appears to be a distinct phenomenon and 
applies to only the largest 10% companies, concentrated only on three calendar months. 
Therefore, the latter effect is more like a calendar/seasonal effect. The only shared 
characteristic by the two effects is that they are both stronger during economic 
contractions and weaker during economic expansions.  
Secondly, we find that market capitalization is the single factor which well explains 
the short-term predictive power in the cross-section. If the level of predictive power of 
trend-following technical indicator can represent the level of price trend, the smaller 
companies exhibit stronger short-term price continuation while the larger companies 
exhibit weaker and even “negative price trend” in the short-term. This indicates the 
price trend favors companies with smaller market capitalization. Any theory purporting 
to explain this price trend needs to explain why market capitalization is negatively 
correlated with the magnitude of price continuation. Information frictions and liquidity 
issues are closely related to the market capitalization of the underlying asset and, thus, 
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Figure 2.1 Predictive regression results on market indices (monthly), 1963:07 to 2016:12 
Notes. Section A, B, and C reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly equity risk premium (in percent) at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the trading signal 
generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡. We use 22 technical indicators 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ with 𝑙 =
3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 generated for each market indices. We denoted each 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ on the 
horizontal axis. Section A, B, and C report the estimation results of the 22 predictive regressions on 
the S&P 500, CRSP value-weighted, and CRSP equal-weighted monthly excess return, respectively. 
The left vertical axis (blue) reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics and right vertical 
axis (orange) reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic and R2 statistic 
of predicting a given market risk premium using a given technical indicator 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ. 
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Figure 2.2 Predictive regression results on size-sorted decile portfolios (monthly), 1963:07 
to 2016:12 
 
Notes. Figure 2 reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly equity risk premium (in percent) of a portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 22 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ on the horizontal axis.  
For each of the 10 market capitalization (size) sorted decile portfolios, this figure reports the 
estimation results of the 22 predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-
consistent t-statistics and bottom panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the 





Figure 2.3 Predictive regression results on other decile portfolios (monthly), 1963:07 to 
2016:12 
 
Notes. Section A reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly equity risk premium (in percent) of a portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 22 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ on the horizontal axis.  
For each of the 10 variance sorted decile portfolios, this figure reports the estimation results of the 
22 predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics and bottom 
panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic and R2 statistic of 





Section B reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly equity risk premium (in percent) of a portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 22 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ on the horizontal axis.  
For each of the 10 beta sorted decile portfolios, this figure reports the estimation results of the 22 
predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics and bottom 
panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic and R2 statistic of 





Section C reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly equity risk premium (in percent) of a portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 22 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ on the horizontal axis.  
For each of the 10 book-to-market ratio sorted decile portfolios, this figure reports the estimation 
results of the 22 predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics and bottom panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic 






Section D reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly equity risk premium (in percent) of a portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 22 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ on the horizontal axis.  
For each of the 13 industry sorted decile portfolios, this figure reports the estimation results of the 
22 predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics and bottom 
panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic and R2 statistic of 





Section E reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly equity risk premium (in percent) of a portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 22 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ on the horizontal axis.  
For each of the 10 momentum sorted decile portfolios, this figure reports the estimation results of 
the 22 predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics and 
bottom panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic and R2 statistic 
of predicting the risk premium of a given portfolio using a given technical indicator 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ.
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Figure 2.4 Predictive regression results on size-sorted deciles (weekly), 1963:07 to 2016:12 
  
Notes. Figure 5 reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the weekly equity risk premium (in percent) of a portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 102 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 with 𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 on the horizontal axis.  
For each of the 10 market capitalization (size) sorted decile portfolios, this figure reports the 
estimation results of the 102 predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-
consistent t-statistics and bottom panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the 




Figure 2.5 Predictive regression results on equal-weighted variance sorted deciles (weekly), 
1963:07 to 2016:12 
 
Notes. Figure 6 reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the weekly equity risk premium (in percent) of a portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 102 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 with 𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 on the horizontal axis.  
For each of the 10 variance sorted decile portfolios (equal-weighted), this figure reports the 
estimation results of the 102 predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-
consistent t-statistics and bottom panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the 




Figure 2.6 Predictive regression results on other sorted deciles (weekly), 1963:07 to 
2016:12 
 
Notes. Section A reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the weekly equity risk premium (in percent) of a portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 102 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 with 𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 on the horizontal axis.  
For each of the 10 book-to-market ratio sorted decile portfolios, this figure reports the estimation 
results of the 102 predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics and bottom panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic 






Section B reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the weekly equity risk premium (in percent) of a portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 102 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 with 𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 on the horizontal axis.  
For each of the 10 momentum (2-12 prior return) sorted decile portfolios, this figure reports the 
estimation results of the 102 predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-
consistent t-statistics and bottom panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the 






Section C reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the weekly equity risk premium (in percent) of a portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 102 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 with 𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 on the horizontal axis.  
For each of the 13 industry sorted decile portfolios, this figure reports the estimation results of the 
102 predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics and 
bottom panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic and R2 statistic 
of predicting the risk premium of a given portfolio using a given technical indicator 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘
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Section A reports the full-sample R2 statistic and sub-sample R2 statistics of the 22 predictive 
regressions by excluding data points in each of the calendar month from the sample, as given by (4) 
in the text. Section B reports the full-sample R2 statistic and sub-sample R2 statistics by excluding 
data points in February, June and October from the sample. 
The full-sample and sub-sample estimation results are based on the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the CRSP value-weighted monthly excess return (in percent) at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 22 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ on the horizontal axis.  
 
 






Section C reports the full-sample R2 statistic and sub-sample R2 statistics of the 22 predictive 
regressions by excluding data points in each of the calendar month from the sample, as given by (4) 
in the text. Section D reports the full-sample R2 statistic and sub-sample R2 statistics by excluding 
data points in March, June and October from the sample. 
The full-sample and sub-sample estimation results are based on the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the CRSP equal-weighted monthly excess return (in percent) at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 22 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 









Section E and F report the full-sample R2 statistic and sub-sample R2 statistics of the 22 predictive 
regressions by excluding data points in each of the calendar month from the sample, as given by (4) 
in the text. Section E and F report results on CRSP value-weighted and equal-weighted weekly 
return, respectively. 
The full-sample and sub-sample estimation results are based on the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the weekly equity risk premium (in percent) of a portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 102 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 with 𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 




Figure 2.8 Sub-sample results regarding business cycles (monthly), 1963:07 to 2016:12 
 
 
Notes. Section A and B report the full-sample R2 statistic and sub-sample R2 statistics using the 
NBER-dated business-cycle, as given by (4) in the text. Section A and B report result on CRSP 
value-weighted and equal-weighted monthly return, respectively.  
The full-sample and sub-sample estimation results are based on the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the CRSP value-weighted/equal-weighted monthly excess return (in percent) at time 
𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡. We use 22 technical 
indicators 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ  with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 generated for each price indices. We 






(Figure 2.8 continued) 
 
 
Section C and D report the sub-sample R2 statistics on the market capitalization (size) sorted decile 
portfolios (monthly) using the NBER-dated business-cycle, as given by (4) in the text. Section C 
and D report result on expansions and recessions, respectively.  
The sample estimation results are based on the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the portfolio monthly excess return (in percent) at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the trading signal 
generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡. We use 22 technical indicators 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ with 𝑙 =
3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ on the 






Figure 2.9 Sub-sample results regarding business cycles (weekly), 1963:07 to 2016:12 
CRSP VW index(weekly, business cycle) 
 
 
CRSP EW index(weekly, business cycle) 
 
Notes. Section A and B report the full-sample R2 statistic and sub-sample R2 statistics using the 
NBER-dated business-cycle, as given by (4) in the text. Section A and B report result on CRSP 
value-weighted and equal-weighted monthly return, respectively.  
The full-sample and sub-sample estimation results are based on the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the CRSP value-weighted/equal-weighted weekly excess return (in percent) at time 
𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡. We use 102 technical 
indicators 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘  with 𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 generated for each price indices. We 




(Figure 2.9 continued) 
 
 
Section C and D report the sub-sample R2 statistics on the market capitalization (size) sorted decile 
portfolios (weekly) using the NBER-dated business-cycle, as given by (4) in the text. Section C and 
D report result on expansions and recessions, respectively.  
The sub-sample estimation results are based on the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the portfolio weekly excess return (in percent) at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the trading signal 
generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡. We use 22 technical indicators 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 with 𝑙 =
 3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘   on the 







Figure 2.10 Out-of-sample results on the size sorted deciles (monthly), 1968:07 to 
2016:12
  
Notes. Section A and B report the out-of-sample estimation result on the market capitalization (size) 
sorted decile portfolios (monthly). The benchmark, historical average forecast, is given by (5) and 
(6) in the text. Section A reports the adjusted MSFE statistic (Clark & West 2007) for testing the 
null hypothesis that the historical average MSFE is less or equal to the technical indicator forecast 
MSFE. Note that the MSFE around 1.3 indicates significant at 10 % signified level.  
Section B reports the out-of-sample R2 which measures the proportional reduction in mean squared 






 Figure 2.11 Out-of-sample results on the size sorted deciles (weekly), 1973:01 to 2016:12 
 
Notes. Section A and B report the out-of-sample estimation result on the market capitalization (size) 
sorted decile portfolios (weekly). The benchmark, historical average forecast, is given by (5) and 
(6) in the text. Section A reports the adjusted MSFE statistic (Clark & West 2007) for testing the 
null hypothesis that the historical average MSFE is less or equal to the technical indicator forecast 
MSFE. Note that the MSFE around 1.3 indicates significant at 10 % signified level.  
Section B reports the out-of-sample R2 which measures the proportional reduction in mean squared 




Figure 2.12 Predictive regression results using random signals (weekly), 1963:07 to 
2016:12 
 
Notes. Figure 13 reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the weekly equity risk premium (in percent) of a portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
random signal which generates a 1 or 0 signal randomly with 50%/50% probability at each time t. 
We use 102 sets of random signals.  
For each of the 10 market capitalization (size) sorted decile portfolios, this figure reports the 
estimation results of the 102 predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-
consistent t-statistics and bottom panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the 








Notes. Section A, B, and C report estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly market excess return (in percent) at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the trading signal 
generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡. We use 22 technical indicators 𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ  with 𝑙 =
3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted each 𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ on the 
horizontal axis. Section A, B, and C report the estimation results of the 22 predictive regressions on 
the S&P 500, CRSP value-weighted, and CRSP equal-weighted monthly excess return, respectively. 
The left vertical axis (blue) reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics and right vertical 
axis (orange) reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic and R2 statistic 
of predicting a given market risk premium using a given technical indicator 𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ. 
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 (Figure 2.13 continued) 
 
Section F reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly equity risk premium (in percent) of a decile portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 
is the trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡. We use 22 technical indicators 
𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ  with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted 
each 𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ on the horizontal axis.  
For each of the 10 market capitalization (size) sorted decile portfolios, this figure reports the 
estimation results of the 22 predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-
consistent t-statistics and bottom panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the 




(Figure 2.13 continued) 
 
Section G reports estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the weekly equity risk premium (in percent) of a decile portfolio at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is 
the trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 102 technical indicators 
𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘  with 𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 generated for each price indices. We denoted 
each 𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑙) 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 on the horizontal axis.  
For each of the 10 market capitalization (size) sorted decile portfolios, this figure reports the 
estimation results of the 102 predictive regressions. Top panel reports the heteroskedasticity-
consistent t-statistics and bottom panel reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the 





Figure 2.14 International predictive regression results, 1990:07 to 2016:12 
 
Notes. Section A and B report estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly/weekly Global market excess return (in percent) at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 22 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ/𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘   with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠  or 𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠  and 
generated for each price indices. We denoted each 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ/𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 on the horizontal axis. Section 
A and B report the estimation results on the global market monthly and weekly excess return, 
respectively. The left vertical axis (blue) reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics and 
right vertical axis (orange) reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic and 
R2 statistic of predicting a given market risk premium using a given technical indicator 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ. 
 
(Figure 2.14 continued) 
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Section C and D report estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly/weekly Global (exclude US) market excess return (in percent) at time 
𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡. We use 22 technical 
indicators 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ/𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘   with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 or𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 
and generated for each price indices. We denoted each 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ/𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 on the horizontal axis. 
Section A and B report the estimation results on the global market (exclude US) monthly and weekly 
excess return, respectively. The left vertical axis (blue) reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics and right vertical axis (orange) reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the 





(Figure 2.14 continued) 
 
Section E and F report estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly/weekly Europe Market excess return (in percent) at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 22 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ/𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘   with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠  or 𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠  and 
generated for each price indices. We denoted each 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ/𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 on the horizontal axis. Section 
A and B report the estimation results on the Europe market monthly and weekly excess return, 
respectively. The left vertical axis (blue) reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics and 
right vertical axis (orange) reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic and 




 (Figure 2.14 continued) 
 
Section G and H report estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly/weekly North America market excess return (in percent) at time 𝑡 + 1; 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡. We use 22 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ/𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘   with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠  or 𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠  and 
generated for each price indices. We denoted each 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ/𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 on the horizontal axis. Section 
A and B report the estimation results on the North America market monthly and weekly excess 
return, respectively. The left vertical axis (blue) reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics 
and right vertical axis (orange) reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic 





(Figure 2.14 continued) 
 
Section I and J report estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly/weekly Japan market excess return (in percent) at time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 
trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡 . We use 22 technical indicators 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ/𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘   with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠  or 𝑙 =  3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠  and 
generated for each price indices. We denoted each 𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ/𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 on the horizontal axis. Section 
A and B report the estimation results on the Japan market monthly and weekly excess return, 
respectively. The left vertical axis (blue) reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics and 
right vertical axis (orange) reports the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic and 




(Figure 2.14 continued) 
 
Section I and J report estimation results for the predictive regression model, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑟𝑡+1 is the monthly/weekly Asia-pacific (exclude Japan) market excess return (in percent) at 
time 𝑡 + 1; 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the trading signal generated by a technical indicator at time 𝑡. We use 22 technical 
indicators 𝑀𝑂𝑀(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ/𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘  with 𝑙 = 3, 4, 5, … , 23, 24 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠  or 𝑙 =
 3, 4, 5, … , 103, 104 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠  and generated for each price indices. We denoted each 
𝑀𝐴(𝑙) 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ/𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 on the horizontal axis. Section A and B report the estimation results on the Asia-
pacific (exclude Japan) market monthly and weekly excess return, respectively. The left vertical axis 
(blue) reports the heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics and right vertical axis (orange) reports 
the R2 statistics. Each point in the figure reports the t-statistic and R2 statistic of predicting a given 











 SHORT-TERM REVERSAL, STATE OWNERSHIP, 
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, AND THE FAMA-FRENCH 
FIVE-FACTOR MODEL IN THE CHINESE STOCK MARKET 
 
Abstract 
We find that the five-factor asset pricing model proposed by Fama and French 
(2015) is a better description of Chinese stock market return than the three-factor model. 
However, a substantial return spread generated by shorting past winners and buying 
past losers, i.e., the short-term reversal (STR), is poorly explained by the five-factor 
asset pricing model. We propose an STR factor, which delivers substantial 
improvement to the conventional three-factor/five-factor asset pricing model in 
explaining not only the STR spread but also all the other left-hand-side portfolios we 
examined. Moreover, we find two factors based on state ownership and institutional 
ownership also provides additional and useful information to the three-factor/five-
factor model. Overall, our result suggests that the five-factor asset pricing model is not 





Fama and French (2015) proposed a five-factor asset pricing model which helps 
better explain U.S. stock return than the original three-factor model (Fama & French 
1993). Fama and French (2016) further suggest that the five-factor model can better 
explain many pricing anomalies. In other markets besides the U.S, for example, Fama 
and French (2017) examine the explanatory power of the five-factor model in North 
America, Europe, Japan, and Asia Pacific. As an out-of-sample test, the current study 
examines the five-factor asset pricing model in the Chinese stock market. 
The Chinese stock market has become increasingly relevant to both the academics 
and practitioners of finance. As per data from China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
by market capitalization, the Chinese stock market has become the second largest stock 
market worldwide since 2015. In this paper, we constructed the five-factors using 
Chinese firm data following Fama and French (2015). We find that the five-factor 
model provides superior explanatory power compared to the three-factor model in 
explaining the daily return of the Chinese stock market. We contribute to the literature 
which has examined only the monthly-level performance of the five-factor model in 
China (see Guo et al. 2017; Li et al. 2017). Next, we took the five-factor model as the 
baseline model and proposed three factors that capture additional information in 
explaining the average returns of the Chinese stock market. 
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Based on the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997) 
proposed a momentum factor which helps better explain the expected return of the U.S., 
and the vast literature has examined the momentum factor extensively. However, 
although momentum seems to be everywhere (e.g. Asness, Moskowitz & Pedersen 
2013; Fama & French 2012), it is absent in China (e.g. Cakici, Chatterjee & Topyan 
2015; Chui, Titman & Wei 2010; Griffin, Ji & Martin 2003; Li et al. 2017; Wang & 
Chin 2004). Like others, we observe no momentum effect in daily/monthly return of 
the Chinese stock market but identify substantial short-term reversal in our double-
sorted portfolios formed on market cap and past cumulative return. The short-term 
reversal returns are poorly explained by the three-factor/five-factor model. More 
intersetingly, we propose an short-term reversal factor (STR) that boosts the 
explanatory power of the three-factor/five-factor model not only on the double-sorted 
portfolios formed on market cap and past cumulative return but also on all the other 
left-hand-side portfolios we examined, including the Chinese mutual funds’ return. 
Therefore, rather than a momentum factor widely examined in the literature, we stress 
the importance of adding an STR factor in better describing the Chinese stock market 
return.  
In addition to the STR factor, we constructed two additional factors based on the 
ownership structure (state ownership and institutional ownership) of the listed firms, 
and find they can enhance the explanatory power of the three-factor/five-factor model. 
The first factor is based on the state (government) ownership of the listed companies, 
which is a unique feature of the Chinese stock market. Existing literature suggests that 
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state ownership has a negative impact on firm value and performance. Sun and Tong 
(2003) find that state ownership has a negative impact on a firm’s performance. 
Similarly, Wei, Xie and Zhang (2005) find that firm value is negatively related to state 
ownership, and they argue a lower firm value is due to the agency problem arises from 
the appointment of top managers by the government without meaningful personal 
ownership in the firm. Furthermore, Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) find that the 
companies with politically connected CEOs underperform those without political 
connected CEOs in China. Although the non-tradable share reform26 completed at the 
end of 2006 has considerably reduced the number of companies with state-own equity, 
our sample suggests 635 of the 3116 companies still have non-zero state ownership by 
the end of 2006. We thus construct a state ownership factor (SO) by longing the 
companies with zero state ownership and shorting companies with high state ownership, 
yielding a positive spread27 and suggesting that the return of companies without state 
ownership outperform the counterparts with state ownership. More interestingly, 
compared with the conventional three-factor/five-factor model, adding this factor 
boosts the explanatory power on most left-hand-side portfolios we examined. Our last 
factor is based on institutional ownership. The equity ownership by an institutional 
investor may help deliver a better corporate governance mechanism, better 
management monitoring, and better shareholder protection, suggesting a robust long-
                                                 
26 During 2005 to 2006, the Chinese government launched a reform to convert non-tradable 
shares to tradable shares after provides a compensation plan to the tradable shareholders. State-
own equity accounts for most of the non-tradable shares. 
27 We also obtain a positive spread on the other type of state ownership factor using “Low-
minus-None” and “High-minus-Low”. 
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term firm performance. Moreover, we argue institutional ownership is highly relevant 
to the Chinese firms since the listed companies have relatively weaker corporate 
governance and shareholder protection compared with the developed markets (Bai, C-
E et al. 2004; Sun & Tong 2003; Wei, Xie & Zhang 2005).  Cornett et al. (2007) find 
that the institutional investors which less likely to have a business relationship with a 
firm have a positive impact on the performance of the firm. Yuan, Xiao and Zou (2008) 
find equity ownership by mutual funds has a positive effect on the performance of 
Chinese companies. Elyasiani and Jia (2010) find a positive relationship between firm 
performance and institutional ownership stability. Along this line, we proposed am 
institutional ownership factor (IO) buying companies with high institutional ownership 
and shorting companies with low institutional ownership. We find that adding this 
factor help improve the explanatory power of the three-factor model.  
2. Data 
Our sample includes all A-shares, which are all companies traded in Chinese RMB 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchange. The A-shares include all stocks traded in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Main Board, Shenzhen Small and Medium-sized Enterprise 
Board (SMEB) and Growth Enterprise Market (GEM). The accounting data, daily and 
monthly return data (consider dividend reinvestment), and risk-free rate are retrieved 
from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research database (CSMAR). The sample 
period is from Jan 2004 to Dec 2017. The reason for the sample to start from 2004 is 
that the institutional ownership and state ownership data are available only since 2003, 
which are used to construct the factors starting from 2004. To our knowledge, we are 
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the first to conduct empirical asset-pricing exercise using these data. We have a 
sufficient number of observations given that we focus on daily return. Moreover, we 
argue that the Chinese stock market before 2004 is of little interest today since it has 
vastly changed. 
Table 3.1 presents an overview of our sample. There were around 1350 listed firms 
from 2004 to 2006. The number of the listed firms enlarged greatly between 2009 and 
2011 and between 2014 and 2017.  There are 3346 firms in the sample by the end of 
2017. The three columns to the right show the summary statistics of the market 
capitalization, from which we can witness the market’s “price roller coaster.” The 
average firm market capitalization tripled from 1.68 billion RMB to 5.94 billion RMB 
between 2006 and 2007, suggesting the dramatic market bubble before the global 
financial crisis (GFC). In the following year, more than 50% of the total market value 
vaporized with the outburst of GFC. In 2009, the average market cap re-bounces 
substantially to a new high of 8.83 billion RMB, and stay until 2013. In 2004-2015, the 
market experienced a short-lasting bull market, pushing average market cap to 14.77 
billion RMB and reaching a total market capitalization of 41471 billion RMB 28 by the 
end of 2015. Finally, the difference between the average and the median market cap 
reveals the presence of giant companies which pump up the mean.  
                                                 
28 Alternatively, this is 41.5 trillion RMB, or around 6.5 trillion US dollar. Since 2015, the 
Chinese stock market has become the second largest stock market by total market cap. 
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3. The playing fields 
3.1 Book-to-market, operating profitability and investment style 
Although the focus of the current paper is not the five-factor model, for 
performance measurement and comparison, we still construct double-sorted five by five 
portfolios on Size (market cap) and B/M (Book-to-market equity ratio), Size and OP 
(operating profitability), and Size and Inv (investment style). Size is the floating market 
capitalization 29 . B/M is book equity (BE)/market equity (ME) , where BE =
stockholder’ equity + deferred income tax liability −
deferred income tax assets − book value of preferred stock . OP is defined as 
operating profit/BE. Inv is the difference between the total asset this year and that of 
last year, divided by the total asset last year.  The accounting data is from the annual 
financial report. At the end of June at year t, we use 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th Size 
percentile (end of June of year t data) of the all A-shares excluding GEM stocks30 as 
the breakpoints to sort all A-shares into five quintiles. At the same time, we use the 20th, 
40th, 60th and 80th percentile of B/M, OP and Inv (end of fiscal year t-1 data) to sort all 
A-shares into quintiles. Taking the intersections of Size quintiles and B/M quintiles, 
Size quintiles and OP quintiles, and Size quintiles and Inv quintiles, we obtain three sets 
                                                 
29 Floating market capitalization is the market value of tradable shares in the market. Guo 
et al. (2017) use total market capitalization for their portfolio construction and thus may have 
overweighed old state-own companies which have lots of non-tradable shares. 
30 This choice of breakpoints is similar to Fama and French (2015) and Guo et al. (2017), 




of 25 value-weighted (VW) double-sorted portfolios. They are value-weighted based 
on floating market capitalization at the end of June at year t.  
3.2 Momentum and short-term reversal  
Existing literature fail to find significant momentum (factor) in China (Cakici, 
Chatterjee & Topyan 2015; Chui, Titman & Wei 2010; Griffin, Ji & Martin 2003; Li et 
al. 2017; Wang & Chin 2004). Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) suggest price 
continuation is due to the gradual market response to the information. Hirshleifer (2001) 
and Daniel, KD, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001) argue that the psychological 
biases will increase under more uncertainty. Zhang (2006) provide further supporting 
evidence that momentum is stronger for stocks with higher information uncertainty. In 
the case of China, it is surprising that there is no momentum in this relatively less 
transparent market suffering from macroeconomic uncertainty and policy uncertainty, 
and full of individual investors. However, it is possible that momentum/reversal exist 
in a different format. We briefly explore the past cumulative return sorted portfolios 
using our updated data. We sort stocks into VW 25 double-sorted portfolios formed on 
past cumulative return and Size. The portfolios are constructed daily by sorting all A-
shares into quintiles by past cumulative return and Size, respectively. The breakpoints 
are the 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentile of the all A-shares excluding GEM stocks 
based on the past cumulative return, which is calculated using the rolling windows 
between (trading) day t-251 and day t-21, day t-251 and day t-63, day t-251 and day t-
2, and so on. As shown in Table 3.2, we use the windows to denote the double-sorted 
portfolios as (251,21), (251,63), (251,2), … To be included in the portfolio, the 
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company must exist in the market at the start of the window and has a good return at 
the end of the window. Also, all stocks must have a good return at t-1 since the 
portfolios are rebalancing at the end of day t-1. At the end of day t-1, we take the 
intersections of past cumulative return quintiles and Size quintiles to form 25 VW 
portfolios for thirteen types of window. Again, these portfolios are value-weighted 
based on floating market capitalization.  
Table 3.2 shows the average return of high past cumulative return portfolio minus 
that of low past cumulative return portfolio for each set of portfolios, which are sorted 
by a decreasing length of past cumulative return window. The portfolios based on a 
one-year window (251,21) suggest that there is no significant momentum effect in the 
Chinese stock market. In contrast, portfolio based on (251,2) window exhibits a strong 
reversal effect. This difference implies that, when we include the nearest 21 trading 
days in the window, the reversal appears. In other words, the reversal effect captured in 
(251,2) window is entirely driven by a reversal effect within the latest 21 trading days.  
To obtain a detailed range of the reversal effect in China, we examine other past 
cumulative return windows31. Table 3.2 shows that the portfolios based on a (125,2) 
window show powerful reversal effect. In contrast, there is no momentum/reversal on 
the (125,63) window. The difference between (125,2) and (125,64) suggests the 
reversal only exist within the past 64 trading days. A comparison between the portfolios 
                                                 
31 251 days and 125 days window approximately cover one-year, half-year of past return 
data, respectively. 63 days, 43ays and 21 days cover 3-month, 2-month and 1-month of past 
return, respectively. 10 days and 5 days cover half-a-month and one-week of past return, 
respectively. Although the windows are chosen arbitrarily, we believe they describe a 
comprehensive picture of momentum/reversal effect in China. 
126 
 
based on (64,2) and (64,43) window suggests strong reversal within 43 trading days but 
no significant momentum/reversal between the interval t-64 to t-43. The portfolios 
based on (43,2) window result show stronger reversal than before. Interestingly, we 
start to observe some reversal effect for portfolios based on (43, 22) windows, 
indicating the reversal effect starts to appear when we enter the past 43 days window. 
However, moving from (43,2) to (43,21), we can observe a substantial reduction in the 
absolute values of the returns, indicating that the reversal effect is stronger within the 
21 trading days. A comparison between (21,2) and (21,10) window suggests there the 
past ten trading days have a stronger reversal effect. Finally, we can compare (10,2) 
with (10,5) and finally locate the most powerful reversal within the past five trading 
days. This short-term reversal is captured in the last window (5,2), showing the most 
substantial negative return of -0.13% to -0.28% per day. 
Overall, we observe no momentum effect in the Chinese stock market using various 
windows within one year, while we find substantial short-term reversal effect within a 
window of 43 past trading days. The short-term reversal effect gets stronger as we 
shrink the window of cumulative return and is most potent when we use a window of 
past five days. Also, note that large companies tend to have a lower bug still significant 
short-term reversal. 
We call this a short-term reversal effect and consider it as an anomaly in the Chinse 
stock market. We use the 25 VW double-sorted portfolios formed on Size and the past 
cumulative return based on the window (5,2) as one of the playing fields because these 
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portfolios generate the highest spreads and may pose a challenge to the asset pricing 
model. Hereafter, we call it 25 VW Size-STR portfolios. 
3.3 Institutional ownership 
Institutional ownership may be related to stock return through two channels. Firstly, 
retail investors have played a vital role in the Chinese stock market. By March 2018, 
99.73% of the total security accounts belong to individual investors (China Securities 
Depository and Clearing Co. Ltd, http://www.chinaclear.cn).  In this environment, 
institutional investors might be able to obtain abnormal return consistently because they 
have a significant advantage over the retail investors. Secondly, institutional ownership 
may be beneficial to company performance by providing better corporate governance 
and monitoring mechanism, therefore boosting long-term firm performance. We argue 
that institutional ownership is especially relevant to the Chinese firms since those 
companies have relatively weaker corporate governance and shareholder protection 
compared with the developed markets (Bai, C-E et al. 2004; Sun & Tong 2003; Wei, 
Xie & Zhang 2005). Therefore, to extrapolate the effect of institutional ownership on 
firm return, we examine portfolios formed on the amount of institutional ownership. 
We use the institutional ownership data from CSMAR. This data includes the 
percent institutional ownership for most A-shares in the market. It is constructed by 
identifying the institutional investors from the shareholder file of the interim and annual 
reports. The category of institutional investors includes fund management company, 
foreign institutions (QF II), securities brokerage, insurance, social security fund, trust, 
finance company (exclude banks), and bank. We aggregate the percent holding of all 
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institutional investors and obtain the total percent institutional ownership data for each 
company.  
The summary statistics for the percent institutional ownership data is presented in 
Appendix 1. Note that not all A-shares have institutional ownership, but most of the 
companies do. For example, our sample has 3028 firms in 2016, while Appendix 1 
suggests that 2765 of them have non-zero institutional ownership.  
Following a similar construction process to the other portfolios described above, 
we construct 25 VW portfolios formed on percent institutional ownership (IO) and Size. 
The only difference is that the 25 VW Size-IO portfolios rebalance twice every year to 
utilize as much ownership information as possible. It rebalances at the end of June at 
year t using percent institutional ownership data at the end of December at year t-1. It 
also rebalances at the end of December at year t using percent institutional ownership 
data at the end of June at year t. Since all companies will have published their interim 
report by the end of December and their annual report by the end of June next year, our 
construction methodology avoids look-forward bias. To be included in the portfolios, a 
company must have non-zero institutional ownership data corresponding to the 
rebalancing date. 
3.4 Summary of the playing fields 
Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics of all the double-sorted VW portfolios. 
Overall, we can observe a powerful “size effect,” since smaller companies, controlling 
for the other sorting variables, have monotonically higher return than the larger 
companies for all 25 VW portfolios. This substantial size effect in China is widely 
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documented in the existing literature (Cakici, Chatterjee & Topyan 2015; Carpenter, 
Lu & Whitelaw 2015; Guo et al. 2017; Hilliard & Zhang 2015; Hu et al. 2018).  Note 
the small minus big (S-B) returns are significant in most sorts, producing a return spread 
ranging from 0.03% to 0.11% per day. The only exception are the lowest past 
cumulative return quintiles.  
Regarding the Size-B/M portfolios in Panel A, we do not observe a “value effect.” 
For small companies, we even observe negative “value effect,” where the high minus 
low (H-L) spread is negative and significant (𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐 = −1.8). Whether value 
effect exist in China is controversial in the literature. The absence of value effect in our 
result is consistent with the finding of  Hilliard and Zhang (2015) and Hu et al. (2018), 
while there is also literature argue the presence of value effect (Cakici, Chatterjee & 
Topyan 2015; Carpenter, Lu & Whitelaw 2015; Guo et al. 2017). There is the difference 
in the weighting method (floating market cap versus total market cap), sample stocks, 
breakpoints, time interval and database that may affect the outcome. Moreover, we 
examine daily return instead of monthly return widely used by others.  
Panel B and Panel C show some mixed results regarding operating profitability and 
investment style. The cross-sectional patterns are similar for portfolios formed on both 
OP and Inv. Both 25 VW Size-OP portfolios and 25 VW Size-Inv portfolios have a 
positive H-L spread for the medium-to-large Size quintiles, and a negative H-L spread 
for the smallest two Size quintiles. Nevertheless, two rows of the five Inv quintiles have 




Turn to our “new” playing fields presented in Panel D and Panel E of Table 3.3. 
The 25 Size-IO VW portfolios show positive H-L spread except for one row of Size 
quintiles. The biggest Size quintiles show significant H-L spread with 0.03% of daily 
excess return (7.5% annually). The 25 Size-STR VW portfolios in Panel E suggest a 
substantial short-term reversal effect. H-L spread for all Size quintiles are tremendous 
and negatively significant, generating a daily excess return ranging from -0.13% to -
0.28% (that is -32% to -70% annually). Note that the largest Size quintiles have the 
lowest reversal H-L spread.  
4. Factor construction 
Following the approach of Fama and French (1993), we construct our factors by 
sorting all A-shares in our sample into 2 × 3 portfolios. The breakpoint for the Size 
groups is the medium floating market capitalization of all the all A-shares excluding 
GEM stocks at the end of June of year t. The breakpoints for the characteristic groups 
(B/M, OP, Inv, and IO) are the 30th and 70th percentile of the corresponding variable of 
all the A-shares excluding GEM stocks at the end of December of year t-1. At the end 
of June of year t, we sort all A-shares independently into two Size groups (Small and 
Big) and three characteristic groups (Low, Neutral and High) using the breakpoints. 
Then we take the intersection of Size group with the characteristic groups, yielding the 
2 × 3 value-weighted portfolios denoting as SL, SN, SH, BL, BN, and BH, where S and 
B indicate small and big portfolio, and L, N, and H denote for low, neutral and high 
characteristic portfolios. The only exception is that portfolios formed institutional 
ownership and Size are constructed twice a year at the end of June (and the end of 
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December) of year t using IO breakpoints at the end of December of year t-1 (and the 
end of June of year t). Floating market capitalization is the metric for value-weighting.   
We use Size - B/M 2 × 3 portfolios to construct the value factor (HML, High minus 
Low), which is computed as HML = (SH + BH)/2 − (SL + BL)/2. The corresponding 
SMB𝐵/𝑀(Small minus Big) factor is the average return of three small stock portfolios 
minus the average return of three big stock portfolios, where SMB𝐵/𝑀 = (SL + SN +
SH)/3 − (BL + BN + BH)/3. The RMW (Robust minus Weak) factor is computed 
using 2 × 3 portfolios formed on Size and OP, where RMW = (SH + BH)/2 − (SL +
BL)/2 . The corresponding SMB𝑂𝑃 = (SL + SN + SH)/3 − (BL + BN + BH)/3 , as 
well. In contrast, the CMA (conservative minus aggressive) factor is defined as CMA =
(SL + BL)/2 − (SH + BH)/2. We also construct an IO (institutional ownership) factor, 
which is defined High percent institutional ownership stock return minus Low percent 
institutional ownership stock return, IO = (SH + BH)/2 − (SL + BL)/2 . Similarly, 
SMB𝑂𝑃 and SMBIO are constructed in the same way. Using all the 2 × 3 portfolios, we 
can finally construct the SMB factor, where SMB =  (SMB𝐵/𝑀 + SMB𝑂𝑃 + SMBINV +
SMBIO)/4. 
A similar calculation applies to STR (short-term reversal) factor, where STR =
(SL + BL)/2 − (SH + BH)/2, which is formed on Size and past cumulative return 
(from day t-5 to day t-2). For comparison purposes, we also construct a conventional 
momentum (MOM) factor based on 2 × 3 portfolios formed on Size and past cumulative 
return from day t-251 to t-21, where MOM = (SH + BH)/2 − (SL + BL)/2. Note that 
STR and MOM factors are based on the daily-rebalancing portfolios.  
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Existing literature suggests state (government) ownership has a negative impact on 
firm value and performance in China (e.g., Fan, Wong & Zhang 2007; Sun & Tong 
2003; Wei & Varela 2003; Wei, Xie & Zhang 2005). To examine the effect of state 
ownership on the expected return of the Chinese stock market, we also construct an 
additional factor, state ownership (SO) factor. The percent state ownership data is 
calculated using the “capital structure” data in CSMAR. This dataset classifies the total 
equity to floating shares and non-tradable shares. We are interested in the proportion of 
state-own shares which falls into the category of non-floating shares. We then calculate 
the proportion of state-own shares in the total equity value for each company. The 
summary of the state-own share data is in Appendix 2. The proportion of state-own 
equity decreases over time, especially after the non-tradable share reform mostly 
completed by the end of 2006. Also, the proportion of companies with positive state 
ownership is decreasing over time. 1005 out of 1263 companies have non-zero state 
ownership at the end of 2003. By the end of 2016, only 635 out of the 3116 companies 
have non-zero state ownership. 
The number of companies with state-own shares gradually reduces over time and 
accounts for only a small part of the sample (635 out of the 3116 companies) by the end 
of 2016. It is thus impractical to construct only high-minus-low SO factor which will 
only use a small proportion of the total sample. To comprehensively examine the impact 
of state-own shares, we also include companies with zero (none) state ownership and 
construct three varieties of SO factors. They are SOLMH(Low minus High), SONMH 
(None minus High), and  SONML(None minus Low). Using the end of financial year 
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state ownership data, we sort all A-shares into three portfolios: zero (Z), low (L) and 
high (H) portfolios. The breakpoint for L and H portfolios is the median percent 
government holding of all A-shares excluding GEM stocks. We then take the 
intersection of the corresponding small (S) and big (B) portfolios with the Z, L, and H 
SO portfolios, thereby getting six portfolios: SZ, SL, SH, BZ, BL, and BH. Then  
SOLMH = (SL + BL)/2 − (SH + BH)/2 ; SONMH = (SZ + BZ)/2 − (SH + BH)/2 ; 
SONML = (SZ + BZ)/2 − (SL + BL)/2. These portfolios rebalance at the end of June 
at year t using the state-own shares data at the end of year t-1. 
Table 3.4 presents the summary statistics of all the factors. First of all, Panel A 
suggests that STR, SONMH, SONML, SOLMH and IO all have a positive average return. 
We can also observe that market excess return, SMB, STR, SONMH, and SONML are 
significantly different from zero, however HML, RMW, CMA, MOM, SOLMH, and IO 
are not. Market premium and SMB have a Sharpe ratio of 0.03 and 0.04, respectively. 
STR has a Sharpe ratio of 0.20. The conventional MOM factor is insignificant with 
negative Sharpe ratio, verifying our findings of the absence of momentum in the 
previous section. Also, note that the mean returns of RMW and CMA are 
indistinguishable from zero.  
Panel B of Table 3.4 presents the correlation matrix of the factors. RMW and HML 
are negatively correlated with SMB, verifying that small companies tend to have 
weaker profitability and lower book-to-market equity ratio. The positive correlation 
between STR and SMB suggest that small (large) companies have stronger(weaker) 
short-term reversal. Very interestingly, the institutional investors seem to be strong 
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momentum-follower because of the 0.36 correlation coefficient between IO factor and 
MOM factor, even though there is no momentum return in China. Appendix 3 presents 
the comparison of our five factors with those available in CSMAR for a cross-validation 
purpose. 
5. Redundancy tests 
Among all the factor we proposed, we are interested in whether they capture useful 
information in explaining the average return in the Chinese stock market. Firstly, we 
regress each of the factors on market premium, SMB, and HML, to examine whether 
they are fully explained by the conventional three-factor model.  
Table 3.5 presents the result. The three-factor model can adequately explain CMA, 
MOM, SOLMH, SONML, SONMH. CMA factor is redundant in China to the three-factor 
model as per the insignificant regression intercept, consistent with the finding in Li et 
al. (2017) and Guo et al. (2017). The insignificant MOM verifies the finding in the 
existing literature regarding China. It is worthwhile noting that the average return of 
RMW and IO are insignificant in Table 3.4, but they become significant with an 
intercept of 0.02 and 0.03 after regressing on the three-factor model, indicating that 
they may embed additional and useful information to the three-factor model. We now 
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exclude SOLMH and SONML, while keeping SONMH which is the most significant SO 
factor. We also exclude the redundant MOM32 factor. 
After reducing the number of the factors using the three-factor model, we consider 
the factor spanning test following Fama and French (2015): if the regression intercept 
of one factor on all the other factors is zero, then the LHS factor is redundant. Table 
3.6.1 presents the result of the first factor spanning test where we exclude CMA and 
RMW from the model. The first column indicates that none of the factors has zero 
regression intercept when regressing on the other factors. SMB, HML, STR, SONMH, 
and IO are not redundant as per the first factor spanning test.   
Our second factor spanning test now includes RMW and CMA, as shown in Table 
3.6.2. RMW and CMA are not redundant with intercept of 0.02 and 0.01 (t-statistics = 
4.19, 2.25), respectively. Interestingly, CMA is not redundant in the factor spanning 
test while it can be fully explained by the three-factor model. HML is not redundant to 
the other factors (intercept = 0.02, t-statistic = 3.06). On the daily-level, we confirmed 
that HML is not redundant, consistent with the monthly analysis result of Guo et al. 
(2017), even though the value effect is not significant as reported in Table 3.4. STR has 
a highly significant intercept of 0.18 (t-statistic =11.93) after controlling for other 
factors. Note that the R2 statistic for STR is only 4%, a low level partially due to its 
                                                 
32 We keep CMA in the following section due to its importance in the literature. 
The focus of the current study is not the five-factor model, so we do not discuss the 
necessity of CMA in the model.  
136 
 
daily-rebalancing nature. However, SONMH and IO seem to be redundant when adding 
RMW and CMA to the model. We still include  SONMH and IO in the following analysis 
to further examine their explanatory power since they are non-redundant in the first 
factor spanning test. Hereafter, we use SO to denote SONMH for ease of presentation. 
6. Model performance 
Fama and French (2015) proposed the five-factor asset pricing model: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the portfolio i’s return minus the risk-free rate 𝑅𝐹𝑡 for day t; 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡 
is the value-weighted market excess return constructed using all A-shares in our 
sample; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 , 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡  and 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡  are size, value, profitability and investment 
factor. 
Adding STR, SO and IO to the five-factor model, we examine the following eight-
factor model: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 +
𝑟𝑖𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑆𝑂𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖𝐼𝑂𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡 , 𝑆𝑂𝑡 and 𝐼𝑂𝑡 are the short-term reversal, the state ownership and the 
institutional ownership factor, respectively. Note that SO indicates SONMH (none state 
ownership portfolio returns minus high state ownership portfolio returns).  
The GRS statistic of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) tests whether the 
intercepts in time-series regressions of excess return are jointly indistinguishable from 











 ) to measure the model performance of the additional 
factors, 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡 , 𝑆𝑂𝑡  and 𝐼𝑂𝑡 , comparing to the three-factor/five-factor model. GRS 
statistic test the hypothesis that all regression intercepts are jointly indistinguishable 
from zero, i.e. the asset pricing model fully expla,in expected returns. 𝐴|𝑎𝑖| is the 
average absolute value of the regression intercepts. 
𝐴|𝑎𝑖|
𝐴|?̅?𝑖|
 is the average absolute value 
of the regression intercepts scaled by the average absolute value of the deviation of each 
portfolio’s excess return from the cross-section average. Following Fama and French 





  which measures the proportion of the variance of LHS 
expected return left unexplained, where ?̂?𝑖
2  is the difference between the squared 
estimate of the regression intercept and its standard error for portfolio 𝑖 ; ?̂?𝑖
2  is the 
difference between the square of the realized deviation, ?̅?𝑖
2, of portfolio 𝑖 and the square 
of its standard error; 𝐴(?̂?𝑖
2) and 𝐴(?̂?𝑖
2) are the average value of ?̂?𝑖
2 and  ?̂?𝑖
2, respectively. 
For all the model performance metrics, a lower level indicates better model explanatory 
power. 
Table 3.7 presents the model performance measures for each set of the 25 VW 
portfolios. Panel A (Panel B) report model performance results when the three-factor 
(the five-factor model) is the baseline model. Overall, the GRS statistics are significant 
for all portfolios, indicating that none of the models is a complete description of the 
daily expected return in the Chinese stock market. We can observe Panel B have lower 
performance measures than Panel A, suggesting the five-factor model is a better 
description of the daily expected return than the three-factor model, confirming the 
finding in the monthly-level analysis of Guo et al. (2017) and Li et al. (2017). The five-
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  for the 25 Size-
B/M portfolios, 25 Size-Inv portfolios, 25 Size-IO portfolios, and especially for the 25 








Panel A of Table 3.7 shows that adding STR to the three-factor model made 
improvement for the 25 Size-B/M portfolios and a substantial improvement on the 25 
Size-STR portfolios which three-factor model poorly explained. For example, adding 
STR reduces |𝑎𝑖| from 0.072 to 0.039, and reduces 
𝐴|𝑎𝑖|
𝐴|?̅?𝑖|
 from 0.94 to 0.51 for the 25 
Size-STR portfolios. More interestingly, Panel B shows that adding STR boosts the 
explanatory power for ALL left-hand-side portfolios, highlighting that STR provides 
important additional information in explaining the daily expected return of Chinese 
stock market. It is expected that the improvement is strongest for the 25 Size-STR 
portfolios which five-factor cannot well explain. On the top of the five-factor model, 
adding STR help reduce the GRS statistics for all portfolios especially on the 25 Size-
STR portfolios. Regarding 𝐴|𝑎𝑖|, STR produce a substantial improvement (3.5 basis 
point per day, 857 basis point per year) for the 25 Size-STR portfolios while some 
improvement on the other portfolios.  Regarding the cross-section average return and 
variance, adding STR substantially reduced 
𝐴|𝑎𝑖|
𝐴|?̅?𝑖|





  for the 25 Size-STR 
portfolios and makes decent improvement for the other portfolios compared to the five-
factor model. 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 3.7 shows that adding SO (and STR) to the three-
factor (five-factor) help further boost the explanatory power for almost all 25 VW 
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portfolios, suggesting that SO also provides additional information beyond the three-
factor/five-factor model. Finally, Panel A shows that adding IO to the model help better 
explain 25 Size-OP and 25 Size-Inv portfolios. However, the improvements made by 
IO disappear in Panel B when CMA and RMW are added to the model, indicating IO 
only provides additional information to the three-factor model but not the five-factor 
one. Nevertheless, adding IO help much better explain 25 Size-IO portfolios in both 
Panel A and Panel B. 
Overall, it seems that the five-factor model produces a decent improvement to the 
conventional three-factor model in explaining the expected return in the Chinese stock 
market. However, the 25 Size-STR portfolios pose a severe challenge to the five-factor 
model, leaving a substantial proportion of the cross-section returns unexplained. 
Luckily, adding the STR factor greatly improves the explanatory power not only for the 
25 Size-STR portfolios but also for the other portfolios. However, note that the average 
absolute intercepts of 25 Size-STR portfolios are still substantial (3.9 basis points per 
day, 975 basis points per year) even after adding the STR factor. At last, SO also 
provides additional information to both three-factor and five-factor model. 
Table 3.8 presents the regression loadings on the STR, SO and IO factors. The left-
hand side presents the loadings of the STR SO and IO factor (r, g and I) and the right-
hand-side (t(r), t(g) and t(I)) are the t-statistics of the loadings.  
The loadings of STR are significant for 8 of the 25 Size-B/M portfolios, 9 of the 25 
Size-OP portfolios, 8 of the 25 Size-Inv portfolios, 4 of the 25 Size-IO portfolios, and 
25 of the 25 Size-STR portfolios. The loadings on SO and IO are significant for most 
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portfolios when control the five factors and STR, suggesting they play a critical role in 
explaining the expected returns in the Chinese stock market33.  
From Table 3.8 we can observe some interesting cross-sectional patterns regarding 
SO and IO factor. From the result of the 25 Size-B/M portfolios, the loadings on IO are 
only significantly negative in the northwest corner of the 25 Size-B/M portfolios, 
suggesting that small companies with low book-to-market ratio (i.e., small growth 
stocks) are unfavorable to the institutional investors. Meanwhile, the substantial IO 
loadings in the southwest/northeast suggest the institutional investors prefer large 
companies with high B/M ratio (i.e., large value stocks) and small companies with low 
B/M ratio (i.e., small growth stocks). The negatively significant IO loadings on the west 
of Size-OP portfolios suggest small-to-medium companies with weak profitability is 
unattractive to institutional investors. In contrast, we can tell that institutional investor 
prefers profitable companies with large market cap. 
From the result of the 25 Size-B/M(OP) portfolios, the sign of the loadings and the 
corresponding t-statistics on SO factor describes that small companies tend to have 
none state ownership while large companies tend to have high state ownership.  
The result on the 25 Size-Inv portfolios shows that negatively significant SO 
loadings on the southwest and positively significant loadings on the northeast, revealing 
that small & aggressive (large & conservative) companies tend to have none (high) state 
                                                 
33 Among all the portfolios, SO and IO have more significant loadings than STR, although 
from Table 7 we observe stronger improvement provided by STR. This may due to that STR is 
daily-rebalancing, incorporating lots of noises into the STR factor return and thus reduce its 
correlation with the left-hand-side portfolios, most of which rebalance yearly. 
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ownership, which is an expected outcome. Finally, turn to IO loadings for the 25 Size-
Inv portfolios, we can see largest Size quintile are preferred by institutions who do not 
show a clear preference to investment style, while small aggressive companies are 
unfavorable to the institutional investors (negatively significant loadings on the 
northeast of 25 Size-Inv portfolios). 
Overall, we observe significant STR loadings, and significant SO and IO loadings 
on most portfolios controlling for the five-factors, suggesting they might provide useful 
and additional information in explaining the expected returns of the Chinese stock 
market on the top of the five-factor model. 
7. Mutual fund return 
To examine how useful the “new” factors are in explaining the investment 
performance, we examine them on mutual fund data from CSMAR. To include enough 
number of observations, we filter out mutual funds which have fewer than 2000 trading 
days 34. We obtain a sample of 495 mutual funds. We then compute the daily net asset 
value (NAV) return using the daily NAV data from CSMAR. Following that, we 
calculate the model performance measures same as the prior section, treating all mutual 
funds as a big set of left-hand-side portfolios.   
Panel A of Table 3.9 presents the model performance measures based on the 498 
mutual funds daily NAV return. First, none of the models can adequately explain the 
funds’ performance because the GRS statistics are all significant. It is surprising that 
                                                 
34 Our result is qualitatively similar when we choose 1000 days as the filter range. 
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 while do not reduce the average absolute intercept. In contrast, 
adding the STR factor generates a much larger improvement, and it reduces |𝑎𝑖| from 
0.017 to 0.015, reduces  
𝐴|𝑎𝑖|
𝐴|?̅?𝑖|






from 0.84 to 0.23, suggesting that STR helps tremendously in explaining the cross-
sectional variance of the mutual funds’ return. Therefore, the short-term reversal 
appears to be an important feature of the Chinese mutual funds’ return. In contrast, 
adding SO and IO factor seems to provide no improvement as per the performance 
measures. 
Panel B, Panel C and Panel D present the regression details on the 498 mutual funds 
based on the three-factor/five-factor/eight-factor model. For all models, only around 5 
to 6 percent of the mutual funds have significant intercepts, a small proportion of which 
are positively significant while the rest are negatively significant. This indicates most 
of the mutual funds do not generate positive alpha after controlling for only the three 
factors.  
Panel B shows that 36.04% of the funds have significant loadings on the SMB 
factor and 37.85% of the funds have significant loadings on the HML factor. More 
interestingly, most of them have positive exposure to SMB (prefer small stocks) while 
negative exposure to HML (prefer growth stocks). Meanwhile, a smaller proportion of 
the funds show an opposite investment strategy with a different exposure (7.63% have 
negatively significant exposure on SMB, and 5.72% have positively significant 
exposure on HML). 
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Comparing Panel C to Panel B of Table 3.9, adding RMW and CMA slightly 
increases the number of negative alphas. The average adjusted R2 statistic increases 
from 58.76% to 59.39% in Panel C (63 basis points increase). 30.32% of the funds have 
significant loading on RMW, while 28.01% of them are positively significant, 
suggesting a preference for the profitable firm. In contrast, 22.29% of the CMA 
loadings are negatively significant, while 8.53% of the CMA loadings are positively 
significant, revealing that more mutual funds prefer firms with aggressive investment 
style than conservative ones.  
Turning to the regression details of the eight-factor model in Panel D of Table 3.9. 
Firstly, the average adjusted R2 increases to 59.39% from 60.29% in Panel C, which is 
a 90-basis-point increase, more than the improvement provided by the five-factor model. 
Secondly, after adding STR, SO, and IO, the percentage of significant loadings on the 
SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA all reduced, suggesting that STR, HMN, and ISNT 
provide additional information in explaining the Chinese mutual fund’s performance. 
3.57% of funds have significant positive exposure to STR who may have been 
trading to an STR strategy. Meanwhile, it is puzzling that why 18.57% of the mutual 
funds trade against (represented by negatively significant exposure) short-term reversal 
despite its substantial return. One possible explanation is that the short-term reversal 
may not be profitable to trade in a costly environment. Alternatively, it may be due to 
their unawareness of the short-term reversal effect. It could also due to the price impact 
or a herding behavior of mutual funds. We leave this puzzle for future research. 
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Panel D of Table 3.9 also shows that the proportion of positive and negative 
significant loadings on SO are balanced (12.65% and 11.04%). Meanwhile, a 
significant proportion of mutual funds (36.35%) have significant positive loadings on 
IO, suggesting most of them invest in what everyone (every institution) else invests. 
8. Monthly-level result 
Since most existing literature examines monthly return, as a robustness check, now 
we redo the analysis based on the monthly return. All the factors are constructed like 
our daily analysis. SMB, HML, RMW, CMA and SO are based on 6 (2×3) Size-BM, 6 
Size-OP, 6 Size-Inv, 6 Size-SO portfolios that rebalance at the end of every June at year 
t, using the year-end sorting data at year t-1, and hold until the end of June at year t+1. 
IO is based on the 6 Size-IO portfolios that rebalance twice a year at the end of June of 
year t (based on the institutional ownership data at the end of December of year t-1) 
and at the end of December of year t (based on the data at the end of June of year t). 
Following the convention, MOM is based on the 6 double-sorted portfolios formed on 
Size and past cumulative return from month t-12 to month t-2.  Finally, STR is based 
on the 6 double-sorted portfolios formed on Size and past cumulative return of month 
t-1 only. Note that MOM and STR rebalance end of every month t-1. Also note that the 
monthly-level STR factor inherently has a longer window than the daily-level one 
which is based on past return between day t-5 and day t-2, due to the limit of data 
frequency. At last, a similar methodology to the daily-level analysis also applies to 
construct the monthly-level playing fields. 
145 
 
Table 3.10 presents the summary statistics for the risk factors based on the monthly 
return. Mkt, SMB, STR have significant returns, like the daily result in Table 3.4. Note 
that the monthly-level STR has 1.21% monthly return (14.52% annually) while the 
daily-level STR has 0.18% daily return (45% annually), as reported in Table 3.435. 
𝑆𝑂𝑁𝑀𝐻  is barely significant but it provides the largest spread among the three SO 
factors. HML is insignificant suggesting the absence of value effect in the market. 
Meanwhile, RMW, CMA, MOM and IO return are indistinguishable from zero, similar 
to our daily-level result. 
Table 3.11.1 presents the first factor spanning test. Note that HML is a non-
redundant factor although value effect is not significant in Table 3.10. STR, SONMH, 
and IO are significant (non-redundant) after controlling for the other factors, suggesting 
that they provide additional information to the other factors. 
The result of the second factor spanning test (adding RMW and CMA) in Table 
3.11.2 shows that RMW and CMA are non-redundant.  STR is non-redundant with the 
second highest intercept. However, SO and IO appear to be redundant after adding 
RMW and CMA. 
Table 3.12 presents model performance results based on the monthly-level models. 
Overall, the monthly return poses less problem to the asset-pricing model than the daily 
return as the GRS statistics are lower in the monthly-level result than the daily-level 
one. The 25 Size-IO portfolios have insignificant intercepts when explained by the five-
                                                 
35 The daily-level STR is based on portfolios that rebalances much frequently than the 
monthly-level one, so it is unclear which can provide higher return if consider transaction cost. 
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factor model in Panel B.  If comparing the model performance measures in Panel A and 
Panel B, we can find that the five-factor model can better explain the expected return 
than the three-factor model for all left-hand-side portfolios, except the 25 Size-B/M 
portfolios and 25 Size-STR portfolios. 
We find that adding the monthly-level STR does not provide an improvement in 
explaining the expected return of most left-hand-side portfolios except for the 25 Size-
STR portfolios. In contrast, daily model performance in Table 3.7 shows STR deliver 
decent improvement for most 25 VW portfolios. This difference suggests that daily-
level STR may provide more critical information in explaining the expected return than 
the monthly-level STR. Note that daily-level STR is different from the monthly-level 
STR because the daily-level one uses information in a much short-term frequency. 
Nevertheless, as reported in both Panel A and B, the 25 Size-STR portfolios still pose 
a significant challenge to the three-factor/five-factor model which requires the help of 
the monthly-level STR to explain. We can observe substantial improvement for the 25 
Size-STR portfolios after adding STR to the model. 
Turning to SO, Panel A shows that adding SO provides improvement for all left-
hand-side portfolios. Also, Panel B shows that SO provides an improvement to 25 Size-
B/M portfolios, 25 Size-INV portfolios, and 25 Size-STR portfolios, suggesting that SO 
provides a decent level of improvement even to the five-factor model on the monthly-
level. However, IO can provide an improvement to three of the five sets of left-hand 
side portfolios in Panel A but little improvement in Panel B. As a result, IO seems to 
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be redundant in explaining the expected return after control for the five-factor model 
on the monthly level. 
9. Conclusion 
We find that the five-factor asset pricing model is an overall better description of 
the expected return of the Chinese stock market than the three-factor model. We 
confirm the absence of momentum in China while observe the substantial spread of the 
Size-STR (short-term reversal) double-sorted portfolios, which pose a significant 
challenge to the three-factor/five-factor model. Adding an STR (factor) not only help 
explain the Size-STR double-sorted portfolios, but also make decent improvement in 
explaining most of the left-hand-side portfolios. Nevertheless, daily-level STR provides 
robust improvement while a monthly-level STR do not, suggesting that the STR in a 
daily frequency provides more useful information in the Chinese stock market. The 
explanatory power on mutual funds’ performance also increase when daily-level STR 
is added, and daily-level STR help substantially in explaining the cross-sectional 
variance of Chinese mutual funds’ return.  
We show that SO (state ownership factor) provides an improvement to the 
conventional three-factor/five-factor model for most left-hand-side portfolios. SO and 
IO (institutional ownership factor) can generate significant loadings on most left-hand-
side portfolios. Also, adding SO and IO helps further explain the mutual fund’s return 
with significant loadings on these two factors. Overall, our result suggests that 
ownership structure contain useful information, which is complementary to the five-
factor model.  
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Finally, we are surprised to find that IO is highly correlated with the momentum 
factor, suggesting that considerable institutional investors in China are momentum 
follower even though momentum return is insignificant in China. More interestingly, 
many mutual funds have negatively significant exposure to STR despite the substantial 
positive spread of the short-term reversal.  
Overall, our result suggests five-factor model although made decent improvement 
compared with the three-factor model, is not a complete description of the Chinese 






Summary statistics for the sample: 2004-2017. 
  This table reports the summary statistics for all the A-shares (include Shanghai and Shenzhen Main 
Board, SMEB and GEM stocks). N is the total number of companies in the sample. Mean (Median) is 
the average(median) of floatable market capitalization of all the companies in the sample. Total is the 
total floatable market capitalization of the sample. The unit for market cap is a billion in the Chinese 
RMB. 
Year N Mean Median Total 
2004 1353 0.82 0.47 1103 
2005 1355 0.74 0.39 1001 
2006 1404 1.68 0.69 2366 
2007 1526 5.94 2.26 9068 
2008 1601 2.78 0.97 4456 
2009 1694 8.83 2.69 14959 
2010 2039 9.37 2.92 19108 
2011 2318 7.05 1.97 16344 
2012 2470 7.28 1.98 17975 
2013 2468 8.02 2.70 19794 
2014 2590 12.10 3.91 31338 
2015 2807 14.77 6.85 41471 
2016 3028 12.85 5.79 38917 




Difference in average daily percent excess return between the portfolio with high past cumulative return and the portfolio with low past cumulative return (High minus 
Low spread): 07/01/2004-12/29/2017, 3286 trading days. 
  This table reports the difference in average percent excess return between portfolio with high past cumulative return and portfolio with low past cumulative return. 
These portfolios are 25 (5 × 5) value-weighted portfolios formed on Size and past cumulative return. The numbers in the parenthesis, (), denotes for the rolling window 
used to calculate past cumulative return. For example, (251,21) denotes the portfolios which are formed on Size and past cumulative return between the day t-251 to 
day t-21. The t-statistics of the high minus low spread are in the brackets []. 
 (251, 21) (251, 2) (125, 2) (125, 63)   
Small -0.02 [-0.93] -0.13 [-6.02] -0.18 [-8.94] -0.01 [-0.66]   
2 -0.02 [-1.36] -0.10 [-6.36] -0.13 [-7.71] 0.00 [0.28]   
3 -0.01 [-0.89] -0.08 [-4.74] -0.09 [-5.09] 0.00 [0.35]   
4 0.00 [-0.07] -0.05 [-3.03] -0.07 [-4.21] 0.01 [0.89]   
Big -0.01 [-0.55] -0.04 [-1.86] -0.07 [-2.78] -0.03 [-1.35]   
 (63, 2) (63, 43) (43, 2) (43, 21)   
Small -0.23 [-11.29] -0.01 [-0.72] -0.22 [-10.77] -0.04 [-2.64]   
2 -0.17 [-10.39] -0.01 [-0.51] -0.18 [-10.80] -0.04 [-3.41]   
3 -0.14 [-7.87] 0.00 [-0.36] -0.15 [-8.60] -0.05 [-3.96]   
4 -0.10 [-5.53] 0.00 [0.02] -0.12 [-6.25] -0.04 [-2.66]   
Big -0.08 [-2.92] -0.01 [-0.44] -0.08 [-3.03] -0.02 [-0.94]   
 (21, 2) (21, 10) (10, 2) (10, 5) (5, 2)  
Small -0.20 [-10.26] -0.06 [-3.89] -0.20 [-10.25] -0.09 [-5.57] -0.23 [-12.20] 
2 -0.19 [-10.82] -0.05 [-3.86] -0.19 [-11.45] -0.09 [-6.47] -0.28 [-16.87] 
3 -0.15 [-8.64] -0.05 [-3.33] -0.16 [-9.21] -0.08 [-5.37] -0.26 [-15.35] 
4 -0.13 [-6.62] -0.02 [-1.60] -0.14 [-7.34] -0.08 [-5.19] -0.21 [-12.03] 




Averages of daily percent excess return for 25 (5 × 5) value-weighted (VW) portfolios: 07/01/2004-12/29/2017, 3286 trading days. 
  At the end of each June, all A-shares (include Shanghai and Shenzhen Main Board, SMEB and GEM stocks) are assigned to five Size groups (Small to Big) using the market cap 
quintiles of all A-shares excluding GEM stocks. Stocks are allocated independently to five B/M groups (Low to High) using the B/M quintiles of all A-shares excluding GEM stocks. 
The intersections of these two sorts produce 25 value-weighted Size-B/M portfolios. At the end of June of year t, Size is the market cap at the end of June of year t. B/M is the book 
equity B at the end of December of year t-1 divided by the market cap M at the end of December of year t-1. The Size-OP, Size-Inv portfolios are constructed in the same way, except 
the OP and Inv variables. The Size-IO portfolios are constructed twice every year at the end of each June and December, using the institutional ownership data 6 months prior to the 
construction. The Size-STR portfolios are constructed daily at the end of day t-1, formed on the past cumulative return between day t-5 to day t-2 and Size at the end of day t-1. The 
column of H-L shows the difference between the average percent returns of High variable portfolios minus average percent returns of Low variable portfolios for each Row. 
Similarly, the rows S-B show the average percent returns of Small portfolio minus the average returns of Big portfolio for each column. The number in the brackets are t-statistics. 
  Low 2 3 4 High H-L     Low 2 3 4 High H-L 
 Panel A: Size-B/M portfolios   Panel B: Size-OP portfolios 
Small 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.10 -0.03 [-1.80]  Small 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.11 -0.02 [-1.19] 
2 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.00 [-0.32]  2 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.00 [-0.05] 
3 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.00 [0.00]  3 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.02 [1.43] 
4 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.00 [0.27]  4 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.01 [1.12] 
Big 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.01 [-0.28]  Big 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02 [0.87] 
S-B 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 
   
S-B 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.05 
  
 [3.74] [2.87] [3.09] [2.47] [1.82] 
    
[4.56] [4.88] [2.65] [1.52] [1.83] 
  
 Panel C: Size-Inv portfolios   Panel D: Size-IO portfolios 
Small 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 -0.01 [-0.87]  Small 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.02 [0.59] 
2 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07 -0.01 [-1.33]  2 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.01 [1.03] 
3 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.02 [1.65]  3 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.02 [1.53] 
4 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.00 [0.16]  4 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 [-0.30] 
Big 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02 [1.66]  Big 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.03 [1.93] 
S-B 
 
0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05    S-B 
 
0.08 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.07   
[4.43] [3.69] [2.64] [2.46] [2.61] 
  
[3.28] [3.12] [2.24] [1.32] [2.05] 
 
 Panel E: Size-STR portfolios          
Small 0.22 0.23 0.18 0.08 -0.02 -0.23 [-12.20]          
2 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.06 -0.08 -0.28 [-16.87]          
3 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.03 -0.08 -0.26 [-15.35]          
4 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.03 -0.06 -0.21 [-12.03]          
Big 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.02 -0.02 -0.13 [-5.07]          
S-B 
 
0.11 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.00            
[4.48] [5.83] [5.18] [2.54] [-0.02] 




Summary statistics of factor daily returns: 07/01/2004-12/29/2017, 3286 trading days. 
   Mkt is the value-weighted market portfolio return of all A-shares (include Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Main Board, SMEB and GEM stocks) in excess of risk-free rate. At the end of June, all A-shares are 
assigned to two Size groups using the median market cap of all A-shares excluding GEM stocks as the 
breakpoint. Stocks are also allocated independently to three B/M, OP and Inv groups (Low, Neutral and 
High) using the 30th and 70th percentile of all A-shares excluding GEM stocks. The intersections of 
Size and other variable groups produce 6 (2 × 3) value-weighted Size-B/M, Size-OP, and Size-Inv 
portfolios, SL, SN, SH, BL, BN, and BH, where S and B denote for small and big portfolio, and L, N 
and H indicate low, neutral and high characteristic portfolios. SMB is the average of SMBB/M, SMBOP, 
SMBInv, and SMBIO, where SMBB/M  is the average of the returns on the three small stock portfolios of 6 
Size-B/M portfolios minus the average returns on the three big stock portfolios of 6 Size-B/M portfolios, 
SMBB/M= (SL+SN+SH)/3-(BL+BN+BH)/3. SMBOP, SMBInv, and SMBIO are constructed in the same 
way, except for the OP, Inv and IO variables. HML is the average return on the two high B/M portfolios 
of 6 Size-B/M portfolios minus the average return of the two low B/M portfolios of 6 Size-B/M portfolios, 
HML=(SH+BH)/2-(SL+BL)/2. RMW, CMA and IO are constructed in a same way using 6 Size-OP, 6 
Size-Inv and 6 Size-IO portfolios, except 6 Size-IO portfolios are constructed twice a year at the end of 
June and December. MOM is average return on the two high past cumulative return portfolios of 6 Size-
MOM portfolios minus the average return of the two low past cumulative return portfolios of 6 Size-
MOM portfolios. STR is average return on the two low past cumulative return portfolios of 6 Size-STR 
portfolios minus the average return of the two high past cumulative return portfolios 6 Size-STR 
portfolios. Size-MOM portfolios (Size-STR portfolios) are constructed daily formed on past cumulative 
return between day t-21 to t-251 (t-2 to t-5) and Size at day t-1. SO factors are based on 6 Size-SO 
portfolios formed on state ownership (Zero, Low and High) using the percent state ownership of all A-
shares excluding GEM stocks as breakpoints. SONML=(SZ+BZ)/2-(SL+BL)/2, SOLMH=(SL+BL)/2-
(SH+BH)/2, SONMH=(SZ+BZ)/2-(SH+BH)/2, where Z, L, and H indicate zero, low and high percent 
state ownership portfolios. Panel A shows average daily percent returns (Mean), the standard deviations 
of daily returns (Std dev.), the t-statistics, and Sharpe Ratio for the average returns. Panel B shows the 
correlation coefficient between each factor. 
Panel A, Averages, standard deviations, t-statistics and Sharpe ratio for daily factor return 
  Mkt SMB HML RMW CMA MOM STR SOLMH SONMH SONML IO 
Mean 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Std Dev. 1.73 0.81 0.55 0.59 0.40 0.74 0.87 0.35 0.36 0.29 0.45 
t-Statistic 1.91 2.80 0.13 0.74 0.26 -1.33 11.97 0.37 1.80 1.78 1.57 
Sharpe Ratio 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.20 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Panel B, Correlation between factors  
 Mkt SMB HML RMW CMA MOM STR SOLMH SONMH SONML IO 
Mkt 1.00           
SMB 0.09 1.00          
HML 0.06 -0.53 1.00         
RMW -0.10 -0.71 0.35 1.00        
CMA -0.32 0.27 -0.04 -0.51 1.00       
MOM 0.03 0.10 -0.23 0.08 -0.14 1.00      
STR 0.16 0.12 -0.07 -0.14 0.00 0.07 1.00     
SOLMH -0.12 0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.14 -0.11 -0.02 1.00    
SONMH -0.17 0.26 -0.20 -0.03 0.17 0.02 -0.05 0.66 1.00   
SONML -0.06 0.23 -0.17 -0.03 0.03 0.16 -0.03 -0.38 0.45 1.00  




Explain each factor using the three-factor model: 07/01/2004-12/29/2017, 3286 trading days. 
  This table reports the results of regressions of a selected factor on Mkt, SMB and HML. The 
construction of factors is in Table 4. The t-statistics are in the brackets. 
  Int Mkt SMB HML R2 
RMW 0.03 -0.01 -0.53 -0.03 0.51  
[4.02] [-2.34] [-49.49] [-2.09] 
 
CMA 0.00 -0.09 0.20 0.15 0.22  
[-0.24] [-23.97] [22.44] [11.20] 
 
MOM -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.34 0.06  
[-1.33] [2.76] [-1.69] [-12.42] 
 
STR 0.17 0.08 0.09 -0.05 0.04  
[11.62] [8.76] [4.29] [-1.49] 
 
SOLMH 0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.02 
 
[0.40] [-7.49] [3.94] [-0.39] 
 
SONMH 0.01 -0.04 0.11 -0.04 0.10 
 
[1.56] [-10.97] [12.31] [-2.95] 
 
SONML 0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.06  
[1.39] [-4.09] [10.01] [-3.08] 
 
IO 0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.40 0.17  





Factor spanning regression: 07/01/2004-12/29/2017, 3286 trading days. 
  This table reports the results of regressions of a selected factor on all the other factors. The construction 
of factors is in Table 4. The t-statistics are in the brackets. 
  Int Mkt SMB HML STR SONMH IO R2 
Mkt 0.00  0.43 0.46 0.27 -0.88 0.07 0.08  
[0.00] [9.53] [6.67] [8.08] [-10.45] [0.99] 
 
SMB 0.03 0.06  -0.85 0.06 0.42 -0.37 0.37  
[2.32] [9.53] [-37.84] [4.22] [13.17] [-13.71] 
 
HML 0.02 0.03 -0.36  -0.02 -0.02 -0.42 0.42  
[3.06] [6.67] [-37.84] [-2.33] [-1.03] [-25.87] 
 
STR 0.18 0.07 0.10 -0.08  -0.12 -0.07 0.04  
[11.80] [8.08] [4.22] [-2.33] [-2.85] [-2.04] 
 
SONMH 0.01 -0.04 0.12 -0.01 -0.02  0.06 0.11  
[1.91] [-10.45] [13.17] [-1.03] [-2.85] [4.19] 
 
IO 0.02 0.00 -0.15 -0.40 -0.02 0.09  0.18  





Factor spanning regression including RMW and CMA: 07/01/2004-12/29/2017, 3286 trading days. 
  This table reports the results of regressions of a selected factor on all the other factors. The construction 
of factors is in Table 4. The t-statistics are in the brackets. 
  Int Mkt SMB HML RMW CMA STR SONMH IO R2 
Mkt 0.03  0.23 0.57 -0.92 -2.22 0.22 -0.34 -0.25 0.25  
[0.96] [4.20] [9.00] [-11.85] [-27.46] [7.24] [-4.21] [-3.56] 
 
SMB 0.04 0.02  -0.36 -0.91 -0.15 0.01 0.46 0.09 0.64  
[4.26] [4.20] [-18.34] [-44.62] [-5.32] [1.37] [18.59] [4.10] 
 
HML 0.02 0.04 -0.26  0.23 0.17 -0.02 -0.09 -0.44 0.44  
[2.21] [9.00] [-18.34] [10.74] [7.10] [-1.88] [-3.96] [-25.00] 
 
RMW 0.02 -0.04 -0.42 0.15  -0.53 -0.02 0.27 0.23 0.69  
[4.19] [-11.85] [-44.62] [10.74] [-30.72] [-2.48] [15.73] [15.02] 
 
CMA 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 0.09 -0.42  0.00 0.17 -0.14 0.47  
[2.25] [-27.46] [-5.32] [7.10] [-30.72] [-0.05] [11.16] [-10.15] 
 
STR 0.18 0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.11 0.00  -0.10 -0.03 0.04  
[11.93] [7.24] [1.37] [-1.88] [-2.48] [-0.05] [-2.17] [-0.79] 
 
SONMH 0.00 -0.02 0.21 -0.05 0.26 0.21 -0.01  0.02 0.18  
[0.70] [-4.21] [18.59] [-3.96] [15.73] [11.16] [-2.17] [1.23] 
 
IO 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.36 0.29 -0.22 -0.01 0.02  0.32  





Summary test statistics of three-, five-factor models, and the models with added factors for 25 (5 × 5) 
VW portfolios: 07/01/2004-12/29/2017, 3286 trading days. 
  This table reports the ability of the three-, five-factor models, and the models with added factors to 
explain daily excess returns on the 25 (5 × 5) VW portfolios. The three-factor model is Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model including Mkt, SMB and HML, and the five-factor model is Fama and French 
(2015) five-factor model including Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW and CMA. Panel A(B) reports the test 
summary statistics when three-factor model (five-factor model) is the bassline model; STR indicates the 
model where STR is added to the three-factor (five-factor) model; STR SO indicates the model where 
STR and SO are added to the three-factor (five-factor) model; STR SO IO indicates the model where 
STR, SO and IO are added to the three-factor (five-factor) model. The GRS statistic tests whether the 




 denotes for the ratio of average absolute value of regression intercept 𝑎𝑖 over average 





 is the average squared 
intercept over the over the average squared value of ?̅?𝑖, corrected for sampling error in the numerator 
and denominator. 
Panel A, Three-factor model as the baseline model  Panel B, Five-factor model as the baseline model 

















 25 Size-B/M portfolios 
Three-factor 3.29*** 0.015 0.76 0.75  Five-factor 3.28*** 0.014 0.70 0.73 
STR 3.06*** 0.015 0.74 0.68  STR 2.87*** 0.012 0.63 0.61 
STR SO 2.91*** 0.014 0.70 0.59  STR SO 2.85*** 0.012 0.62 0.59 
STR SO IO 2.81*** 0.014 0.69 0.62  STR SO IO 2.88*** 0.012 0.63 0.62 
 25 Size-OP portfolios 
Three-factor 4.31*** 0.018 0.90 1.05  Five-factor 3.67*** 0.014 0.70 0.67 
STR 4.33*** 0.019 0.95 1.16  STR 3.45*** 0.013 0.68 0.62 
STR SO 4.17*** 0.017 0.89 0.98  STR SO 3.44*** 0.013 0.67 0.60 
STR SO IO 3.86*** 0.016 0.82 0.79  STR SO IO 3.34*** 0.013 0.67 0.59 
 25 Size-Inv portfolios 
Three-factor 3.50*** 0.017 0.78 0.71  Five-factor 3.66*** 0.015 0.70 0.64 
STR 3.58*** 0.017 0.81 0.76  STR 3.44*** 0.014 0.68 0.62 
STR SO 3.44*** 0.016 0.76 0.68  STR SO 3.42*** 0.014 0.67 0.60 
STR SO IO 3.17*** 0.015 0.72 0.61  STR SO IO 3.33*** 0.014 0.67 0.59 
 25 Size-IO portfolios 
Three-factor 1.92*** 0.014 0.79 0.55  Five-factor 1.56** 0.012 0.68 0.31 
STR 1.97*** 0.014 0.80 0.59  STR 1.49* 0.012 0.66 0.28 
STR SO 1.88*** 0.013 0.76 0.48  STR SO 1.50* 0.011 0.65 0.27 
STR SO IO 1.74** 0.011 0.60 0.21  STR SO IO 1.53** 0.010 0.57 0.17 
 25 Size-STR portfolios 
Three-factor 23.05*** 0.072 0.94 1.27  Five-factor 22.57*** 0.074 0.97 1.30 
STR 17.07*** 0.039 0.51 0.43  STR 16.33*** 0.039 0.50 0.40 
STR SO 16.89*** 0.039 0.50 0.41  STR SO 16.30*** 0.039 0.50 0.40 




Factor loadings for 25 (5 × 5) VW portfolios: 07/01/2004-12/29/2017, 3286 trading days. 
  This table reports the regression coefficient estimates on STR, SO, and IO factor for all the 25 (5 × 5) 
VW double-sorted portfolios. r, g and I are coefficient estimates on STR, SO and IO factor, respectively. 
t(r), t(g) and t(I) are t-statistics of the corresponding loadings. The regression equation is the eight-factor 
model, 
𝑅(𝑡) − 𝑅𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑎 + 𝑏[𝑅𝑀(𝑡) − 𝑅𝐹(𝑡)] + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝑡) + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿(𝑡) + 𝑟𝑅𝑀𝑊(𝑡) + 𝑐𝐶𝑀𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑟𝑆𝑇𝑅(𝑡)
+ 𝑔𝑆𝑂(𝑡) + 𝐼 ∗ 𝐼𝑂(𝑡) + 𝑒(𝑡). 
  Low 2 3 4 High   Low 2 3 4 High 
Panel A: Size - B/M portfolios          
 r          t(r)         
Small 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01  2.85 1.75 -0.28 -2.36 -1.11 
2 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01  1.36 2.86 -0.37 0.62 -0.88 
3 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00  -0.33 0.59 -1.45 -0.10 0.15 
4 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  0.20 -2.70 -0.88 -1.18 -1.05 
Big -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02  -1.64 2.84 2.33 -0.42 2.80 
 g      t(g)     
Small 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.08  2.81 1.95 1.37 4.42 2.69 
2 -0.01 -0.03 0.11 -0.01 -0.13  -0.39 -1.58 6.17 -0.76 -6.40 
3 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 -0.12  -0.17 -3.74 -4.23 -8.01 -5.14 
4 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 -0.34  -4.18 -4.12 -3.69 -6.77 -13.03 
Big 0.01 -0.16 -0.13 -0.16 -0.12  0.74 -7.74 -5.61 -6.58 -5.78 
 I      t(I)     
Small -0.11 -0.24 0.06 0.14 0.13  -3.52 -8.35 2.38 7.23 4.98 
2 -0.09 -0.19 -0.04 0.07 0.05  -4.42 -11.45 -2.48 5.08 2.69 
3 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.03  -1.73 -1.41 -2.43 2.42 -1.46 
4 0.09 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.02  4.59 3.53 -0.61 -0.83 0.71 
Big 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.03 -0.03  11.25 12.29 7.70 1.26 -1.42 
Panel B: Size - OP portfolios          
 r      t(r)     
Small 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  2.44 0.22 -1.15 -0.47 -1.02 
2 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03  3.24 0.76 -1.30 -0.77 2.67 
3 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01  0.90 1.78 0.80 -2.25 -0.70 
4 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01  -0.24 0.41 -2.18 -1.68 -1.58 
Big -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00  -2.65 -1.76 0.91 -0.05 0.81 
 g      t(g)     
Small 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.01 0.10  3.38 4.88 6.67 0.39 2.66 
2 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.10  1.29 1.34 -0.05 1.53 -3.51 
3 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.16 -0.16  -2.43 -0.09 -3.11 -8.02 -7.10 
4 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.19 -0.27  -3.34 -2.81 -1.96 -9.05 -11.63 
Big -0.15 -0.13 -0.12 -0.19 0.11  -4.80 -4.86 -4.62 -8.15 7.84 
 I      t(I)     
Small 0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.03  2.90 0.62 2.51 -0.90 0.81 
2 -0.07 -0.13 0.05 -0.01 0.02  -4.66 -8.43 2.96 -0.61 0.64 
3 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 0.05  -1.61 -4.81 -1.31 1.83 2.26 
4 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.11  1.81 -3.09 -1.24 3.98 5.58 
Big 0.11 0.00 0.16 0.11 0.11  4.10 0.16 6.92 5.37 9.06 
Panel C:  Size - Inv portfolios          
 r      t(r)     
Small 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01  1.62 -0.06 0.59 1.86 0.80 
2 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03  3.82 0.26 -0.44 -0.13 4.29 
3 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01  0.38 0.68 1.70 -1.26 -0.96 
4 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02  0.39 -0.34 -1.20 -1.71 -2.76 
Big 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00  1.79 -0.65 -1.51 2.40 0.09 
 g      t(g)     
Small -0.03 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.21  -1.14 0.22 3.44 2.81 6.97 
2 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01  -1.29 1.15 -0.87 -1.00 0.71 
3 -0.12 -0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.12  -5.62 -5.72 -1.51 -2.83 -5.85 
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4 -0.14 -0.13 -0.21 -0.12 -0.08  -6.47 -6.00 -10.30 -5.75 -3.56 
Big -0.18 -0.01 0.32 -0.16 -0.18  -6.08 -0.54 14.11 -8.68 -10.11 
 I      t(I)     
Small 0.14 0.07 0.09 -0.05 -0.13  5.49 3.49 3.75 -1.69 -4.74 
2 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.11  -1.61 -0.83 -3.45 -1.72 -6.02 
3 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.05  -2.67 -0.70 -0.77 2.54 -2.53 
4 -0.01 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.02  -0.42 1.57 3.53 0.50 1.17 
Big 0.24 0.14 -0.08 0.22 0.16  9.35 6.12 -4.17 13.38 10.24 
Panel D:  Size - IO portfolios          
 r      t(r)     
Small -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01  -2.11 -0.32 0.50 0.82 0.38 
2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00  1.00 1.46 1.23 0.21 0.06 
3 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02  -0.62 -0.32 -1.20 0.12 -2.42 
4 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01  -0.92 -0.36 -3.49 -0.56 -1.32 
Big 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.67 0.22 0.74 0.87 1.79 
 g      t(g)     
Small 0.16 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.01  5.52 0.97 3.53 3.66 0.09 
2 -0.12 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.01  -5.89 1.52 1.26 3.69 0.55 
3 -0.21 -0.12 -0.05 0.05 -0.07  -10.96 -5.68 -2.24 2.08 -3.01 
4 -0.21 -0.18 -0.27 -0.03 -0.04  -8.97 -8.30 -12.28 -1.34 -1.97 
Big 0.02 0.13 -0.34 -0.05 0.13  0.87 5.79 -15.95 -2.92 7.36 
 I      t(I)     
Small -0.02 0.09 0.23 0.25 0.75  -0.66 3.58 7.77 8.46 11.68 
2 -0.36 -0.21 0.03 0.18 0.39  -19.53 -11.66 1.91 8.22 17.16 
3 -0.25 -0.10 0.02 0.23 0.23  -14.30 -5.58 1.00 11.32 11.63 
4 -0.22 -0.10 0.03 0.12 0.23  -10.50 -5.48 1.37 6.18 11.68 
Big -0.86 -0.30 0.12 0.40 0.55  -36.77 -14.67 6.23 27.14 35.27 
Panel E: Size - STR portfolios          
 r      t(r)     
Small 0.39 0.22 0.07 -0.10 -0.34  29.58 20.17 6.21 -8.59 -20.81 
2 0.42 0.21 0.07 -0.12 -0.40  48.59 25.28 7.54 -14.55 -37.60 
3 0.42 0.21 0.06 -0.13 -0.43  50.44 25.36 6.71 -15.55 -41.39 
4 0.44 0.24 0.05 -0.17 -0.46  47.70 27.52 5.57 -18.75 -41.54 
Big 0.70 0.37 0.06 -0.25 -0.74  65.03 36.12 5.39 -22.71 -70.34 
 g      t(g)     
Small -0.05 -0.14 -0.18 -0.17 -0.15  -1.57 -5.03 -6.25 -5.71 -3.63 
2 -0.16 -0.22 -0.25 -0.20 -0.23  -7.05 -10.20 -10.69 -9.12 -8.14 
3 -0.18 -0.29 -0.31 -0.27 -0.29  -8.28 -13.51 -13.55 -11.82 -10.66 
4 -0.21 -0.28 -0.33 -0.28 -0.35  -8.58 -12.51 -13.95 -11.79 -11.86 
Big -0.18 -0.36 -0.35 -0.32 -0.15  -6.49 -13.40 -11.60 -11.04 -5.47 
 I      t(I)     
Small 0.07 -0.04 -0.07 0.02 0.05  2.26 -1.54 -2.70 0.93 1.44 
2 -0.01 -0.11 -0.14 -0.09 -0.02  -0.59 -5.93 -6.59 -4.76 -0.99 
3 -0.02 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 0.00  -0.80 -4.91 -3.99 -3.09 -0.01 
4 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.09  2.62 -2.26 -1.78 0.10 3.45 




Summary test statistics of three-, five-factor models, and the models with added factors for 498 mutual 
funds' return: 10/14/2009-12/29/2017, 2000 trading days. 
  This table reports the ability of three-, five-factor models, and models with added STR, SO and IO 
factor to explain the mutual fund's performance. Thee three-factor model is Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model including Mkt, SMB and HML, and the five-factor model is Fama and French (2015) 
five-factor model including Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW and CMA.  
  Panel A reports the summary test statistics of the model performance. STR indicates the model where 
STR is added to the five-factor model; STR SO indicates the model where STR and SO are added to the 
five-factor model; STR SO IO indicates the model where STR, SO and IO are added to the five-factor 
model. The GRS statistic tests whether the expected values of all 25 intercept estimates are zero. 𝐴|𝑎𝑖| 
indicates the average absolute regression intercept. 
𝐴|𝑎𝑖|
𝐴|?̅?𝑖|
 denotes for the ratio of average absolute value 






 is the average squared intercept over the over the average squared value of ?̅?𝑖, corrected 
for sampling error in the numerator and denominator.  
  Panel B, C, D, and E reports the summary of the factor loadings for the mutual funds' return. sig.(%) 
indicates the percentage of funds have significant loadings on the  factors. positive sig. (%) denotes the 
percentage of funds which have positively significant loadings on the factors. negative sig. (%) indicates 
the percentage of funds which have negatively significant loadings on the factors. Mean(Adj R2) is the 
average adjusted R-squared statistics. 
Panel A, Model performance measures    









      
Three-factor 2.64*** 0.017 1.25 0.91       
Five-factor 2.61*** 0.017 1.24 0.84       
STR 2.65*** 0.015 1.09 0.23       
STR SO 2.64*** 0.015 1.10 0.34       
STR SO IO 2.66*** 0.016 1.17 0.59       
Panel B, Summary factor loadings of the three-factor model    
 Int Mkt SMB HML RMW CMA STR SO IO Mean(Adj R
2) 
Mean -0.01 0.67 0.10 -0.23      58.76% 
Mean (t-statistics) -0.61 65.94 2.32 -4.93       
positive sig. (%) 2.01 50.00 28.41 5.72       
negative sig. (%) 4.72 0.00 7.63 32.13       
sig. (%) 6.73 50.00 36.04 37.85       
Panel C, Summary factor loadings of the five-factor model    
Mean -0.01 0.67 0.15 -0.25 0.15 -0.15    59.39% 
Mean (t-statistics) -0.68 60.80 3.85 -5.51 3.32 -2.43     
positive sig. (%) 1.51 49.90 31.93 4.32 29.82 6.22     
negative sig. (%) 5.12 0.00 5.92 33.33 1.91 27.81     
sig. (%) 6.63 49.90 37.85 37.65 31.73 34.04     
Panel D, Summary factor loadings of the eight-factor model    
Mean -0.01 0.65 0.10 -0.20 0.06 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.26 60.29% 
Mean (t-statistics) -0.57 58.65 2.01 -4.09 1.09 -1.53 -1.40 0.15 6.26  
positive sig. (%) 1.61 49.90 26.51 5.92 13.96 7.03 3.51 12.65 36.35  
negative sig. (%) 5.22 0.00 6.33 30.72 3.61 22.49 18.57 11.04 2.51  




Summary statistics of factor monthly returns: 07/2004-12/2017, 162 months. 
   Mkt is the value-weighted market portfolio return of all A-shares (include Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Main Board, SMEB and GEM stocks) in excess of risk-free rate. At the end of June, all A-shares are 
assigned to two Size groups using the median market cap of all A-shares excluding GEM stocks as the 
breakpoint. Stocks are also allocated independently to three B/M, OP and Inv groups (Low, Neutral and 
High) using the 30th and 70th percentile of all A-shares excluding GEM stocks. The intersections of 
Size and other variable groups produce 6 (2 × 3) value-weighted Size-B/M, Size-OP, and Size-Inv 
portfolios, SL, SN, SH, BL, BN, and BH, where S and B denote for small and big portfolio, and L, N 
and H indicate low, neutral and high characteristic portfolios.  SMB is the average of SMBB/M, SMBOP, 
SMBInv, and SMBIO, where SMBB/Mis the average of the returns on the three small stock portfolios of 6 
Size-B/M portfolios minus the average returns on the three big stock portfolios of 6 Size-B/M portfolios, 
SMBB/M= (SL+SN+SH)/3-(BL+BN+BH)/3. SMBOP, SMBInv, and SMBIO are constructed in the same 
way, except for the OP, Inv and IO variables. HML is the average return on the two high B/M portfolios 
of 6 Size-B/M portfolios minus the average return of the two low B/M portfolios of 6 Size-B/M portfolios, 
HML=(SH+BH)/2-(SL+BL)/2. RMW, CMA and IO are constructed in a same way using 6 Size-OP, 6 
Size-Inv and 6 Size-IO portfolios, except 6 Size-IO portfolios are constructed twice a year at the end of 
June and December. MOM is average return on the two high past cumulative return portfolios of 6 Size-
MOM portfolios minus the average return of the two low past cumulative return portfolios of 6 Size-
MOM portfolios. STR is average return on the two low past cumulative return portfolios of 6 Size-STR 
portfolios minus the average return of the two high past cumulative return portfolios 6 Size-STR 
portfolios. Size-MOM portfolios (Size-STR portfolios) are constructed monthly formed on past 
cumulative return between month t-12 to t-2 (t-1 to t-1) and Size at month t-1. SO factors are based on 
6 Size-SO portfolios formed on state ownership (Zero, Low and High) using the 30th and 70th percentile 
of percent state ownership of all A-shares excluding GEM stocks as breakpoints. SONML=(SZ+BZ)/2-
(SL+BL)/2, SOLMH=(SL+BL)/2-(SH+BH)/2, SONMH=(SZ+BZ)/2-(SH+BH)/2, where Z, L, and H 
indicate zero, low and high percent state ownership portfolios. Panel A shows average monthly percent 
returns (Mean), the standard deviations of monthly returns (Std dev.), the t-statistics and Sharpe Ratio 
for the average returns. Panel B shows the correlation between each factor. 
Panel A, Averages, standard deviations, t-statistics and Sharpe ratio for daily factor return 
  Mkt SMB HML RMW CMA MOM STR SOLMH SONMH SONML IO 
Mean 1.18 0.89 0.02 0.06 0.10 -0.29 1.21 0.08 0.24 0.16 0.19 
Std Dev. 8.72 5.12 3.07 3.50 2.22 3.75 4.06 1.55 1.91 1.45 2.06 
t-Statistic 1.72 2.20 0.08 0.23 0.60 -0.99 3.80 0.66 1.61 1.41 1.17 
Sharpe Ratio 0.11 0.13 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 0.25 -0.09 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
Panel B, Correlation between factors  
 Mkt SMB HML RMW CMA MOM STR SOLMH SONMH SONML IO 
Mkt 1.00           
SMB 0.12 1.00          
HML 0.05 -0.54 1.00         
RMW -0.35 -0.74 0.21 1.00        
CMA 0.09 0.44 0.08 -0.72 1.00       
MOM -0.17 -0.06 -0.17 0.29 -0.20 1.00      
STR 0.01 0.31 -0.21 -0.23 0.06 -0.25 1.00     
SOLMH -0.06 0.26 -0.18 -0.19 0.18 -0.06 0.06 1.00    
SONMH -0.15 0.50 -0.40 -0.23 0.18 0.09 0.00 0.67 1.00   
SONML -0.13 0.38 -0.33 -0.10 0.04 0.17 -0.06 -0.19 0.60 1.00  




Factor spanning regression: 07/2004-12/2017, 162 months. 
  This table reports the results of regressions of a selected factor on all the other factors. The construction 
of factors is in Table 10. The t-statistics are in brackets. 
  Int Mkt SMB HML STR SONMH IO R2 
Mkt 1.15  0.58 0.30 -0.15 -1.27 0.03 0.09  
[1.57] [3.14] [0.99] [-0.86] [-3.02] [0.08] 
 
SMB 0.44 0.10  -0.77 0.20 0.96 -0.68 0.53  
[1.43] [3.14] [-6.83] [2.68] [5.83] [-4.48] 
 
HML 0.55 0.02 -0.30  -0.10 -0.19 -0.63 0.49  
[2.94] [0.99] [-6.83] [-2.22] [-1.71] [-7.19] 
 
STR 1.25 -0.03 0.22 -0.29  -0.48 -0.42 0.17  
[4.05] [-0.86] [2.68] [-2.22] [-2.55] [-2.52] 
 
SONMH 0.23 -0.04 0.19 -0.10 -0.08  0.02 0.34  
[1.68] [-3.02] [5.83] [-1.71] [-2.55] [0.31] 
 
IO 0.45 0.00 -0.17 -0.39 -0.09 0.03  0.29  




Table 3.11.2  
Factor spanning regression including CMA and RMW: 07/2004-12/2017, 162 months. 
  This table reports the results of regressions of a selected factor on all the other factors. The construction 
of factors is in Table 10. The t-statistics are in brackets. 
 Int Mkt SMB HML RMW CMA STR SONMH IO R2 
Mkt 1.93  -0.32 0.46 -2.34 -1.63 -0.12 -0.64 0.72 0.28  
[2.93] [-1.37] [1.65] [-6.46] [-3.89] [-0.73] [-1.65] [1.92] 
 
SMB 0.67 -0.04  -0.42 -1.01 -0.14 0.14 0.65 0.11 0.76  
[2.98] [-1.37] [-4.59] [-8.95] [-0.96] [2.55] [5.26] [0.88] 
 
HML 0.42 0.04 -0.29  0.19 0.43 -0.08 -0.21 -0.55 0.53  
[2.22] [1.65] [-4.59] [1.67] [3.59] [-1.70] [-1.92] [-5.57] 
 
RMW 0.44 -0.09 -0.34 0.09  -0.67 0.00 0.15 0.30 0.83  
[3.41] [-6.46] [-8.95] [1.67] [-9.93] [0.09] [2.00] [4.31] 
 
CMA 0.26 -0.05 -0.04 0.18 -0.58  -0.03 0.10 0.00 0.63  
[2.11] [-3.89] [-0.96] [3.59] [-9.93] [-1.17] [1.37] [-0.06] 
 
STR 1.23 -0.03 0.29 -0.24 0.02 -0.26  -0.47 -0.50 0.19  
[3.81] [-0.73] [2.55] [-1.70] [0.09] [-1.17] [-2.48] [-2.72] 
 
SONMH 0.15 -0.03 0.24 -0.11 0.17 0.12 -0.08  -0.03 0.36  
[1.05] [-1.65] [5.26] [-1.92] [2.00] [1.37] [-2.48] [-0.33] 
 
IO 0.21 0.03 0.04 -0.31 0.35 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03  0.42  





Summary test statistics of three-, five-factor models, and the models with added factors for 25 (5 × 5) 
VW portfolios: 07/2004-12/2017, 162 months. 
  This table reports the ability of the three-, five-factor models, and the models with added factors to 
explain monthly excess returns on the 25 (5 × 5) VW portfolios. Thee three-factor model is Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model including Mkt, SMB and HML, and the five-factor model is Fama and 
French (2015) five-factor model including Mkt, SMB, HML, RMW and CMA. Panel A(B) reports the 
test summary statistics when three-factor model (five-factor model) is the bassline model; STR indicates 
the model where STR is added to the three-factor (five-factor) model; STR SO indicates the model 
where STR and SO are added to the three-factor (five-factor) model; STR SO IO indicates the model 
where STR, SO and IO are added to the three-factor (five-factor) model. The GRS statistic tests whether 




 denotes for the ratio of average absolute value of regression intercept 𝑎𝑖 over average 





 is the average squared 
intercept over the over the average squared value of ?̅?𝑖, corrected for sampling error in the numerator 
and denominator. 
Panel A, Three-factor model as the baseline model  Panel B, Five-factor model as the baseline model 



















 25 Size-B/M portfolios 
Three-factor 2.09*** 0.275 0.61 0.42  Five-factor 1.91** 0.264 0.59 0.48 
STR 2.31*** 0.276 0.61 0.41  STR 2.03*** 0.272 0.61 0.47 
STR SO 2.26*** 0.265 0.59 0.36  STR SO 2.05*** 0.268 0.60 0.45 
STR SO IO 2.01*** 0.267 0.59 0.40  STR SO IO 2.00*** 0.272 0.60 0.47 
 25 Size-OP portfolios 
Three-factor 3.18*** 0.349 0.82 0.79  Five-factor 2.80*** 0.281 0.66 0.49 
STR 3.20*** 0.346 0.81 0.81  STR 2.72*** 0.280 0.65 0.47 
STR SO 3.26*** 0.331 0.77 0.73  STR SO 2.88*** 0.284 0.66 0.47 
STR SO IO 2.78*** 0.303 0.71 0.55  STR SO IO 2.78*** 0.292 0.68 0.49 
 25 Size-Inv portfolios 
Three-factor 2.37*** 0.312 0.66 0.47  Five-factor 2.29*** 0.281 0.60 0.40 
STR 2.37*** 0.316 0.67 0.46  STR 2.19*** 0.282 0.60 0.40 
STR SO 2.46*** 0.294 0.62 0.39  STR SO 2.31*** 0.272 0.58 0.37 
STR SO IO 2.18*** 0.279 0.59 0.34  STR SO IO 2.23*** 0.273 0.58 0.36 
 25 Size-IO portfolios 
Three-factor 1.47* 0.261 0.65 0.35  Five-factor 1.21 0.206 0.52 0.16 
STR 1.60** 0.273 0.69 0.42  STR 1.19 0.218 0.55 0.22 
STR SO 1.67** 0.261 0.65 0.40  STR SO 1.30 0.218 0.55 0.23 
STR SO IO 1.34 0.225 0.56 0.18  STR SO IO 1.25 0.214 0.54 0.18 
 25 Size-STR portfolios 
Three-factor 3.57*** 0.530 0.76 0.83  Five-factor 3.15*** 0.548 0.78 0.89 
STR 2.98*** 0.374 0.53 0.36  STR 2.54*** 0.365 0.52 0.32 
STR SO 2.82*** 0.361 0.52 0.33  STR SO 2.48*** 0.358 0.51 0.31 






Summary statistics of the institutional ownership data. 
  This table reports the summary statistics of the institutional ownership data. N indicates the number of 
A-shares which have institutional ownership data; Mean is the average percent institutional ownership 
of the sample; Median is the median percent institutional ownership of the sample; Min and Max are the 
minimum and maximum percent institutional ownership of the sample. 
Year/month N Mean Median Min Max 
2003/06 918 6.85% 2.18% 0.03% 86.71% 
2003/12 921 7.34% 2.47% 0.03% 88.90% 
2004/06 997 7.79% 2.79% 0.03% 88.01% 
2004/12 955 8.85% 3.17% 0.03% 88.37% 
2005/06 954 9.04% 3.30% 0.04% 87.16% 
2005/12 961 9.32% 4.03% 0.04% 87.40% 
2006/06 1012 9.06% 4.45% 0.03% 85.94% 
2006/12 1061 9.51% 4.71% 0.09% 86.77% 
2007/06 1140 9.53% 5.02% 0.00% 85.64% 
2007/12 1149 9.77% 5.54% 0.00% 85.77% 
2008/06 1156 9.49% 5.24% 0.07% 84.91% 
2008/12 1120 9.63% 5.42% 0.00% 83.29% 
2009/06 1183 8.99% 5.08% 0.06% 83.91% 
2009/12 1357 8.44% 5.03% 0.05% 84.76% 
2010/06 1569 8.32% 5.12% 0.05% 85.31% 
2010/12 1730 8.08% 5.14% 0.07% 85.66% 
2011/06 1934 7.16% 4.32% 0.02% 84.76% 
2011/12 2039 7.09% 4.34% 0.00% 86.62% 
2012/06 2118 6.47% 3.61% 0.03% 88.34% 
2012/12 2160 6.37% 3.28% 0.05% 87.89% 
2013/06 2004 6.86% 3.77% 0.04% 87.56% 
2013/12 2024 6.96% 3.93% 0.05% 86.62% 
2014/06 2107 6.77% 3.70% 0.05% 86.31% 
2014/12 2340 6.53% 3.78% 0.03% 85.95% 
2015/06 2600 6.37% 4.17% 0.03% 83.16% 
2015/12 2596 6.38% 4.24% 0.03% 87.48% 
2016/06 2642 6.40% 4.06% 0.05% 88.13% 
2016/12 2765 6.60% 4.37% 0.00% 86.13% 





Summary statistics of the state ownership data. 
This table reports the summary statistics of the companies which have state ownership (SO) data. N 
denotes the number of firm which have SO data. N(=0) and N(>0) indicates the number of firms have 
SO equal or larger than zero. Mean, Median, Min and Max indicate the average, median, minimum and 
maximum value, respectively, of the percent state ownership of the firms with non-zero SO. Note that 
0.00% indicates it is close but not equal to zero. 
Year/month N N(=0) N(>0) Mean Median Min Max 
        Among stocks with SO>0 
2003/12 1263 258 1005 45.33% 49.18% 0.12% 85.00% 
2004/12 1353 293 1060 44.17% 47.75% 0.00% 85.00% 
2005/12 1351 307 1044 42.93% 46.02% 0.09% 84.99% 
2006/12 1432 345 1087 37.68% 40.18% 0.02% 84.44% 
2007/12 1548 469 1079 36.04% 36.94% 0.02% 91.48% 
2008/12 1602 581 1021 34.33% 34.34% 0.02% 97.12% 
2009/12 1751 1060 691 32.36% 31.39% 0.01% 89.78% 
2010/12 2107 1449 658 28.80% 24.16% 0.01% 89.78% 
2011/12 2341 1773 568 25.77% 18.55% 0.00% 84.71% 
2012/12 2470 1986 484 26.60% 19.94% 0.00% 85.68% 
2013/12 2514 2063 451 21.51% 13.39% 0.00% 92.19% 
2014/12 2631 2135 496 19.79% 9.89% 0.00% 92.19% 
2015/12 2823 2289 534 17.41% 8.62% 0.00% 81.39% 




Comparison of our five factors with CSMAR's five factor, 07/01/1994 to 12/29/2017, 5714 trading days. 
  This table reports a comparison between our five-factors and those available from China Stock Market 
& Accounting Research database (CSMAR). The construction of our factors is in Table 4. Mean is the 
average percent daily return of the factors. Median is the median of the percent daily return of the factors. 
Std dev. is the daily standard deviation of the factors. Correlation is the correlation coefficient between 
our factors and those retrieved from CSMAR. 
 Mkt SMB HML RMW CMA 
 CSMAR Ours CSMAR Ours CSMAR Ours CSMAR Ours CSMAR Ours 
Mean 0.122 0.059 0.046 0.036 0.022 0.006 -0.005 0.000 0.012 0.007 
Median 0.095 0.098 0.077 0.070 -0.003 -0.022 -0.027 -0.014 0.006 0.008 
Std dev. 2.098 2.001 0.770 0.722 0.618 0.605 0.658 0.761 0.594 0.532 
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